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The recent decades have witnessed cross-border M&As becoming dominant in the 
worldwide FDI flows, which is driven by both the needs and desire of private firms to 
enhance their international competitiveness and the ongoing removal or relaxation of 
restrictions on FDI by many host countries. However, like any other forms of FDI, cross-
border M&As may bring both benefits and costs to host economies. Concerns have even 
been expressed that FDI entry through cross-border M&As is less beneficial, if not 
positively harmful, for economic development than the greenfield investments. This 
provides a rationale for policy intervention by host governments to ensure that their 
economies benefit from these transactions. This thesis attempts to convey an overview of 
various legal responses of host countries to the inward FDI in the mode of cross-border 
M&As, with a further introduction and discussion of China’s legal framework governing 
these transactions.  
 
The host country’s regulation of cross-border M&As starts at the entry stage. In most 
developing countries and some developed countries, FDI screening mechanism plays a 
major role in regulating foreign acquirers’ entry; even in countries with no screening for 
FDI in general, cross-border M&As are still singled out for review before they could be 
substantively implemented. In addition, virtually all countries use industry policies, i.e. 
prohibiting or restricting foreign ownership, to control the incidence of cross-border 
M&As in their key industries.  
Entry regulations alone are obviously not enough to optimize the impacts of cross-border 
M&As on host economies. In the developed world where cross-border M&As are mostly 
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carried out through capital markets, the focus of their M&A regimes is to protect the 
interests of shareholders and the order and efficiency of capital markets; in most 
developing countries, on the other hand, host governments are more concerned with how 
to regulate these M&A transactions so that the foreign investments involved in them can 
be more beneficial to serve their economy development objectives. 
 
For most host economies, the most important negative effect of cross-border M&As may 
be the competition concern. However, the FDI-related nature of these transactions, which 
may produce complex effects on a host-country’s market structure and competition, poses 
a great challenge to the traditional merger control regimes. Host governments, especially 
those of developing countries, have to balance the competition costs of cross-border 
M&As against the economic gains from the FDI involved therein. 
 
The development of cross-border M&As in developing countries are different in style and 
substance from that in the developed world. Being the largest developing country and 
world’s largest FDI recipient which has recently become a WTO member, China has a 
good reason to anticipate a boom in cross-border M&As in the near future, and therefore 
has started lately its construction of legal framework governing these transactions. 
Despite the substantial progress, there are still many problems and weaknesses in such 
framework, which have hindered the development of cross-border M&As in China.  The 
government is expected to continue its effort in legal reform and eventually create a legal 
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The dramatic increase of foreign direct investment (FDI) all around the world is regarded 
as one of the driving forces behind the expansion of international production and the 
further speeding up of globalization. Over the last decade of 20th century, such increase 
has been mainly realized via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (cross-border M&As). 
Although both FDI flows and cross-border M&As declined at global level from the outset 
of this century because of the slow growth of world economy as a whole as well as the 
bleak prospects for recovery,1 the trend of international investment towards cross-border 
M&A transactions becomes even more apparent. In 1982, cross-border M&As accounted 
only for a negligible share of total FDI outflows; by 1990 they already amounted to 
US$151 billion, 64.8 per cent of total global FDI outflows; and in 2001, despite the 
plunge from 2000, they stood at US$601 billion, 81.8 per cent of global FDI outflows. 2 
The speed and patterns of the changes in the global market for firms, goods and services 
brought about by globalization have both required and encouraged firms that wish to 
remain competitive, internationally or domestically, to restructure and expand their 
                                                 
1  For detailed data, see United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  World 
Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspective 
[hereinafter UNCTAD WIR 2003] 
2 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Investment Policy Reviews – 
China: Progress and Reform Challenges, 2003, pp.148 
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business for more efficiency gains from synergy, bigger size or stronger market power. 
As the temporary recessions of global economy at present are unlikely to prevent the 
progress of globalization, it is believed that cross-border M&As, which may offer firms a 
quick and attractive solution to generate efficiency and enhance global competitiveness, 
will keep on dominating the worldwide FDI flows, at least in the developed world.  
Data from the UNCTAD indicate that despite the dominant position of greenfield 
investments before the falling of FDI in the last three years, both number and value of the 
FDI associated with cross-border M&As in developing countries and economies in 
transition were showing a steady rise. 3 This suggests the increasingly important role that 
these countries are playing in the scene of international M&A market.  
Many developing countries and transition economies are currently in the process of 
industry restructuring, privatizing or transforming their economic structures. As most of 
them are in lack of domestic financial resources, under many circumstances, foreign 
investment in the form of cross-border M&A is the only realistic way for these host 
countries to deal with their given situation. It is therefore understandable that many 
countries traditionally viewing cross-border M&As unfavorably are now inclined to 
accept them as an effective means to globalize and restructure their economies. 
Meanwhile, there is a very strong revealed preference on the part of multinational 
corporations – the main forces of international investors most of which are from 
industrial world – to enter countries by the M&A route.4 As the recent decline of FDI 
                                                                                                                                                 
For detailed data of recent trends in FDI and Cross-border M&As, please refer to H. Christiansen and A. 
Bertrand, Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment, OECD, June 2003, also available 
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/11/2958722.pdf 
3  For detailed data, see UNCTAD  World Investment Report 2000:  Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions and Developments [hereinafter UNCTAD WIR 2000] 
4 For further explanation for the increasing preference of many multinational corporations to cross-border 
M&As, please refer to pp.17, Section B, Internal motivations.   
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flows has given further impetus to the intensification of competition among developing 
host countries for inward foreign investments, more opportunities will be opened up for 
the growth of cross-border M&As within their territories.  
The fact that so many cross-border M&As have occurred in developed world rather than 
in developing countries partly reveals that merger activities are primarily associated with 
the strong capital market and strong economy. Apart from these economic factors, the 
different regulatory responses to cross-border M&As from host countries may also 
account for the uneven development of these transactions all around the world.  
In developed countries such as the US, the UK and the EC, either the largest target 
country or the largest acquirer where cross-border M&As are commonplace, the 
regulatory framework governing these transactions has been well developed, creating a 
largely free environment for cross-border M&As, with certain regulatory controls under 
competition laws. The legal environments in these countries are regarded as conducive to 
cross-border M&As because of their maturity and sophistication to deal with various 
situations that may emerge during the transactions.  
On the other hand, in most developing countries whose domestic firms are mostly 
acquired parties in cross-border M&As, the protectionist backlash against liberalizing the 
restraints on these transactions is still prevailing in their law-making, manifesting itself in 
various restrictive regulations such as exchange control, FDI screening and industry 
policies. Besides, the lack of competition laws and the inexperience in dealing with cross-
border M&As have led to various deficiencies in their M&A regimes, which also pose 
additional risks for carrying out such transactions in these countries.  
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As the largest developing country, China has been such an influential economy in both 
developing and developed world that merits a special attention. 5  While it is well 
acknowledged that so far China has been highly successful in attracting FDI, and has 
made significant progress in improving its FDI legislation, cross-border M&As, which 
are taking the lead in the contribution to the increase of worldwide production, account 
for no more than 10 percent of total inwards FDI flows in China.6  
The underdevelopment of cross-border M&As in China is attributable to a wide range of 
factors, among which the immature and restrictive legal framework has proved a 
formidable obstacle. Fortunately the Chinese government has been increasingly aware 
that its legal environment hinders the development of cross-border M&As, which limits 
the China’s potential to realize a greater amount of FDI inflows. This can be reflected in 
the ongoing legal reform, which receives impetus mainly from the government’s 
economic development objectives, as well as China’s obligations under various 






                                                 
5 It is worth notice that FDI in Asia and the Pacific declined the least in the developing world because of 
China, which became the world’s biggest recipient of FDI with an inward flow of $53 billion. For detailed 
statistics, refer to WIR 2000.    
6 In 2000, the value of foreign M&As of Chinese enterprises was US$225 million, accounting for 5.5% of 
the total FDI inflows in China the same year; in 2001, it was US$235 million, accounting for 5.0% of FDI 
inflows; in 2002, it was US$207 million, which only accounted for 3.9%. Data from The Policies, Issues 
and Studies suggested for the Mergers and Acquisitions by Foreign Investors of Domestic Enterprises, A 
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A. Merger and Acquisition 
 
The terms “merger” and “acquisition” do not have identical definitions all around the 
world. An example is that “takeover” is often used to represent “acquisition”, and 
“takeover bid” is equivalent to what is called “tender offer” in the US, with no substantial 
difference between them. It is also possible that the same term can be used to describe 
different forms of transactions in different jurisdictions. Besides, there have been 
numerous literature defining merger and acquisition  for their own purposes.  It is 
therefore necessary to clarify some basic definitions here in order to avoid confusions in 
the subsequent discussion.  
Broadly speaking, a merger can be defined as any business transaction whereby several 
independent companies become vested in, or under the control of, one company (which 
may or may not be one of the original companies), and the original participating parties 
may or may not cease to exist. 7 In this sense, a merger may be effected through an 
acquisition, or a combination among companies of equal positions. Such activities are 
usually divided into subgroups based on the relationship between the surviving company 
and the original merging parties. The company that continues operating after the merger 
can either be the acquiring company assuming all assets and liabilities of the merged 
company (or companies) which has ceased to exist (statutory merger), or a new entity 
which is formed jointly by the original parties that cease to exist (consolidation), or 
                                                                                                                                                 
report prepared by the Policy Research Department, Ministry of Commerce (the MOFCOM) of PRC, and 
China Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (AITEC), 2003. 
7 Weinberg and Blank Take-overs and Mergers, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003 para.1-1004   
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become the parent company of the merged company (subsidiary merger). 8 In the case of 
subsidiary merger, the acquiring company may be satisfied with a corporate control based 
on shareholding and may wish to retain the legal existence of the acquired company. In a 
narrow sense, however, a merger only includes the statutory merger and consolidation, in 
which cases all participating parties are merged into the surviving company.9 
As to acquisition, it generally means a transaction or series of transactions whereby part 
of or all the assets or shares of a company are purchased by another company from the 
sole or main owner of the former. A purchase of more than a half of a company’s shares 
may also be termed a take-over.10  
An acquisition can be effected through either assets acquisition or shares acquisition. In 
the assets acquisition, the acquiring company purchases all, or substantially all, of the 
assets of the target company, leaving the latter a mere corporate shell to dissolve. In the 
shares acquisition, referred to as take-over in many European countries, the purchase of 
all or substantially all of the outstanding stocks of a company by another company would 
take place. The target company generally becomes a subsidiary of, or is merged into, the 
acquiring company. 11 Usually, a take-over (or a shares acquisition) can be achieved: 12 
                                                 
8In some European countries, such as in Germany and UK, the mergers in the sense of corporate fusion are 
not allowed. That is, merger usually means a share-for-share transaction, and will mostly bring about a 
subsidiary merger. See Edited by Meredith M. Brown International Merger and Acquisition: An 
Introduction, Kluwer Law International 1999, pp.45-46. 
9  Norbert Horn, Cross-border Merger and Acquisition and the Law: An Introduction, Studies in 
Transnational Economic Law Vol.15 Kluwer Law International 2001, pp.4 
10  Ibid. In Weinberg and Blank, supra  note 6, a take-over is defined as a transaction or series of 
transactions in which “a person (individual, group of individuals or company) acquires control over the 
assets of a company, either directly by becoming the owner of those assets or indirectly by obtaining 
control of the management of the company.” See para.1-1002. 
11 Angela Schneeman The Law of Corporations, Partnerships, and Sole Proprietorships, Delmar Publishers 
1997, pp.367-394 
12 Weinberg and Blank, supra note 7,  para.1-1003 
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(1) by buying shares in the target company with the agreement of all its member (if the 
shares of target company are closed held, i.e. held by only a few person) or of only its 
controllers; 
(2) by purchases on the Stock Exchange;  
(3) by means of a takeover bid; or 
(4) by purchase of new shares. 
 
In most European countries, distinctions between mergers and acquisitions are made 
based on the relative size of the merging companies as well as the forms in which the 
transactions are completed: mergers are normally taking place between companies with 
equal size, which are to be combined into a single business, while acquisitions (or 
takeovers) are defined as the purchases of shares by larger company of the smaller ones. 
In comparison, the size factor is almost disregarded in the US. Moreover, both asset and 
share acquisitions are deemed to “mere purchase”, i.e. non-statutory transactions, despite 
the fact that acquisitions may produce the economic effects very similar to those of 
statutory mergers.13 
 
B. Cross-Border Merger and Acquisition  
 
Based on the nationalities of the transacting parties, M&A transactions can be divided 
into two categories: domestic M&As (where participating parties are of same nationality) 
and cross-border M&As (where participating parties come from different countries). In a 
cross-border merger, the assets and operations of two (or more) firms belonging to two 
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(or more) different countries are combined to establish a new legal entity. In a cross-
border acquisition, the control of assets and operations is transferred from local to a 
foreign company, the former becoming an affiliate of the latter. 14  
However, it makes little practical sense to make difference between cross-border merger 
and cross-border acquisition when both of them are deemed to be a mode of FDI entry. 
They are likely to be treated similarly because there is no evidence showing substantive 
differences between mergers and acquisitions in terms of their economic effects. And in 
practice, the data on M&As show that less than 3 percent of cross-border M&As by 
number are mergers, indicating that cross-border M&A transactions are, by and large, 
“cross-border acquisitions”.15   
Accordingly, in the subsequent discussions, “cross-border M&A” will be used as a whole 
to mean the transactions where operating enterprises merge with or acquire control of the 
whole or a part of the business of other enterprises, with parties of different national 
origins or home countries. 16  Besides, the terms used in the scenes of FDI apply to cross-
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Angela Schneeman, supra note 11 
14 UNCTAD  WIR 2000,  pp.99   It should be noted that the transnational nature of these transactions are 
determined by the locations of the companies involved and the company laws applying to these companies. 
15 Ibid, and the similar conclusion was also reached by some others, for example, OECD   New patterns of 
industrial globalization: cross-border mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances 2001, pp.20: “…in 
terms of number of deals, acquisition of assets is the most frequent mode, accounting for more than half of 
cross-border M&As worldwide over the period, while acquisition of stock and mergers account for 35% 
and 15%, respectively.”  
These results can probably be attributed to, among others, that cross-border merger are often subject to a 
more stringent and complicated restriction and formalities. In most European countries, such as the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, cross-border mergers taking their companies as targets 
are legally impossible; in the US, merger statutes in some state do not permit the surviving company to be 
“foreign”, while some others prohibit mergers between companies whose businesses are substantially 
different. See Remi J. Turcon Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, Sweet & Maxwell 1993, 
pp.141 
16 OECD, supra note 15, pp.14 
 9
border M&As as well, -- e.g. the country of the acquirer or purchaser is the “home 
country” and the country of the target or acquired form is the “host country”. 17 
 
III.Categories of M&As 
 
Cross-border M&As are often classified for different purposes. According to the 
relationship between the parties to the transactions, there are horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate M&As, each of which raises different competition concerns; based on the 
attitude of the target company’s management or board of directors, M&As could be 
classified as friendly or hostile, which would decide if the acquiring company has the 
opportunity to access the target company’s detailed financial information; there are also 
majority or minority M&As depending on the equity share of foreign firms, reflecting 
whether the acquiring firm proposes to fully control the target company. The following of 
this section is a survey of some classifications of cross-border M&As, with their own 
policy implications. 
 
A. Horizontal, Vertical and Conglomerate M&As 
 
a. Horizontal M&A   
An M&A is horizontal if it happens between companies at the same level of the 
production chain which are producing or providing essentially the same products or 
                                                 
17 UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.99 
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services, or products or services that compete directly with each other.18  Horizontal 
M&As have grown rapidly recently. According to World Invest Report 2000, 70 percent 
of the value of cross-border M&As are horizontal in 1999 compared to 59 percent 10 
years ago. The rise of horizontal M&As can be attributed to the global restructuring of 
many industries in response to the increasingly intensified competition as a result of 
technology changes and liberalization. By jointing together of their resources, the 
merging companies aim to achieve synergies and often greater market power.19  
As horizontal M&As may result directly in the reduction in the number of competing 
companies in the given market, they are very likely to raise the concerns regarding 
market concentration or dominant power of the firms, which are the very subjects of 
antitrust reviews by relevant regulators. 
 
b. Vertical M&A     
This type of M&A takes place between two companies, one of which is an actual or 
potential supplier of goods or services to the other. In other words, the two merging 
parties are both engaged in the manufacture or provision of the same goods or services 
but at different stages.20 The participating parties to vertical M&As usually seek to ensure 
a source of supply or an outlet for products or services, so as to improve efficiency by 
reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs.21 
Vertical M&As also cause anti-competitive effects when the competitors of the merging 
companies find themselves deprived of the opportunities to access part of their actual or 
                                                 
18  Weinberg and Blank supra note 7, para.1-1008, a typical example of this type is the Vodafone-
AirTouch’s acquisition of Mannesmann in telecommunications. 
19 UNCTAD   WIR 2000 pp.101 
20 Weinberg and Blank supra note 7, para.1-1008 
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potential markets. However, as vertical M&As stay below 10 percent of the total cross-
border M&A transactions, they are often of less importance than horizontal M&As.22 
 
c. Conglomerate M&A   
A conglomerate M&A involves the combination of companies in unrelated activities, i.e. 
the business of the two companies are not related to each other horizontally or vertically. 
Companies seeking to a conglomerate often aim to diversity risk and deepen economies 
of scope. This type of M&As usually do not raise serious anti-competitive problems. And 
they have been diminished in importance since firms have more and more focused on 
their corn business to enhance their abilities to cope with the intensifying international 
competition, which would be better achieved through horizontal or vertical M&As.23 
 
B. Some other classifications 
 
(a). Cross-border M&As can be categorized based on what acquiring firms are seeking, 
which can either be short-term financial gains, or long-term strategic achievements. 
Whether the acquiring company in an M&A transaction is searching for the dominant 
position in the market of host economy, or efficiency gains through synergies, or mere 
risk diversification are strongly related to the potential impacts of this transaction on the 
host economy. The motivations of acquiring companies are therefore of great 
significance to host countries which always wish to avoid undesirable effects and bring 
foreign M&A activities into line with their development objectives. 
                                                                                                                                                 
21 UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.101 
22 Ibid. 
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(b).  A company may acquire 100 percent of the shares of a target company (full or 
outright M&A), or less than 100 percent but more than and 50 percent (majority M&A), 
or 10 percent up to 50 percent (minority M&A), or less than 10 percent (portfolio M&A). 
Generally, unless otherwise specified, the cross-border M&As in the present discussion 
include only the first three, which are regulated mainly as a mode of FDI entry.  
At the global level, full M&As as well as majority M&As account for more than 85 
percent of the cross-border M&As, in terms of value and number.24 In contrast, minority 
M&As by foreign firms account for one-thirds in most developing countries, whereas in 
developed countries there are only less than one-fifth. This reflects a more restrictive 
control over full and majority M&As by foreign firms in developing countries than those 











                                                                                                                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 OECD  supra note 15, pp.23-24 
25 UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.99-101 
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THE FEATURES OF CROSS-BORDER M&As 
 
Being an FDI entry mode, cross-border M&As possess almost all general characteristics 
of foreign investments. However, it is essential to note that compared to greenfield 
investment, there are several features that are exclusive to cross-border M&As. A 
thorough understanding of these features is necessary, because these transactions have 
produced a number of special legal and practical problems to regulators in host countries. 
For such purpose, this chapter firstly reviews and summarizes the main driving forces of 
cross-border M&As, and proceeds to examine the features of each participant in a 
transaction, with emphasis on various interests needed to be protected and how they may 
affect the consummation of a transaction. 
 
I. The Driving Forces behind Cross-Border M&As    
 
One important aspect for understanding cross-border M&As is to examine the motives 
driving the deals (H.D. Hopkins, 1999). The time-honored motives driving FDI can only 
partly explain the current spate of cross-border M&As, such as the “OLI paradigm” 
(Dunning, 1993), the use of which requires proper adaptation to meet new situations.26 
Most of the recent efforts on this topic highlight the unique role of the ongoing process of 
globalization. The rapid changes throughout the world brought about by globalization, 
covering economic, technological, political, and more important, policy and regulatory 
aspects, have provided new opportunities as well as challenges to the participants in the 
 14
global market. 27  To respond, firms have to adjust their corporate strategies at both 
domestic and international level and take corresponding measures to defend and enhance 
their competitive positions, which in turn further a greater degree of globalization. It is 
the dynamic interaction between the rapid changing environment in which firms are 
operating and the inherent motives of firms to pursue more competitive advantages that 
has facilitated the growth of international M&As. Based on this conclusion, the driving 
forces behind cross-border M&As, which may vary among countries and industries and 
change over time, can be loosely grouped into external driving forces and internal 
motives of firms.   
 
A. External Driving Forces 
 
Generally speaking, the rapid changes that have accompanied the globalization have both 
facilitated and pushed companies to undertake cross-border M&As. A wide range of 
factors relating to economy, technology and government regulations have been observed 
to have affected the M&A behaviors of firms. 
 
a. Economic factors 
The economic factors fueling cross-border M&As can be considered from several 
standpoints. They may be divided into three broad categories: macroeconomic factors in 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 For the details of applying OLI paradigm (Ownership, Location and Internalization) into analysis of 
cross-border M&As, see UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.141-142 
27 UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.153 
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the environment, the condition of financial markets and sectoral changes occurring in 
particular industry areas.28  
At the macroeconomic level, the economic expansion in either home or host countries 
increases both the supply of and demand for cross-border M&As; at the industry level, in 
the sectors which are characteristic of intensified competition in global market, over-
capacity, and/or deregulation and rapid technological change, the imperative for 
industrial restructuring often forces firms to seek partners in order to exploit synergies 
and reduce costly overlaps, making cross-border M&As preferable to greenfield 
investment (Nam-Hoon Kang and Sara Johasson, 2000).    
On the other hand, slower economic growth does not always work against cross-border 
M&As. At present, in many Asian countries where financial crisis has resulted in a 
serious economic recession, inward M&As have been increasing owing to the falling 
asset prices and the changes in business practices, which create an environment more 
favorable to foreign merger and acquisition.29  
Moreover, the changes in the world capital markets such as the liberalization of capital 
movements, the growth of active market intermediaries and the emergence of new 
financial instruments have facilitated transnational M&As worldwide. And the rise of 
stock markets and ample liquidity in capital market,   which allow firms to raise large 
amounts of money, have given a further boost to cross-border M&A activities.30 However, 
it should be noted that the entry of foreign acquirers may also be encouraged by 
                                                 
28 Steven B. Wolitzer, testimony in the hearings before the International Competition Policy Advisory 
Commission, formed by the US Department of Justice to report and advise on the status of international 
competition and competition law, Nov. 3 1998. The transcript of this hearing is available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/2232-b.htm.  
29 OECD   supra note 15, pp.40 
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imperfection of host countries’ capital markets which could lead to the undervaluation of 
company assets (Gonzalez et al., 1998). 
 
b. Technological Factors 
Technological developments influence cross-border M&As in several ways. First of all, 
the falling of communication and transportation costs is favorable for the international 
expansion of firms through cross-border M&As. Secondly, the rapid technological 
changes have brought considerable pressures on firms that wish to maintain and enhance 
their competitive advantages in today’s knowledge-based economy,31 driving them to 
seek cooperation in the global market. Cross-border M&As are preferred as they can 
provide the fastest means to serve such needs. In addition, the technological development 
itself has also created new business and markets such as the communication and 
information related industries. This has also encouraged international M&As in that firms 
tend to capture new markets and establish the dominant position as fast as possible, 
especially those showing great potential of high and long-term profits. 
It is noted that technological factors are more related to the surge of cross-border M&As 
in the developed world. However, in many developing countries with relatively low level 
of technological development, the market potential for high-technology products are huge. 
Many multinational companies are willing to invest in these host countries for more 
market shares. Such investments are often in the form of cross-border M&As when 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 See UNCTAD WIR2000 pp.152-153. The result of a study made based on a simple gravity model shows 
that a 1% increase of the stock market to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.955% increase in across-border 
M&A activity (J. di Giovanni, 2002). 
31 According to Nam-Hoon Kang and Sara Johansson (2000), technological factors have pushed firms to 
conduct cross-border M&As by increasing the cost of research and development, or by rapidly changing 
competitive conditions and market structure. Besides, as the technology-related assets such as technical 
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taking into consideration the speed factor, provided that these developing countries are 
able to offer satisfactory protection for intellectual property.  
 
c. Regulatory Factors 
The adjustments made to many national legal frameworks as well as the governments’ 
efforts at international level have shown the tendency towards a more favorable policy 
and regulatory environment for cross-border M&As. 32  Liberalization of international 
capital movements and investments, coupled with new investment incentives, has 
promoted the rapid increase and spread of FDI, particularly cross-border M&As; 33 
privatization also contributes to cross-border M&A activities by increasing the 
availability of domestic firms for sale and opening up economies to the increased 
competition (UNCTAD, 2000; Nam-Hoon Kang and Sara Johasson, 2000); the 
integration of regional market, such as the formation of the European Community, has 
also facilitated cross-border M&As ( KJetil Bjorvatn, 2004)34. 
                                                                                                                                                 
competence and market know-how, flexibility and ability to innovate are increasingly becoming strategic, 
firms are forced to look for the fastest way to obtain and absorb such intangible strategic assets. 
32 Despite the overall trend towards the more liberalized regulatory landscape, a number of countries, 
developed or developing, have adopted various policy instruments to deal with cross-border M&As for 
their own purposes.  Some of them have specific authorization requirement for cross-border M&As; some 
others have instruments to screen cross-border M&As for particular purposes – e.g. the adoption of the 
Exon-Florio provision in the United States is to control cross-border M&As for the purpose of national 
security; additionally, governments may reserve the right to approve some proposed M&A transactions 
while reject or modify the others so as to develop their own priorities. See UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.146-
148. 
33 The changes in national regimes that favor the development of FDI may include the removal of various 
restrictions, the provision of high standard of treatment, guarantees, and more incentives etc, among which 
the opening up of previously closed industries and the removal of compulsory joint venture requirements, 
restrictions on majority ownership and authorization requirements are particularly relevant to cross-border 
M&As. There are also studies showing that better investor protection is correlated with a more active 
market for mergers and acquisitions (S. Rossi and P.F. Volpin, 2003). At international level, the conclusion 
of bilateral investment treaties and double taxation treaties can be used to illustrate the efforts of 
government to facilitate FDI globally.  
34  E.g., the creation of single market and more recently, the launch of the Euro, have added to the 
competitive pressures which underline the rapid response by firms and make optimal firm size lager than 
previously was, thus favoring cross-border M&As. Also see UNCTAD WIR 2000, pp.149-152.    
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The World Investment Report 2000 has pointed out another noticeable progress in the 
regulatory environment for cross-border M&As. Instead of imposing a blanket restriction 
on foreign M&As under FDI laws, cross-border M&A transactions are now being 
reviewed on a case-by-case basis in most developed countries and some developing 
countries. The emphasis of such review is mainly on competition concerns, with some 
other consideration such as corporate governance and protection for environment and 
employee rights. The shift of control imposed by a government from FDI to competition 
always represents “a step towards liberalization”.35 
 
B. Internal motivations 
 
While the turbulent and continuously changing environment has both provided 
opportunities for and exerted pressures on the firms operating in it, which may closely 
affect the M&A behaviors of these firms, cross-border M&As are taking place due to 
their inherent advantages over other forms of investment. In other words, the needs and 
desires of firms to maintain and strengthen their competitiveness on a global basis can be 
better served through cross-border M&As, leading to these transactions becoming the 
preferred choice of entry mode in making FDI.  
In the first place, the motives of firms to improve their strengths, which may play out 
differently in different industries or markets, are driving them toward cross-border M&As. 
These strategic motives may include the search for either new markets, or increase of 
market power or market dominance in new countries, the search for efficiency gains 
through synergies, the search for greater firm size to acquire economies of scale, the 
                                                 
35 UNCTAD WIR 2000 pp.148 
 19
search for complementary products, resources or strengths, the search for risk 
diversification, the search for short-term financial gains and the search for personal gains 
(H.D. Hopkins, 1999; UNCTAD, 2000). In summary, cross-border M&As are frequently 
motivated by the complementarities between internationally mobile and non-mobile 
capabilities, which may allow firms to grow stronger in the global marketplace (M. 
Aguiar et al, 2003).  
However, the desires of firms to reach these goals do not automatically lead to the choice 
of M&As. The dominance of cross-border M&As in global FDI flows is established on 
the basis that merging with or acquiring an existing company represents the fastest means 
of accomplishing the above goals and obtaining strategic assets, which are crucial to 
enhance a firm’s competitiveness36 (UNCTAD 2000).  
In addition to the motives mentioned above which basically apply to both domestic and 
cross-border M&As, several empirical studies specifically focus on the latter, which are 
usually in the form of analyzing the determinants of the choice of entry modes in making 
FDI. Although many of them have yielded mixed results, some findings do help to 
explain the stronger preference of international investors for M&As, taking account of 
the factors such as a firm’s previous presence in the host country (Andersson and 






II. The Participating Parties in Cross-border M&As 
 
Understanding the multiple roles that are played by the transacting parties to cross-border 
M&As is another starting point for full comprehension of these transactions. This 
includes the understanding of not only the complexities involved in the process of 
balancing interests among the parties, but also the uncertainty and unpredictability in 
entering the foreign markets. 
 
A. The Buyer37 
 
Theoretically, a cross-border M&A transaction starts with the buyer’s initiative for 
strategic expansion. The motivations and conditions of the buyer decide a number of key 
issues concerning the transaction, such as the type of the target, as well as the pattern 
following which the transaction will proceed.38 Being the purchasing party to an M&A 
transaction and an international investor, the buyer faces a host of legal issues arising 
from its articles of association, the business law of its home country, as well as the 
foreign investment and competition legislation of the host country. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
36  According to WIR 2000, the strategic assets such as patents, brand names, the possession of 
governmental licenses and permits and technical know-how, are not available elsewhere in the market and 
take time to develop. See WIR 2000, pp. 140. 
37 It is also referred to as the purchaser, or the acquirer, the acquiring or merging company, or in the case of 
using tender offer, the offeror, based on different forms of cross-border M&A transactions. 
38 In reality, it is not always the buyer in a deal that takes the initiative. The transactions may also be 
commenced by the selling party which searches for suitable partners or buyers. Therefore, the terms 
“buyer” and “seller” make no sense until the participating parties to a transaction has established the 
substantive relationship between them.  
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a. The Shareholders and the Board of Directors of the Buyer 
The authorities of the shareholders (both majority and minority) in an acquiring company 
over a proposed M&A transaction are not unlimited. Their prior consent is not always 
needed, as long as the transaction is small and does not include a substantial change in 
the structure of the economic situation of the acquiring company.39 
In contrast, the directors of the acquiring companies play the central role in initiating and 
proceeding with the transaction. Since the board of directors is not always required to 
obtain approval from shareholders, they have the discretion to decide whether to 
commence a purchase of a foreign firm. The board is also responsible for conducting 
market research, identifying the target, making a proposal to the target company board or 
to its shareholders, and then negotiating with the seller based on the terms and conditions 
it has defined. Moreover, the board of directors of the acquiring company has to make a 
number of key decisions, such as whether to purchase the shares of the assets, the level of 
investment to be made (e.g. majority or minority), the method and procedure to be 
adopted (e.g. by negotiating with individual shareholder or by public tender offer). 
 
b. Due Diligence 
For the buyer in any M&A transaction, an objective, independent and comprehensive 
examination of the selling party – due diligence – is absolutely necessary for identifying 
appropriate targets, negotiating and effectively completing the deal. Such process is 
intended to provide the buyer with adequate information about the actual or potential 
risks and opportunities during or after the transaction, which constitutes the basis upon 
                                                 
39  However, if the acquiring entity is a U.S. entity, it is often the case that a vote of the acquiring 
company’s shareholders may be necessary. See Remi J. Turcon supra note 15, pp.144 
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which the buyer can negotiate for a reasonable price and various kinds of warranties in 
the transaction.  
The due diligence process in a cross-border M&A transaction appears to be more crucial 
and is complicated by a few elements such as the different institutional environments 
between two firms’ home countries and their two different cultures either at national level 
or corporate levels (Angwin, 2001). 40 
Target selection is a crucial step in the due diligence process. Depending on their motives, 
the buyers search for targets with different characteristics such as size, complementary 
resources, local network ties etc. (Katsuhiko et al., 2004). Besides, the legal and financial 
history of a firm represents an important factor that the investor should always consider, 
because it is closely related to the consummation of the transaction and the viability of 
future business. 
A thorough evaluation process of the potential target may generally focus on financials, 
tax matters, asset valuation, operations, the valuation of the business (Angwin, 2001). 
And cross-border M&As also require special attention to topics such as exchange rates, 
local taxes, local accounting standards, foreign government potential trade regulations, 
risk of expropriation and debt/equity ratios that might be imposed by the foreign 
government (Kissin and Herrera, 1990). This is understandable as a foreign buyer must 
learn, as much as possible, about the new or unknown environment in which it will 
purchase and operate a business. 41 
                                                 
40 In practice, the board of the buyer could have a choice as to whether it will conduct the investigation all 
by itself, or by employing an external advisor in the country where the target firm is headquartered, which 
injects external knowledge into the analysis of a foreign target. 
41 For detailed discussion of due diligence, see World Law Group Member Firms, International Business 
Acquisitions-Major Legal Issues & Due Diligence Edited by Michael Whalley and Thomas Heymann, 
Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp.321-341, and Edward E. Shea  The McGraw-Hill Guide to Acquiring 
and Divesting Business, McGraw-Hill,1999, pp.101-122  
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c. The Recognition of Foreign Companies and the Organization of Business Entities 
in Foreign Nations 
Theoretically, the foreign buyer has an option to effect a cross-border M&A transaction 
either by directly acquiring or merging with the local company, or by organizing a local 
company to carry out the transaction.42   
In the first case, to be recognized as a legal entity under the legal system of the host 
country is a prerequisite for the buyer to proceed with the purchase of local firms. In most 
host countries, it is a general rule for foreign companies to fulfil the requirement of 
registration with relevant government authority before they start transacting any 
business.43And meanwhile, it is a well-recognized principle that the business activities 
conducted by foreign companies in a host state are mostly regulated under the local 
laws.44 In practice, a foreign buyer usually acquires a local firm and transforms it into its 
subsidiary through its branch or registered office set up in that host country. 
Yet it is more often the case that the foreign buyer is required to organize a local 
company to conduct cross-border M&A transaction,45 where the laws governing business 
organizations in the host states are crucial. Generally, the foreign buyer will use a 
corporate form as an acquisition vehicle, such as a corporation in common law countries, 
                                                 
42 In many developing countries such as China, where the joint venture is a prevailing form of FDI, the 
acquisition of the shares from the local partner in the existing joint venture to which the foreign acquirer is 
a partner is also regarded as a cross-border M&A transaction. 
43 E.g. Art.365 and 368 of the Companies act of Singapore has provided for that a foreign company has to 
register under the Companies Act before it establishes a place of business or commences to carry on 
business in Singapore. 
44 Norbert Horn, supra note 9, pp.8-9 
45 E.g., in Canada, the only major transaction apparently excluded under the Investment Canada Act is a 
share purchase conducted by a foreign-incorporated corporation that directly carries on business in Canada 
through a branch office, as opposed to through a Canadian-incorporated subsidiary. See George C. Glover, 
Jr., Douglas C. New and Marc M. Lacourci+-ere, The Investment Canada Act: A New Approach To The 
Regulation of Foreign Investment In Canada, 41 BUSLAW 83. 
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or a share company or a limited liability company in many civil law countries,46 or under 
some special circumstances, a partnership47 or a joint venture.48     
As choosing different business forms may lead to different legal consequence, the foreign 
buyer need to weigh up a number of objective factors before deciding the business 
structure so as to create a favorable precondition for the subsequent transaction. These 
factors may include, among others, the location of incorporation, 49  the industrial 
guidance of the host economy,50 the time limitation, 51 etc.  
 
d. Some Special Issues 
Being an international investor, a buyer may also have to address some additional issues 
of legitimacy when entering a foreign market. In countries whose governments adopt 
restrictions to protect domestic business owners from outsiders, there may be special 
requirements of qualifications that a foreign acquirer must meet before buying the local 
                                                 
46 David J. BenDaniel and Arthur H. Rosenbloom  The Handbook of International Mergers & Acquisitions, 
Prentice Hall 1990, pp.78-81 
47 This form is often used when the combined company is to be conducted as a joint venture. 
48  In some countries, especially developing countries, to form a joint venture is still a compulsory 
requirement for most foreign investments, although there is a trend to eliminate such restriction. 
49 The consideration of the location is important, because in a host country with a vast territory, there may 
be regional distinction as to the regulations governing the establishment of business entities, e.g. in the U.S., 
laws pertinent to the organizational structure of a business entity are promulgated by the State in which the 
business is formally established; or there may be incentives and advantages offered by the host government 
to the establishment of business by foreign investors in certain regions for the economic or political reasons, 
e.g. the Chinese government has been making considerable efforts to encourage foreign investment in the 
western region in the Large-Scale Development of Western Region Program. Also, the location of the new 
subsidiary is likely to be the domicile of the combined entity, which may determine the principal stock 
market for the combined entity as well. And consequently the choice of the location could affect the post 
merger valuation of the company. 
50 Most countries, developed or developing, have imposed restrictions on foreign ownership in certain 
industries. The foreign buyer must be clear of the relevant industrial policies before setting up its subsidiary 
to engage in M&A transaction. E.g. in China, there are a number of industries in which only equity or 
contractual joint ventures are permitted,  as provided for in the Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign 
Investment in Industries. 
51 It is simply because in most cases, share company, especially the shares of which are publicly held, is 
subject to numerous formalities and restriction, and consequently the organization of could be more time-
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firm, especially when such transaction involves a State-Owned Enterprise. These 
qualifications may include the holding of technical expertise, a good business reputation, 
a solid financial position, the willingness to introduce advanced technologies and 
management expertise and the capabilities to introduce corporate governance practices. 52 
It is also worthy to know that in some countries, such as the UK, a cross-border M&A 
transaction, in which the acquirer is a foreign state-owned company, may receive special 
attention. It has been clear from the policy statement made by Secretary of State of the 
UK that acquisitions made by state-owned enterprises, whether domestic or foreign, 
would attract the particular attention by Secretary of State, and are more likely to subject 
to the investigation by the Competition Commission even if they did not result in 
significant combination of market shares.53 
 
B. The seller54 
 
There may be a number of reasons for a firm to become the selling party to a cross-border 
M&A transaction. Besides simply being targeted by a foreign investor which wishes to 
enter the host country by buying into a local firm, it can be because of a firm’s urgent 
need for capitals to get rid of its financial troubles when there are limited financial 
resources available in its home country; or it may be the strategy of a domestic firm to 
                                                                                                                                                 
consuming than other business form. The implication is that speed is always an essential factor in a cross-
border M&A transaction. 
52 See the Interim Provisions on Introducing Foreign Investment to Reorganized State-owned Enterprise, 
No 42 [2002] Decree of the State Economy and Trade Commission (SETC), the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) of the People's Republic of China and 
the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
53  P.F.C. Begg, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers—A practical Guide to the legal, financial and 
Administrative Implications (3rd Edition), Graham & Trotman, 1991, pp.8.32-8.38 para.8.89-8.100. 
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have a stronger presence in the world market and more chances to take part in the 
international production system that drive the firm to make such a deal, thereby becoming 
a subsidiary of a multinational corporation. Even in the transaction which is meant to be a 
cross-border merger between companies with equal size, one of the parties may end up 
being acquired by the other for technical or economical consideration.55 Accordingly, the 
sellers in cross-border M&As are also playing the crucial role, which may affect many 
aspects of the transactions. 
 
a. The Role of the Management and Shareholders 
The attitude or recommendation of the target company’s management or board of 
directors determines whether a foreign purchase of the company is friendly or hostile. 
And this might directly impact the buyer’s implementation of due diligence.  
In an ordinary due diligence process, the buyer provides the seller with an enquiry list of 
the legal documents and certificates he wishes to review. Unless bound by confidentiality 
clauses as against third parties, the seller will usually provide the requested documents 
and certificates.56 Obviously, a transaction undertaken against the wishes of the board of 
the target company is considered hostile, and thus there is little chance that the seller will 
fully cooperate in providing information. This means that the due diligence has to be 
implemented based on the publicly available information which may be merely the 
legally obligated minimum information provided by the seller.57   
                                                                                                                                                 
54 It can also be referred to as the target company, the acquired or merged company, and in the case that a 
tender offer is made, an offeree. 
55 See supra note 15. 
56 Mergers and acquisitions - particular types of contract Corporate and Commercial articles in association 
with Hammarskiold & Co, October 1999, available at http://www.legal500.com/devs/sweden/ccframe.htm 
57OECD  supra note 15, pp.23 
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In addition, the management of the sellers can be substantially in charge in the 
transactions of mergers or selling substantially all assets of the company, although 
sometimes the approval of shareholders is required.58 In the case of tender offers or 
private agreements, although the acquirers are transacting directly with shareholders 
rather than with the managements, the managements are allowed in many jurisdictions to 
take defensive measures to deter the acquisition of control. 59 
With respect to shareholders, it has been recognized in most countries that their consent 
is required in all transactions that substantially change the organizational structure and 
economic situation of the company.60 In particular, a merger or a sale of substantially all 
assets of the target must be approved by shareholders in the target company.61 In the case 
of a share acquisition, the purchase of shares from some of the shareholders of the target 
company may be subject to the approval of other shareholders. For example, because of 
the right of first refusal, a shareholder may have to offer his shares to other shareholders 
before he can enter into an agreement to sell the shares to a third party.62   
 
b. The Business Form of the Seller 
Different organizational structures of the sellers may produce different legal consequence 
to cross-border M&As. One reason is that the transferability of ownership specified by 
                                                 
58 The requirements for prior approval from shareholders in the selling company for such deals may vary 
from country to country. 
59 Scott Mitnick, Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in Europe: Reforming Barriers to Takeovers, 01 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 683 
60 Norbert Horn, supra note 9, pp.16 
61 For example, under a number of U.S. State Corporation laws, a merger agreement resulting to 100 
percent shares of the target company being converted to the shares of the acquiring company must be 
approved by a majority vote at a shareholder’s meeting. See Ibid. pp.13 
62 Usually, the articles of incorporation or by-laws of the target company would impose a more stringent 
requirement on the obtaining of such approval, such as requirements of the approval from an absolute 
majority of the shareholders. See Remi J. Turcon supra note 15, pp.144 
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laws or articles of incorporation varies among different business forms. Generally, it is 
most difficult to transfer ownership in a partnership since the consent of all general 
partners is often required, whereas public held companies commonly contain the least 
restrictions for the transfer of ownership, as their shares are traded on securities 
exchanges or over the counter.63 
Besides, the seller’s business form may closely affect the structure of a transaction. For 
example, in the acquisition of a closely held company, which means that there are only a 
small number of shareholders, it is often preferable to enter into a private agreement with 
the shareholders for the direct purchase of their shares; if the target company is public 
held one, purchase of shares from the shareholders by means of friendly or hostile tender 
offer is more practical; in the case that the seller is a listed company, purchase of share on 
a stock exchange would be advisable. 
 
c. The Industry   
Most host countries, developed or developing, impose restrictions on foreign ownerships 
in certain industries that are regarded as crucial to their national interests. These 
industries are usually either related to national security or constituting the cornerstone of 
the national economy, such as the defense industry, the natural resource industry, the 
transportation and the public utilities. In developing countries, some underdeveloped 
industries like agriculture are also included.  
The industry policies in different countries may take different forms. For instance, in the 
US where domestic industries are regulated individually, there is the Federal 
                                                 
63 Remi J. Turcon supra note 15, pp.125 
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Communication Act of 1934 64  governing the field of radio communication and the 
Federal Power Act65 and the Geothermal Act of 197066 regulating the development of 
hydroelectric power and geothermal power.67 In China, in contrast, a uniform guideline -- 
Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Investment in Industries -- applies to all industries, 
specifying restrictions on foreign ownership in all regulated industries.68 
 
d. Other Influential Factors  
Most M&A plans require full consideration of the issues related to the protection of 
employees and minority shareholders in target companies. As different host countries 
may adopt different approaches to address these issues, cross-border M&As require 
additional attentions. 
The employment effects of cross-border M&As may vary according to the motivations of 
foreign acquirers and the characteristics of acquired firms (UNCTAD, 2000).  However, 
there are still great chances that the employees of the acquired companies will be laid off 
for the reasons of rationalizing and eliminating duplication, enhancing efficiency, and 
reducing excess capacity. In responding to such detrimental effects, most host 
governments have adopted various measures to ensure the protection of such 
                                                 
64 47 U.S.C.A. §§151-613. 
65 16 U.S.C.A §§797(a) et seq. 
66 30 U.S.C.A §§1001-1025. 
67 However, in many of these Acts which provide for that the permissions to operate the relevant business 
are granted to U.S. citizens, only the citizenship of the corporation is relevant, i.e. a corporation is qualified 
for the permission as long as it is organized under the laws of the United State, and the citizenship of the 
shareholders is irrelevant. It is therefore possible for a foreign-owned and controlled corporation to invest 
in these regulated industries. Remi J. Turcon supra note 15, pp31-52 
68 The provisions in The Provisional Rules on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors  has stipulated that that in mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises, foreign 
investors shall comply with the Catalogue for Guidance of Foreign Investment in Industries, which has 
prescribed that no wholly ownership is allowed in some industries, and in some others the Chinese Party is 
to be controlling or relatively controlling. 
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employees. 69  For example, the advance notice of termination and unemployment 
compensation are usually required if the employees of the seller are to be excluded by the 
buyer;70 in most European countries, the employees, either the seller’s or the buyer’s, 
must be informed and consulted before the transaction -- e.g. in the Netherlands, 
employees can even hold back the transaction through appeals to courts; the requirements 
for compulsory transfer of employees to the buyer can also be found in many countries 
such as Spain.71                                                   
With respect to minority shareholders, the protection provided by the laws also varies 
from country to country. Taking the US as an example, many state corporation laws 
provide that the minority shareholders have the right to initiate a derivative lawsuit in the 
name of the target company, and ask for a preliminary injunction from the court to block 
the M&A transaction during the pendency of the lawsuit.72 In the UK, in comparison, the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers -- the code governing acquisitions of controlling 
positions in public companies –  provides such protection by imposing the mandatory bid 
provision. This provision requires a partial acquirer to “launch a bid for all remaining 
shares at a price equivalent to the highest price paid in the previous twelve months”, and 
then has an effect of preventing expropriation from minority shareholders.73 
 
 
                                                 
69 Despite the recognition of the possible adverse effects on local employment of the host country, the UK 
government expressed their view in the Blue Paper on Merger Policy that in the present political climate, 
employment issues are unlikely to weigh heavily in the decision as to whether or not the government would 
take actions against the proposed transaction. See P.F.C. Begg, supra note 53, pp.8.27 para.8.77 
70 David J. BenDaniel and Arthur H. Rosenbloom supra note 46, pp.44-45.  
71Anne-Sophie Cornette De Saint-Cyr and Philip Rogers  Cross-border Mergers, ICCLR 2002, 13(9), 343-
351  
72A typical allegation is that the target company’s directors breached one or more their fiduciary duties to 




Apart from some government regulatory organizations, such as securities regulatory 
agencies and antitrust commissions, the bulk of “third parties” involving in cross-border 
M&As are intermediaries which provide various services to facilitate the transactions. 
 
a. Investment Banks, Business Brokers and Finders 
Basically, investment banks, business brokers, and finders help to find and approach 
potential buyers and sellers and introduce them to each other. The main difference is that 
an investment bank may meanwhile act as a business and financial consultant, and/or as 
an agent to make financial arrangement, and/or as a valuation analyst, focusing on the 
appraisal of market values and earning multiples. And experienced finders can provide 
valuable services because they are in continuous contact with corporate executives, 
investment bankers and other characters that are active in the M&A market.74 
 
b. Accounting Firms, Law Firms and Business and Financial Consultants 
Since many actions involved in a cross-border M&A transaction, such the decisions to 
buy or sell, the price negotiations, and the analysis of business valuation, are based on the 
audited financial statement provided by the accounting firms, it is not surprising that 
accounting firms are playing the key role in the transactions. Many internationally 
famous accounting firms also provide services such as financial and tax planning.  
                                                                                                                                                 
73 Scott Mitnick, supra note 59. 
74 Edward E. Shea, supra note 41, pp.2. 
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Another key role player is the law firms, which mainly act as negotiators or 
spokespersons for either buyers or sellers. They prepare agreements for the transaction; 
they participate in legal due diligence and advise the firms on how to plan and implement 
a transaction in the lawful pattern; they also prepare documents and reports required by 
the relevant governmental agencies for information disclosure purpose. In cross-border 
M&As, the local law firms in host countries are especially important, as they can help out 
foreign acquirers with the situation of foreign market uncertainty and information 
asymmetries.  
Besides the above two, there also exist some business and financial consultants, which 
usually provide advice apart from what are provided by accounting firms and law firms, 
such as advice on employee compensation and benefits.75 
 
c. Lenders 
The emergence of mega-M&As gives rise to the need of the buyers to finance the 
transaction through borrowing money from various sources. The primary lenders include 
insurers, banks, credit finance companies, venture capital funds and government agencies 
that provide loans or loan guarantees.  
Generally, these lenders have their own preferred forms of making a loan to the buyers. 
For example, Insurers generally provide “long-term loans that may be cash flow or asset 
based”, while banks provide “intermediate-term, revolving credit and line of credit loans 
that may be cash flow or asset based.”76 
 
                                                 
75 Edward E. Shea  supra note 41, pp.3-5 
76 Ibid. pp.4 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING CROSS-
BORDER M&As – FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF HOST 
COUNTRIES 
 
I. An Overview 
 
A. The Interplay between Cross-border M&As and the Host Country’s Regulatory 
Control  
 
The growing popularity of cross-border M&As are partly driven by the liberalization of 
and improvement in the legal and regulatory regime all around the world. These 
transactions have in turn posed tremendous challenges to the regulators, especially to 
those of host countries.  
Firstly, although being an increasingly preferred mode of FDI entry, cross-border M&As 
are often regarded less beneficial for the economic development of host countries than 
greenfield investment (UNCTAD, 2000). This is largely because the entry of foreign 
acquirers may not represent any addition at all to the investible capital, output or 
employment in host countries,77 and can easily produce certain threats to host economies, 
such as the foreign dominance in strategic industries, the formation of monopoly in host 
markets, etc. Accordingly, considerable controversy has been aroused about whether the 
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host countries should discriminate between these two entry mode of foreign investors 
when applying their FDI laws and regulations. The existing researches on this topic have 
reported conflicting results.78 
Secondly, the intervention of host governments in cross-border M&A transactions on 
grounds of national security or economic sovereignty often causes complaints from 
shareholders of the transacting companies. This can be explained by some empirical 
studies on the value-creating effects of cross-border M&As at the firm level, which have 
found that cross-border M&As provide integrating benefits of internalization, synergy 
and risk diversification and thereby create wealth for both acquirer and target-firm 
shareholders (Kang, 1993; Morck and Yeung, 1992).79  
More importantly, the effects of cross-border M&As on market structure and competition, 
which represent the most serious threat to the host economies, have produced even more 
challenging problems to the competition regulators in host countries. Besides that the 
large number of transactions has severely tested the ability of the competition authorities 
to conduct the merger review in a timely and comprehensive fashion, the transnational 
nature of these transactions also calls for greater procedural and substantive convergence 
of antitrust law worldwide. 
Taking into account the specific economic context and the development priorities of 
individual host countries, cross-border M&As appear to capture more regulatory attention 
in developing countries, which are predominantly host rather than home countries for 
these transactions. In these countries where capital markets are not mature enough and 
                                                                                                                                                 
77 Ajit Singh, Foreign Direct Investment And International Agreements: A South Perspective, Occasional 
Paper No. 6 of Trade-related Agenda, Development and Equity, South Center, October 2001, pp. 12. 
78 A discussion on these results will be in next section.  
 35
national industries are still being constructed, cross-border M&As are likely to raise more 
concerns to their national economic development. Since there are no a priori solutions to 
these concerns, the regulators are required to engage in a very difficult balancing act that 
assesses the trade-offs involved in these transactions. Such assessments are further 
complicated in the current climate characteristic of increasing competition for scarce 
resource (capital, technology, organizational skill) among countries.  
 
Facing such a multitude of legal and practical problems, host countries respond by 
establishing the legal frameworks within which the governments can impose regulatory 
controls over cross-border M&As in the light of the countries’ current conditions and 
needs and thereby bring these transactions into line with their broader development 
objectives.  
At the national level, although the contents and structure of the local laws governing 
cross-border M&As may vary among host countries, there seem to be less differences in 
the skeleton of such legal framework, which consist primarily of FDI-related laws 
(including those applied to foreign investment in general and those applied specifically to 
cross-border M&As), industry policies, company laws, capital market regulations and 
competition laws.  
At the international level, on the other hand, the regulatory efforts of host countries so far 
are largely reflected in a wide range of bilateral, regional and multilateral investment 
agreements, which seem to be in favor of more protection and incentives and fewer 
controls. The fact that only a very few investment agreements have made specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
79 However, there is also some research showing opposite results, such as Datta and Puia (1995), who 
concluded that cross-border M&As (on average) do not create value for the acquiring firm shareholders. 
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references to acquisition also reveals the weakness of international regime in regulating 
cross-border M&As.80 As more and more antitrust regulators have been progressively 
aware of the need for some form of harmonization between and among different 
jurisdictions, an international merger control regime has been placed on the agenda.81  
 
Seen from the viewpoint of the transacting companies, the legal framework of a host 
country governing cross-border M&As represents a determining factor in a successful 
transaction.82 From the perspective of the host countries, on the other hand, it is crucial to 
have appropriate frameworks in place to attract FDI, including M&As, to realize 
efficiency gains and positive spillovers from the interconnections between domestic and 
foreign firms, and meanwhile to minimize the undesirable effects of these investments. 
Given such importance, it is worthwhile to pay some special attention to the main 
features of host countries’ legal regime governing cross-border M&As. In this chapter the 
non-competition aspects of such legal framework are discussed, and the regulation of 
cross-border M&As under competition laws will be studied in next chapter. 
 
                                                 
80 The specific references to “acquisition” are mainly found in the national treatment and most-favored 
treatment provisions of BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties) and FTAs (Free Trade Agreements) to which 
the US is a party. See Article II 2(a) of the BIT between the US and the Egypt, Article 15.4 of the US-
Singapore FTA, and Article 1102 and 1103 of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) as 
examples. Only a small number of investment agreements between other countries make specific references 
to “acquisition”, such as the BIT between Barbados and Venezuela (Article II), and the Canada-Chile FTA 
(Article G-03). 
81 The cooperative efforts for merger control have already been found at the bilateral level. For example, 
the antitrust agencies in the US have greatly expanded the level of procedural cooperation with their 
foreign counterparts in recent years by concluding antitrust cooperation agreements with seven of their 
most important trading partners. See Michael S. Jacobs, Mergers and Acquisitions in A Global Economy: 
Perspectives from Law, Politics, and Business, 13 DePaul Bus. L. J. 1.  
82  Any cross-border M&As should be preceded by a thorough examination of relevant laws in host 
countries. This is to ensure that the proposed transaction is permitted in the target country, and the 
transaction costs increased by the restrictions of that country will not make the combined business 
unprofitable. 
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B. The Controversy about Discriminating Cross-border M&As from Greenfield 
Investments in Host Country’s FDI Regime 
 
Without question, cross-border M&As and greenfield investments are different. At the 
firm level, cross-border M&As and greenfield investments are viewed as very different 
modes of FDI so that the choice between these modes requires careful cost-benefit 
analysis. At the country level, many governments also perceive the costs and benefits of 
the two modes of FDI as very different when formulating their approach to the treatment 
of foreign firms entering and producing in their market.83  
Broadly speaking, cross-border M&As and greenfield investments are subject to different 
sets of rules and regulations. This is attributable to the fundamental difference between 
them -- cross-border M&A involves a transaction between a buyer and a seller at an 
endogenous price, while greenfield investment is simply an investment decision that does 
not involve a market transaction.84 However, from the host country’s point of view, they 
are both foreign investments through which foreign investors enter the host markets. 
Although it may be true that regulating cross-border M&As is more complicated, it is still 
a difficult decision to make as to whether it is appropriate to discriminate these 
transactions from greenfield investments in the host country’s FDI regime.  
 
Some researchers have presented their arguments against a discriminatory policy which is 
more restrictive on cross-border M&As. For instance, Norbäck and Persson (2003) have 
used a model to show that a restrictive policy discriminating against cross-border M&As 
                                                 
83 V. Nocke and S. Yeaple, Merger and The Composition of International Commerce, NBER Working 
Paper No.10405, March 2004, pp.1 
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can be counter-productive. In their support for a non-discriminatory policy, they showed 
that a restrictive cross-border M&A policy might force domestic producers out of 
business without any compensation as a result of competition from the potentially more 
efficient TNCs entering through greenfield investment. Moreover, they found that due to 
the assets complementarity effects and preemption effects,85 the acquisition price paid by 
the foreign acquirer is likely to be higher, and possibly substantially higher, than the 
profit the domestic firm could attain when keeping the domestic assets. Consequently, it 
is possible that forbidding cross-border M&As could lead to a significant loss of producer 
surplus. Norbäck and Persson also argued that the amount of productive capacity in the 
host country will be higher under the nondiscriminatory policy when the asset 
complementarity is sufficiently high and consequently, consumers and labor also gain 
when foreign acquisitions are allowed. This is because the foreign acquirer must be 
“sufficiently more efficient” and “invest sufficiently sequentially” when using the 
domestic assets for the transaction to take place. The transaction efficiency effect will 
thus counteract the concentration effects and increase the total capital in the industry.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
84 Ibid.  
85 According to Norbäck and Persson, the assets complementarity effects can be understood as a surplus 
created by the combinations of the locally strong assets of the target, such as the distribution network, 
access to specific assets like permits etc. and the strong firm-specific assets of the foreign acquirer, which 
may include strong technology, know-how of marketing, organization etc. This is because there is a 
complementary relationship between these assets and the latter’s firm-specific advantages make possible 
that domestic assets are more efficiently used when transferred to foreign ownership. Due to the bidding 
competition between foreign buyers for buying the domestic assets, this entire surplus is captured by the 
seller, i.e. the domestic firm. Preemption effect, on the other hand, means that if the domestic assets are 
more efficiently used by an MNE, it is likely that the profit of a non-acquiring MNE will decrease when the 
assets are transferred from domestic to foreign ownership, which implies that the MNE gains from 
preventing other TNCs from obtaining the assets. Once more, due to the bidding competition between 
TNCs, this entire surplus is captured by the domestic firm. The theory of preemption effects has been 
discussed by S.O. Fridolfsson and J. Stennek (2000). See Why mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share 
Prices – A Theory of Preemptive Mergers, http://ssrn.com/abstract=238948. 
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On the contrary, there are some studies providing evidences to support the policy 
discriminating cross-border M&As from greenfield investments, such as the recent 
research done by A. Mattoo, M. Olarrega and K. Saggi (2001). After reviewing a number 
of previous studies, they developed a simple model upon certain assumptions. One of 
their conclusions was that if the cost of technology transfer is low,86 the government 
prefers direct entry whereas the foreign firm would rather acquire an existing domestic 
competitor. In such a case, restricting the acquisition of the existing domestic firm, such 
as by using the equity restrictions, can help improve host country welfare by inducing 
direct entry by the foreign firm, even in relatively competitive markets.  
Some merits can be found in these theoretic analyses. However, the policy implications 
therein should be considered with caution in view of various limitations in these 
researches. In practice, the laws dealing with cross-border M&As in host countries are 
likely to change in accordance with the countries’ situations. And the assessments of the 
potential effects that result from foreign acquisitions of domestic firms are usually made 
on the case-by-case basis. 
 
II. The Regulation of Entry 
 
A. FDI Screening and Approval of Cross-border M&As 
 
The host country’s regulation of cross-border M&As starts at the time of their entry. Of 
the various regulations on foreign entry, the screening mechanism for the right of 
                                                 
86 This was associated with cost advantages of foreign investor over domestic firms and the relative low 
acquisition prices. 
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establishment seems to be more relevant to cross-border M&A transactions.87 In fact, 
many developed countries (such as Australia, Canada, Japan, etc.) and most developing 
countries have general screening mechanism for foreign investments, which is applied to 
all firms and industries (unless exempted), with the broad aim of bringing the inflows of 
FDI into line with the local economic developments. In these host countries, foreign 
investors entering the market by buying into local firms usually fall into the scope of the 
screening process. 
Basically, there are two kinds of situations in which the requirements to notify and obtain 
approval from the host governments will be triggered. One is that the value of the whole 
transaction, or of the assets of target company which may be the domestic company of 
the host state (direct M&A) or may have controlled a subsidiary in the host country 
(indirect M&A), has reached the specified thresholds. In this case, the acquisitions of 
assets or substantial shareholdings of these target companies must be preceded by 
notification to or authorization from relevant authorities of host governments. The other 
is that the target companies of cross-border M&As are operating in the key industries 
where foreign ownership must be either prohibited or strictly restricted, such as those 
related to national culture or identity, real estate, or national defense.88  
Despite that a substantial number of countries, especially developing countries, have 
adopted FDI screening to monitor the foreign entry, they vary widely in the stringency of 
                                                 
87 Another function of screening is to decide which foreign investment projects qualify for incentives 
offered by the host country. Usually the screening for such purpose makes no difference between greenfield 
investment and cross-border M&As.  
88 For example, in Korea, foreign investment by means of purchasing existing stocks issued by a local 
corporate should report make report to Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy (the MCIE). However, 
if the foreign investor intends to purchase the existing stocks of a defense industry company, the prior 
permission from the MCIE is mandatory. See Article 6 (1) (3) of Korea’s Foreign Investment Promotion 
Act (1998), available at the official website of Korea Investment Service Center: 
http://www.investkorea.org/templet/type0/1/read.jsp.  
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the formalities and the applicable criteria governing the approval decisions. In some 
states (such as Japan), a pre- or post-notification to relevant government agency is 
enough,89  while in some others (e.g. Chile), it is mandatory that approvals must be 
obtained from the government explicitly or implicitly before the material implementation 
of the transactions. There are also some jurisdictions (such as Korea) where certain types 
of foreign investments are subject to requirements of prior permission, while others are 
only required to notify the responsible authorities in advance. In addition, under some 
screening regimes (e.g. Australia), the governments raise no objections to the proposed 
foreign investments they are reviewing unless these investments are found contrary to the 
national interests. And yet in some other countries (such as Canada), the reviewable 
investments are allowed to proceed only if they show economic benefits to the host 
economies.  
 
Leaving aside the theoretical debate about whether cross-border M&As should be 
regulated differently from greenfield FDI under foreign investment laws, it is noted that 
in practice, many countries make difference between them at least at the time of entry. 
For example, in Malaysia where there is no specific foreign investment law, foreign 
acquisitions of interests, mergers and takeovers of companies are governed separately 
under the Foreign Investment Committee Guideline, which is applicable exclusively to 
the acquisition of interests, mergers and takeovers by local and foreign interests. 90 
Another typical example is China, where greenfield investments are primarily regulated 
by laws governing foreign-invested enterprises, while foreign M&As of Chinese 
                                                 
89 Usually the filing of such notifications beforehand is advisable in that it can help the foreign acquirers to 
make sure that the proposed transactions would not incur the governments’ future interruption. 
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enterprises are subject to separate regulations -- The Provisional Rules on Mergers with 
and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors.  
Such different treatments between foreign M&As and greenfield investments are by no 
means confined to developing countries. Taking Canada as an example, Part III and IV of 
the Investment Canada Act provide that greenfield investments are not generally 
reviewable except those in certain industries related to Canada’s national identity or 
cultural heritage, while foreign M&As are generally subject to government reviews 
unless they are below the prescribed thresholds.91   
Even in the countries with most-liberalized FDI policies ( such as most European 
countries, the US, Singapore, etc.), where there is no screening for FDI in general, cross-
border M&As are still singled out for review before they could be substantively 
implemented. And such special reviews are often justified on grounds of protecting 
national security, public interests as well as national cultures or identities.  
 
In summary, in most host countries the flows of foreign investments by means of cross-
border M&As are not as free as those in other forms of FDI at least at the entry stage. The 
rationale behind such entry control is to protect the host country from foreign acquirers 
who might pursue transactions that would be injurious to the host society. It has to be 
admitted that in countries with merger control regimes under competition laws (mostly 
developed countries), the general FDI screening plays a limited role in preventing 
                                                                                                                                                 
90 It was released in August 2004 and effective on 21 May 2003. See Article I and II. 
91 R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.), s. 13- s.15  It is noteworthy that foreign acquirers from non-WTO 
countries are subject to a fixed threshold for review by Canadian government, which is much lower than 
those applicable to foreign acquirers from WTO countries. However, if foreign investors intend to acquire 
Canadian business in cultural industries, financial services or uranium production, the lower thresholds will 
apply regardless of the nationality of the acquirers.  
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questionable cross-border M&A transactions as most of them may have been barred for 
competition reasons. In contrast, in most developing countries, where there is no 
systematic merger control, the governments have to rely substantially on the entry 
regulation under FDI screening to identify the M&A transactions that are potentially 
harmful to their countries’ economy and reject them on justifiable grounds. The 
following pages of this section is a review of the entry regulations for cross-border 
M&As in selected countries, which include both FDI screening and special reviews, 
representing the existing major forms of regulatory control over incoming cross-border 
M&As around the world.  
 
a. Australia 
The Australian government’s foreign investment policy mainly consists of the Foreign 
Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 197592 (the FATA) and other regulations instituted by 
way of Ministerial statements. The Commonwealth Treasurer (the Treasurer) is 
responsible for the administration of the policy, assisted by an advisory body --the 
Foreign Investment Review Board (the Board). 
Both greenfield investments and cross-border M&As are required to make pre-
notification. Under the FATA, some cross-border M&As are subject to compulsory 
notification. For example, Section 26 makes it compulsory for a “foreign interest” to 
notify a proposal to acquire a substantial shareholding (i.e.15% or more for one acquirer, 
and 40% for two or more unassociated persons (s 9(1)) of an Australian corporation, 
                                                 
92This Act includes amendments up to the Treasury Legislation Amendment (Application of Criminal Code) 
Act (No. 1) 2001, Commonwealth of Australia, 31/2001, commencing 15/12/2001 
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unless the total assets of that target are below the $50 million threshold.93 In most sectors 
(i.e. non-sensitive sectors), the notifiable cross-border M&As where the total value falls 
below $100 million will be automatically approved, and those with a total value more 
than $100 million will not encounter objection unless the Treasurer is satisfied with 
evidence that they are contrary to the national interests.94 Obviously, the objective of 
such requirements is to keep the government informed of any transactions which may 
result in control of its sizable national companies falling into foreign hands, so that the 
regulators can make the timely and appropriate responses to avoid the negative effects of 
such changes. 
When the M&A transactions fall into the application scope of the FATA or other 
investment policies, it is in the interest of the foreign acquirers to notify the Treasurer for 
prior approvals. Implementing the transaction without the fulfillment of the notification 
requirements may expose the combined companies to divestiture, if the transactions are 
subsequently found by the government to be contrary to the national interests;95 when 
such notification is compulsory, non-compliance with such requirements would be 
followed by substantial penalties.96 
 
b. France 
France has been long active in controlling the inflow of foreign investment. The 
regulation of foreign investments in France has recently been reformed by the enactment 
                                                 
93 See the FATA s 26, s 26A, and s13A.  
94 See Summary of Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, prepared by the Australian Foreign Investment 
Review Board (the FIRB) in the Foreign Investment Review Board Annual Report 2003-04, pp.75. A copy 
of this document can be found on the official website of the FIRV at http://www.firb.gov.au. 
95 See the FATA s. 18(4) and s. 19(4). 
96 See the FATA s. 26(2) and s. 26A(2).  
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of Decree No. 2003-196 of March 7 2003 (the Decree), together with an administrative 
order of the same date (the Order). 
The Decree generally does not differentiate between greenfield investment and cross-
border M&As. Almost all investments by non-French residents are required to be notified 
to the Ministry of Economy unless the transactions are under the prescribed thresholds,97 
or falling into the scope of exemptions.98 Besides, foreign direct investments in sensitive 
industries, or affecting “public order” or “safety”99, or involving national defense and 
production of weapons and explosives, or related to public health, are subject to prior 
authorization expect those exempted by the Decree.  
For a foreign acquirer who wishes to acquire the shares of the target company through an 
offer, the prior authorization is especially essential. The foreign offeror is required to file 
an application with the Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF) for making the offer. 
Such application must set out, among other things, a copy of the request for authorization 
required pursuant to the rules governing foreign investments or any rules requiring a 
national or international authority to authorize or approve the transaction.100 
 
c. The United States 
The United States has no general screening process for FDI. Foreign investors are 
generally free to either establish new business or acquire existing companies except in 
                                                 
97 See Article 1-4° II of the Decree. 
98 See Article 6 of the Decree.  
99 This requirement applies to investments made by an individual whose current or past activities create a 
serious presumption that the investor may commit or facilitate one of the criminal offences enumerated in 
article 7 1° (a) of the Decree; for example, terrorist activities. “Public order” concerns would be raised if an 
investment benefits an individual who has been convicted of a serious crime or a crime involving immoral 
behavior or if the financing for the transaction is directly or indirectly derived from illegal activities. See 
Article 7 of the Decree. 
100 Article 5.1.4 Title V: Public Tender Offers, of CMF General Regulation. 
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several sensitive sectors such as air and water transportation, nuclear energy, 
telecommunication, etc. where foreign ownership and investments are prohibited or 
restricted. 101  Besides competition considerations, national security may be the only 
reason for which the U.S government would fend off the unwanted foreign M&As of 
Unite States companies.  
The famous Exon-Florio Amendment, Section 5021of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, provides the U.S government with a screening mechanism 
for foreign acquisitions. 102  Under these provisions, notice of a cross-border M&A 
transaction by a foreign person should be made to CFIUS, an inter-agency committee on 
foreign investment in the U.S, which was selected by the President to administer Exon-
Florio. The CFIUS conducts investigations and makes recommendations to the President, 
who makes the final decision whether to block a foreign acquisition. Through this process, 
the Exon-Florio provisions authorize the President to suspend or prohibit an acquisition 
of a U.S firm by a foreign person if the President determines that it will impair, or 
threaten to impair, the national security of the U.S. 
The notifications under the Exon-Florio provisions could be made either voluntarily by 
the parties to the transaction in question or by any member of CFIUS. The absence of 
such notification would not affect the consummation of the transaction. However, such a 
transaction thereafter may risk being divested should the President subsequently 
determine that the national security of the U.S has been threatened or impaired.103  
                                                 
101 The prohibitions or restrictions on foreign investments can be found in a range of minor laws that 
govern individually each of these sectors, such as Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. §2011 et seq.), 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §151 et seq.), Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 
§40101 et seq., see also 14 C.F.R. §211 et seq.), etc. 
102 50 App. U.S.C §2170 
103 31 C.F.R. 800.601(d) 
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It is noteworthy to find that the Exon-Florio Amendment does not define “national 
security” or provide a positive list of products and services it considers essential to the 
national security or a negative list of industries exempt, neither does it place any limits on 
the size or dollar value of the M&As that are subject to the review. This gives the 
President and the CFIUS broad discretion to control the flow of foreign investment into 
the US. As a result, although the Exon-Florio Amendment was claimed to be for the 
purpose of protecting US national security, given such discretion, the regulators can 
incorporate economic or industrial policy concerns into the “national security” standard 
during the review. The broad scope of its coverage and the lack of a cognizable standard 
for review have made this entry regulation susceptible to abuse by the protectionists, 
which could jeopardize the US’ traditional open policy to foreign investments.104 
 
d. Singapore 
Despite being a more advanced developing country, Singapore has provided a 
surprisingly free and liberal environment for foreign investment. There is no general 
screening process as to the right of establishment of any form of foreign investment. 
Even the cross-border M&As do not require official approval except for restrictions in 
certain sectors such as broadcasting, the news media, domestic retail banking, property 
ownership, etc. Foreign acquirers are treated much the same as domestic ones, and the 
governing regime, which includes Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers, the 
Listing Manual, and the relevant provisions of Companies Act, focuses primarily on the 
protection of shareholders and orderly function of the capital market. 
                                                 
104 See W.R. Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to Abuse, 30 
Hous. L. Rev. 1729.  
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e. Thailand 
Unlike many other developing countries, a noticeable feature of the FDI screening in 
Thailand is that it does not differentiate cross-border M&As from greenfield investments. 
Foreign investors entering Thailand through either mode are uniformly governed under 
the new Foreign Business Act B.E 2542 (1999) (the FBA), which replaced the twenty-
year old Alien Business Act (issued in 1972) as one of the government’s efforts to 
deregulate and liberalize its foreign investment policies since the financial crisis in 1997. 
Basically, the FBA sets out in the attached Lists three categories of business activities 
where foreign investments are (1) prohibited for special reasons; (2) prohibited for 
protecting the national safety or security, arts and culture, tradition and local handicrafts, 
natural resources and the environment, unless permission is obtained from the Minister 
with the approval of the Cabinet; and (3) prohibited for the protection of the domestic 
businesses which are not ready to compete with foreigners, unless permitted by the 
Director-General with the approval of the Foreign Business Committee.105 Businesses 
falling out the scope of these categories are open to foreign investors but still subject to 
the requirement of minimum capital of two million Baht.106  
Under such entry regulations, where cross-border M&As and greenfield investment are 
treated equally, foreign acquirers are in effect encouraged to enter Thailand because the 
government has introduced various measures to grant a range of incentives to M&A 
transactions.107 This is consistent with the Thai government’s commitment to liberalize 
                                                 
105 See Section 8 of the FBA. It should also be noted that foreign investments falling into Category (2) and 
(3) may subject to further conditions such as the minimum capital, minimum local shareholding, minimum 
debt/equity ratio, number of alien directors resident in Thailand, period of investment, technology and 
assets, etc. See Section 14, 15 and 18 of the FBA.  
106 See Article 14 of the FBA.  
107 These measures include, for example, provisions for tax-free mergers and non-cash acquisition of assets 
in case of 100% mergers, and for the elimination of all taxes on asset transfer from debtors to creditors.  
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its regulatory regime for cross-border M&As, which was based on the expectation that 
these transactions would speed up corporate and financial restructuring and facilitate 
faster economic recovery after the financial crisis.  
 
B. Industry Policy – Another Way to Control the Entry of Foreign Acquirers 
 
Virtually all countries have some domestic ownership requirements, particularly in the 
industries of strategic significance to host economies. These industries may include 
defense industry, financial services, communication, media, transportation, exploitation 
of natural resources, etc. Local participation in these industries or sectors is deemed to be 
essential for the host countries to control the direction of national economic development, 
and to pursue the national social, cultural and political goals. As a result, discriminatory 
treatment by the host government between foreign and domestic investments in these 
industries is necessary, which is usually in the form of prohibiting or restricting foreign 
ownership.108 
There have been a host of arguments for restricting foreign ownership in the industries 
where host governments consider necessary. A historical survey conducted by Ha-Joon 
Chang (2003) shows that to build up their national industry, many now-developed 
countries systematically discriminated between domestic and foreign investors in their 
industry policy during their early stage of development, using regulatory instruments 
such as limits on ownership and insistence on joint venture with local firms. And thus the 
                                                 
108There could be another kind of discriminatory treatment, i.e. treatments accorded to the foreign investors 
are more favorable than domestic ones. They are usually used as incentives to attract certain type of foreign 
investments or to entice foreign investment into certain industries. The usage of tax incentives, financial 
subsidies and regulatory exemptions are used most for such purpose. 
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conclusion is that only when domestic industry has reached a certain level of 
sophistication, complexity and competitiveness could the benefits of non-discriminate 
and liberalization outweighs the costs. WIR 2003 also summarizes a range of such 
arguments supporting restricting foreign ownership because “under free market condition, 
unrestricted FDI entry may curtail local enterprise development and not enhance 
beneficial externalities.”109 
Meanwhile, there are studies suggesting that the evidence of the practical significance of 
these restrictive policies and the success of governments in countering the potential costs 
by restricting FDI is mixed (UNCTAD, 2003), and foreign ownership restrictions are less 
likely to contribute to their putative objectives (S. Globerman, 1995). 
Moreover, the adverse effects of such industry policy are also observed. For example, 
Lee and Shy (1992) demonstrate that restrictions on foreign ownership may adversely 
affect the quality of technology transferred by the foreign firm; and Benjamin (1990) 
suggests that government’s ownership restrictions may deter foreign firm entry, 
especially the relatively large firms and those with high intra-system sales. 
These results, which predominantly focus on the economic consequences of industrial 
policies, have important implications for government policies.110 On the one hand, there 
are arguably good economic reasons for restricting foreign ownership in some industries 
where the gains might outweigh the costs and the host economy can be better off. 111 On 
                                                 
109  These arguments include protecting infant domestic entrepreneurship, ensuring local technological 
deepening, exploitation of new technology and greater spillover, and preventing footloose activities and 
loss of economic control. See WIR 2003, pp.104--105 
110 There are few controversies surrounding the prohibition or restriction of foreign ownership in industries 
related to national security, media, national identity and culture, etc., the imposition of which is based on 
considerations beyond economic reasons.  
111 The industries falling into this group are different among countries, which must be decided based on the 
conditions and needs of the host economies. Nevertheless, it may be noted that FDI restrictions are more 
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the other hand, however, the host government should also realize the need to reconsider 
the placement of the limits and restrictions on foreign ownership in some other industries 
where other policies can achieve the desired objectives at a lower cost to economic 
efficiency. 112  Recognizing the potential FDI-deterrence effects and the undesirable 
distortion in host economy, it seems more advisable that instead of imposing rigid rules 
which may scare away foreign investors in the first place, host governments should give 
themselves some leeway to make ownership concessions in return for increase in the 
foreign investor’s contribution to other national goals. For example, while a number of 
developing countries such as India, Brazil and Mexico have restrictions in a range of 
industries and sectors on the foreign share of ownership to a maximum of 49%, many of 
them also allow exceptions to this rule for high-priority and high-tech investments. 
 
Mostly, restrictions on foreign ownership in these industries apply to all foreign 
investments, regardless of whether they enter through greenfield investment or cross-
border M&As. Therefore, the industry policies of host countries often directly restrict the 
level of control that foreign firms may gain over their local subsidiaries, thereby 
curtailing foreign investors’ discretion to choose between wholly owned subsidiaries or 
joint venture agreements with local partners. For foreign acquirers, the issue will be to 
                                                                                                                                                 
common in services (telecommunications, utilities, banking, etc.) than in manufacturing, where barriers to 
entry are generally lower and for which most countries offer incentives to FDI rather than try to restrict it. 
112 E.g., it has been argued that there are other instruments available to policy makers to replace the 
ownership restrictions in telecommunication industry to ensure that critical policy objectives are not 
compromised. See S. Globerman, Foreign Ownership in Telecommunications – A Policy Perspective, 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol.19, No. 1, 1995, pp.21-28. 
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determine in advance, if possible, whether the target firms are principally engaged or 
have major investments in one or more of these regulated areas.113  
However, according to a recent study of A. Mattoo et al (2004), which examines the 
relationship among mode of FDI entry, technology transfer and FDI policy, the objective 
of frequently observed restrictions on FDI may not be to limit inflows of FDI, but rather 
to induce foreign firms to adopt the socially preferred mode of entry in the host country. 
To put it simply, this analysis shows that restrictions on the degree of foreign ownership, 
even when applied symmetrically to both modes of entry (greenfield and M&A), can 
induce the foreign firm to adopt the host country’s preferred mode of entry. Although the 
policy implication of this result, which was developed in a simple model under some 
special assumption, should be treated with caution, this study may draw some attention of 
the regulators in host countries to the significance of industry policies in regulating the 
entry of foreign acquirers. 
  
III. Regulatory Framework of Host Countries for Cross-border M&As in 
the After-entry Phase  
 
A. The Impacts of Cross-border M&As on Target Firms and Host Economies  
 
Ideally, the macro-level effect of cross-border M&A activities is the reorganization of 
productive assets within or across industries on a global basis, with the aim of replacing 
                                                 
113 In some countries, such as the US, the regulatory concern is with aggregate foreign interest in and 
ownership of a local entity. Accordingly, a foreign acquirer considering even a minority position in a 
regulated local firm should determine, if possible, whether other non-local persons, of whatever nationality, 
already have a stake in the potential target firm.  
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inefficient owners and management of these capabilities, thereby attaining greater overall 
efficiency gains.  In reality, however, at stated before, the impacts of cross-border M&As 
on host economies are multifaceted, resting on a number of factors that may differ among 
industries and countries.  
There have been numerous studies, empirical and theoretical, examining the impact of 
cross-border M&As on corporate performance of both acquiring and target firms. These 
findings show that, on one hand, most M&A transactions fail to deliver the expected 
financial gains of the acquirers in terms of their share prices and profitability;114 on the 
other hand, there are general positive impacts on the part of acquired firms,115 especially 
with regard to their productivities,116 shareholder gains,117 investor protection,118 as well 
as wages of the employees119, especially in the case of foreign takeovers.120  
There is also some literature showing the negative impacts of cross-border M&As on 
target firms. For example, using the plant level data in electronics and food industries of 
UK (which were two of the highest FDI attracting sectors in the economy) for the period 
                                                 
114 Many studies have reached similar conclusions that most domestic M&As yielded poor results on the 
part of acquiring companies. With respect to cross-border M&As, there have been contradictory findings. 
For example, Jansen and Kőrner (2000) have found that international M&As resulted in rising share prices 
of the acquiring firms after studying 103 German M&As during 1994-1998, while Schenk (2000), Eun et al. 
(1996) and Cakici et al.(1996) concluded that British acquirers experienced wealth reductions after 
acquiring United States firms.   
115 M. Aguiar et al (2003) found that cross-border M&As add value to target firms, and this effect is greater 
for targets in low income emerging markets whose value is increased by about 8.8%. 
116  E.g. L. Piscitello and L. Rabbiosi (2003) found that foreign acquisitions induce productivity 
improvements not necessarily related to labor downsizing. 
117  E.g. the study of J. Danbolt (2000) showed that in U.K., target company shareholders gained 
significantly more from cross-border than from domestic acquisitions. 
118 Finding that targets are typically from countries with poorer investor protection than their acquirers’ 
countries, S. Rossi and P. F. Volpin (2004) suggest that cross-border transactions play a governance role by 
improving the degree of investor protection within target firms. 
119 E.g. S. Girma and H. Gőrg (2003) have found that in U.K, skilled workers, on average, experience a 
post acquisition increase in the wage rate following an acquisition by a US firm, while no such effect is 
discernible following acquisitions by EU or firms of other nationalities. For unskilled workers, there are 
positive post acquisition wage effects from take-overs by EU firms in the electronics industry and US firms 
in the food industry. 
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1980 to 1993, S. Grima and H. Görg (2003) found that foreign acquisitions reduced the 
survival probabilities of the acquired plants in both industries, and the incidence of 
foreign takeovers reduced employment growth, in particular for unskilled labor in the 
electronics industries.121  
For host economies, the policy implication in these studies must be considered with 
cautions, because poor results for acquiring firms do not necessarily means negative 
impacts on host economies, while the fact that individual acquired firms benefit from the 
transaction do not automatically result in the favorable effects on host economy as a 
whole. 
With respect to the impact of cross-border M&As on key areas of economic development 
in host countries, an in-depth study can be found in the World Investment Report 2000.122 
This discussion examines how cross-border M&As may affect the host countries 
economic areas in terms of the external financial resources and investment, the 
technology transfer, upgrading, diffusion and generation, the employment quantity, 
quality and skills, the export competitiveness and trade and the market structure and 
competition.  In conclusion, it suggests that while at the time of entry and in the short 
term, cross-border M&As (as compared to greenfield investment) may involve, in some 
respects, smaller benefits or larger negative effects from the perspective of host-country 
development, over the longer term, many differences between the impacts of the two 
modes diminish or disappear.  
                                                                                                                                                 
120 A detailed review of some other literature can be found in WIR 2000, Chapter V, Section A: Corporate 
performance of M&A, pp.137-140  
121 There is no significant effect for food industries with respect to employment growth, however.  
122 See Chapter VI, FDI and Development: Does Mode of Entry Matter? WIR 2000, pp. 159-209.  
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The bulk of studies on the host-economy-impact of cross-border M&As has not 
distinguished between developed and developing host countries. In fact, most of them 
have reached the conclusions based on the data from developed countries, mostly the US 
and the Europe. Therefore a few surveys showing the evidence from developing countries 
and economies in transition are of great value.  
In their efforts to find out whether FDI into developing countries raises the profitability 
of firms in these host economies, M. Aguiar et al (2003) found that while the non-
acquired firms in the acquired firm’s industry on average are negatively affected by an 
acquisition, this is not true if the acquirer is a firm from a developed country.  
In regard to the specific gains developing countries can derive from cross-border M&As, 
many individual aspects of economic development have been found to benefit 
substantially, such as the increase of investible funds available to host economies, and the 
accessible leading-edge technologies and innovative management practices. In addition, 
cross-border M&As may render it easier for developing host economies to become part 
of global sourcing and marketing network. When under exceptional circumstances, cross-
border M&As may be especially valuable for host economies as they could preserve 
potentially profitable assets that are under threat.123  
In conclusion, the regulatory control by host governments at the time of entry, if any, is 
far from addressing the concerns arising from cross-border M&As. The impact of these 
transactions on the host economies depends on a number of factors, including the 
development level and the financial circumstance of the host countries, as well as the 
                                                 
123 Chunlai Chen and Christopher Findlay, A Review of Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions in APEC, A 
report prepared by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council for the APEC Investment Experts Group, 
April, 2002 pp.5 
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situation of the target company and the motivations of the foreign acquirer. 124  To 
optimize such impacts calls for a comprehensive and efficient legal regime which should 
be built up upon the basis of the thorough consideration of all these factors.  
 
B. Optimizing the Impacts of Cross-border M&As – the Regulatory Response of Host 
Countries 
 
Despite the widespread acceptance, many host governments still remain vigilant when it 
comes to cross-border M&As. In a number of host countries, concern is expressed in 
political discussion and the media that FDI entry in the form of cross-border M&As is 
less beneficial, if not positively harmful, for economic development than the greenfield 
investments. And in the center of these concerns is that such transaction involve a 
transfer of assets from domestic to foreign hands, and do not directly add to the 
productive capacity of host countries.125 Such concerns become even more serious in 
most developing countries and transition economies, as in most cases, the motives for 
foreign investors to choose cross-border M&As as the entry mode into these countries are 
to obtain faster access to the market and to benefit from the existing market share of the 
local firm (K.E. Meyer and S. Estrin, 2001). Accordingly, the divergence between the 
foreign acquirers’ goals and the welfare interests of host economies has provided a 
                                                 
124 WIR 2000, pp 163-164 
125 See WIR 2000, pp. 159. Unlike greenfield investments which manifest themselves in new productive 
facilities, cross-border M&As do not directly increase the investments in the productive capacity of host 
countries. Instead, by paying for the acquired assets, foreign acquirers place the investible resource in the 
hands of the former local owners. Accordingly, whether cross-border M&As can result in overall increase 
in the productive investments of host economies may largely depend on whether these domestic capital 
freed by the transactions will be reinvested in new sectors of the economy. See WIR 2000, pp. 164 
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rationale for policy intervention by host governments to ensure that their domestic 
economies benefits from FDI entering through the acquisitions of domestic firms.   
 
a.  Regulatory Response of Developed Host Economies  
In developed countries, such as the United States and the European countries, which have 
long history in dealing with cross-border M&As, the relevant legal frameworks are 
mature and well-developed. Considering their leading position in regulating these 
transactions, a cursory review of several important features in their regimes may provide 
some useful information for the countries that are still in the process of structuring their 
own legal framework to govern cross-border M&As. 
 
The protection of shareholders in M&A transactions 
In countries where capital markets are highly developed, cross-border M&As are often 
implemented through acquiring the shares in the open market from the shareholders of 
the target companies, either by direct purchase or by a tender offer.126 In this case, the 
protection for the interests of shareholders, especially for those of minority shareholders 
is of critical importance. Whether they will be treated fairly and their rights as the owner 
of the acquired business will be respected may affect not only the current shareholders’ 
choices as to whether or not to continue to place their money in developing the 
productive capacity of the host economy, but also the potential investors’ decisions to 
enter the market.  
                                                 
126 For example, Tender offers accounted for nearly 33 percent of cross-border investments in British public 
firms, and 30 percent of French public companies. Another reason for the preference for share acquisitions 
may be that in some countries such as France, the transfer of tangible and intangible assets constituting a 
going concern is strictly regulated, and the fiscal cost of an assets transfer is high. 
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The dominant position of the United Kingdom in the Europe as regards both the value 
and the number of cross-border M&A transactions justifies some special notice and 
further discussion. It is important to note at first that in the United Kingdom, as in the 
United States, there is cultural acceptance of M&A process, be it with the target of listed 
companies or of private companies. And the concept of shareholder value is developed to 
the extent that it is accepted that investors are entitled to seek the highest return. This 
may be one of the factors leading to the constant high capital market value in the UK. 
The laws of the United Kingdom governing the foreign acquisition of its domestic 
companies have formed an integrated legal system. They not only concern the financial 
or commercial impacts of cross-border M&As and their probable consequences for 
market structure, but also provide an orderly framework within which sufficient 
protection are offered to shareholders as well as the liquidity of the capital markets during 
the transactions. The former are addressed primarily by the competition laws which will 
be discussed in depth in next chapter, while the latter are mainly dealt with by the City 
Code on Takeovers and Merger (the Code), 127  which is perhaps the single most 
important regulator of conduct in the course of an M&A transaction in the United 
Kingdom. 
The purpose of the Code is to ensure a fair and equal treatment of all shareholders in 
relation to a takeover.128 Although it does not have the force of law, and is administered 
by a self-regulated body—the Takeover Panel, the provisions for conduct have been very 
successful in maintaining orderly markets and shareholder protections.129 These can be 
attributed to two significant features of the Code. One of them is the mandatory bid 
                                                 
127 Available at the Takeover Panel official website: http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk.  
128 See the Code, Introduction, para 1(a). 
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provisions, which means that when control of a firm is acquired through tender offer, 
private transaction, or on the open market, the remaining shareholders will be allowed to 
exit the corporation at the best price offered. The other is the prohibitions against 
defensive measures taken by the board, which embodies the philosophy that shareholders 
own the company and the board manages it, and thus it is the shareholders that should 
decide on whether or not to sell the company.130 Non-compliance with the Principles and 
Rules of the Code, as well as its “spirits”, may lead to penalties such as public censure, 
and violations may influence the access to public securities markets. 
Although in its Introduction Section, the Code itself says that it is concerned neither with 
the implications for competition policy which may be raised by M&A transactions, nor 
with the financial or commercial advantages of such transactions, it has been indeed 
functionally playing a role in maximizing the efficiency gains from M&A transactions, 
because “the gains realized by both target and acquiring shareholders appear to be social 
gains, not merely private ones” (Lichtenberg, 1992). This is especially applicable to 
cross-border M&As. According to a study of foreign takeovers in the United Kingdom, 
which found that, relative to firms in domestic takeovers, firms taken over by foreigners 
increased both productivity and wages (M. Conyon et al, 1999), it may be concluded that 
most foreign acquirers may have advantages over the domestic ones (even in the UK, 
many of whose domestic firms are already competitive players in the global market). 
Since there are the few regulatory restrictions in the course of cross-border M&As in the 
UK, the frustrated actions of the target managements will be the major barriers to the 
implementation of transactions. Thus, the prohibition of the defensive measures by target 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 See Scott Mitnick, supra note 59. 
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managements has substantially reduced the risks and cost of the transactions. In the 
meantime, the adoption of a mandatory bid rule will raise the price of such transactions 
by forcing acquirers to pay all shareholders a uniform premium, similar in size to that 
which previously would have been paid only to the controlling shareholders if without 
such rule. 131  Given that the application of the Code does not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign acquirers, it is functionally facilitating the cross-border M&As, in 
which the foreign buyers are likely to bring in large amount of capitals (in many forms) 
and superior technologies.  
 
Protection of the order and efficiency of capital markets in M&A transactions 
Different from greenfield investment, cross-border M&As can directly involve the 
transactions in capital market of the host economy, thereby influence the orderly 
functions of capital markets. Since in capital market, transactions usually interrelate with 
each other, a large amount of purchase and sale of securities in a transaction will 
probably lead to fluctuation of the whole market. Considering that financial stability is 
the base of the sustainable growth of economy, it makes sense for the host country to pay 
close attention to the potential effects of cross-border M&As on its capital market. 
Regulations that aim to curb the undesirable effects of cross-border M&As on capital 
market are playing a role in regulating the conducts of foreign acquirers who propose to 
carry out the transaction through purchase of shares.  
                                                                                                                                                 
130 For a detailed analysis of these two features, please refer to Weinberg and Blank supra note 7, Part 4, 
Section 20 and 21. 
131 It has been argued that even if the mandatory bid rule has the effect of increasing the cost of acquisitions, 
its effect appears to be countered by the prohibition on defensive measures. See Scott Mitnick, supra note 
59. 
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These rules, on one hand, have the functions to keep the host governments informed of 
the proposed M&A transactions and the relevant financial information of the foreign 
acquirers. Usually notification and disclosure of information are required. For 
transactions that have not exceeded the thresholds for antitrust investigations, the capital 
market rules provide another approach for host countries to be aware of the magnitude of 
the transactions. On the other hand, they are the basis of a transparent and well-ordered 
capital market which contributes significantly to the long-term stability of the national 
financial system. And a favorable financial environment is also a key factor associated 
with the host country’s attractiveness for foreign investment.132  
Most countries have adopted relevant rules to regulate the making of tender offer, a 
public offer to purchase a certain number of securities at a specified price with the offer 
remaining open for a specific period. Such regulations usually aim at timely disclosure of 
the intention of the acquirers as well as their financial situations before any irreversible 
decisions have been made by the shareholders. Although the control over the making of 
tender offers itself is not likely to affect substantively the economic impacts of cross-
border M&As on host countries, the information about the foreign acquirers that have 
been disclosed is closely related to the subsequent stage of the transaction; and what is 
more, based on such information, the host governments could make proper responses so 
as to limit any possible unpleasant consequences in advance. 
Basically, the host countries will require the tender offers be made on the satisfaction of 
certain conditions which typically include: 
                                                 
132 Capital market rules play a main role in protecting the interests of shareholders. In this sense, they are 
functioning similar to the Code in the UK. For example, in the U.S., the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has adopted several tender offer practices rules to maintain a “level playing field” in 
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(1) the tender by shareholders of a minimum number or percentage of the outstanding 
shares; 
(2) approval or other favorable action by government agencies; and 
(3) absence of litigation affecting the tender offer. 
 
Despite the worldwide similarity in the rules governing tender offers, they are being 
implemented differently from country to country in a way consistent with each 
government’s philosophies in regulating the transactions. For example, in the U.S., where 
the government has taken great effort to maintain an investor-orientated market, the 
government agencies, i.e. the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) is only 
granted the authority to prescribe and enforce disclosure standards. When such standards 
are met, the SEC is not authorized to prevent the tender offer. And often the notification 
and disclosure obligations will not be triggered until the acquirer has held a substantially 
large shareholding of the targets.133 In contrast, the making of tender offers is subject to 
prior application in some other countries such as France. Whenever an offeror wishes to 
make an offre publique d’achat (OPA) or an offre publique d’échange (OPE),134 he must 
file an application with the Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF) beforehand. In the 
case of cross-border M&As, the foreign acquirers must attach a copy of prior declaration 
                                                                                                                                                 
the market and protect shareholders and investors by allowing them to make the decisions whether or not to 
tender their shares.  
133 In particular, Section 13(d), an amendment adding to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the rules 
and regulations promulgated thereunder requires any person who acquires beneficial ownership of 5% or 
more of a corporation’s equity securities to publicly disclose such ownership by filing a “Schedule 13D” 
disclosure statement with the SEC, and with corporation and any securities exchange on which the 
securities are traded. Such filings must be made within 10 days of the acquisition of 5% or more of the 
corporation’s securities. See 17 C.F.R. §240.13d-1(a).  
134 If the consideration to be paid for the share acquisition consists of cash, such transaction are referred to 
as an offre publique d’achat (OPA); where the consideration consists of securities, the transaction is known 
as an offre publique d’échange (OPE). 
 63
made to the Ministry of Economy that is empowered to authorize the investment by non-
residents of France, if such investments are required to obtain authorization before 
implementation. The CMF has a period of five trading days following the publication of 
the proposal's filing to determine whether the offer proposal is acceptable.135 
 
b. Regulatory Responses of Developing Countries 
Capital markets in developing countries are still immature with low levels of transactions 
and liquidity, which is aggravated by the restrictive governmental policies in this area. It 
is therefore not surprising that financially motivated cross-border M&As are rare in 
developing countries, and those carried out through public tender offer or the purchase of 
shares in stock exchanges of the host countries are less likely to take place. As a result, 
most developing countries’ regulatory emphasis regarding cross-border M&As is not 
placed on protecting the interests of shareholders and the orderly function of their 
securities markets. Instead, these host governments are more concerned with how to 
regulate these M&A transactions so that the foreign investments involved in them can be 
more beneficial to serve their current development priority as well as the sustainable 
economic development goals.  
One of the main reasons behind the strong feelings against cross-border M&As in 
developing countries is the fear of the dominance of foreign ownership in domestic 
industries which may result in the development of these industries being under control of 
foreign hands. Legislation that addressed such concern can be found in developing host 
countries. For example, in Indonesia, a FDI can be established in the form of a straight 
                                                 
135 Article 5.1.8 Title V of CMF General Regulation. 
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investment, which means that 100% of the shares are owned by foreign investors.136 
However, it is required that no later than 15 years from the commencement of 
commercial production, some of the company’s shares should be sold to Indonesian 
citizen and/or business entities, through direct placement and/or indirectly through 
domestic capital market.137 By imposing such requirement, the Indonesian government 
could at least ensure that domestic participation will not be completely excluded in the 
industries where foreign ownership dominates.   
Apart from such compulsory requirements, it is noted that many of the legislative efforts 
in developing countries have also been focused on the provision of incentives to foreign 
acquirers in order to encourage them to transact and operate in a way that is most 
beneficial to the host economies. For instance, in many Asia countries which were 
affected by the financial crisis, their governments released a wide range of laws and 
regulations with the aim to attract cross-border M&As which are believed to be able to 
play an immediate role in providing sufficient funds and preserving their existing 
domestic assets that would otherwise have been wiped out. In Korea, for example, the 
government enacted the Foreign Investment Promotion Act (the FIPA) in 1998 with the 
aim to promote foreign investment by providing incentives and inducements.138 It is 
noted that Article 2(4) of this Act specifies two forms of foreign investments eligible for 
the promotions, one of which is cross-border M&A transactions.139 In parallel with the 
FIPA, the system for tax reduction or exemption has also been drastically improved on 
September 16, 1998 as a part of means to positively induce foreign investments. Among 
                                                 
136 See Article 2.1(a) of the Government Regulation No.20/1994 Concerning on the Requirements for Share 
Ownership in Foreign Direct Investment (as amended by Government Regulation No.83/2001). 
137 See Article 7.1 of the Government Regulation No.20/1994 
138 Act No.5559, September 16, 1998, see Article 1. 
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others, cross-border M&As involving introduction of technologies, or those in service 
businesses that support the international competitiveness of Korea domestic enterprises, 
are eligible for the tax incentives under such system.140 Undeniably, the recovery of 
Korea’s after-crisis economy has benefited substantially from these encouraging 
legislative measures which have led to rapid rise of cross-border M&As in this 
country.141 
In addition to these legal frameworks established substantially for special purpose under 
exceptional circumstances, many developing countries also have legislation aiming to 
secure the long-term benefits from inward cross-border M&As. This may be because 
most these regulators have realized that the increase of cross-border M&As into their 
countries should not be a one-time effect of their privatization or restructuring programs 
and only used to resolve the past problems. Instead, they hope, and believe, based on both 
theoretical researches and empirical evidence from developed countries, that in the long-
term, cross-border M&As can not only induce new investment, domestic or foreign, but 
they can also introduce new managerial, production and marketing resources to target 
firms, thereby improving efficiency and productivity.142 An example of such legislation 
can be found in Peru, where foreign investors are granted guarantees of various legal 
stabilities under its governing FDI regime, provided they commit themselves to fulfil a 
                                                                                                                                                 
139 See Article 2(1).4(a). The other form is long-term loan; see Article 2(1).4(b).  
140Article 3(3) and Article 26 of the FIPA, and Article 121-2 (2)—(5) of Korea’s Restriction of Preferential 
Taxation Act, Act No.6194, January 21 2000 
141 According to UNCTAD (2000), acquisitions by foreign firms in the Republic of Korea exceeded $9 
billion in 1999, making it the largest recipient of M&A-related FDI in developing Asia.  
142 According to a research by César Calderón et al (2004), who had worked with annual data for the period 
1987-2001 for samples of 22 industrial and 50 developing countries, it is found that an expansion of M&A 
is indeed followed by an increase in greenfield FDI. They also estimated that the subsequent expansion of 
greenfield FDI is at least as large as the initial increase in M&A, and substantially more in developing 
economies. Such findings are consistent with the evidence from developing countries which shows that 
sequential investment after cross-border M&As can be sizable (WIR 2000). 
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range of obligations.143 Among others, there are provisions requiring foreign investor to 
undertake new investment commitments in order to enjoy the system of law stability.144 
Particularly, only when these new investments are assigned to the expansion of 
production capacity or technological improvement can the receiving enterprises be 
eligible for such guarantees.145 It is therefore not surprising that a noteworthy feature of 
Peru’s privatization program is that the new owners committed themselves to further new 
investments of about US$ 9.1 billion for modernization and expansion of the firms 
acquired.146 
 
In summary, the focus and patterns of host countries’ regulation of cross-border M&As 
depends primarily upon the governments’ policy objectives, which may vary 
substantially among jurisdictions. Generally, FDI policies can be used to maximize the 
benefits and minimize the costs of cross-border M&As through such as sectoral 
reservations, ownership restrictions, screening, incentives, etc. It is also necessary to have 
certain specific cross-border M&A policies in place to address the special concerns 
arising from these transactions. However, as has been increasingly recognized by most 
countries, developed or developing, one of the principle policy challenges that cross-
border M&As pose to host governments is that the inflow of foreign investments through 
foreign acquisitions may be beneficial to host economies even though these transactions 
                                                 
143 The cornerstone of Peru’s FDI regime is the Foreign Investment Promotion Law (approved in August 
1991) which establishes clear rules and security for the development of foreign investments in the country. 
The general legal framework for the treatment of foreign investments is complemented by the Framework 
Law for Private Investment Growth, approved by Legislative Decree Nº 757 and the Regulations of the 
Private Investment Guarantee Systems, approved by Supreme Decree Nº 162-92-EF. 
144 See Article 16 of the Supreme Decree Nº 162-92-EF for the details of the conditions to enjoy the system 
of law stability.  
145 Article 17(a) of the  Supreme Decree Nº 162-92-EF 
146 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review of Peru, 2000, pp. 3 
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raise competition concerns at the meantime. Accordingly, the most important policy 
instrument dealing with cross-border M&As -- competition policy will be discussed in 





















REGULATING CROSS-BORDER M&As UNDER HOST 
COUNTRIES’ COMPETITION LAWS 
 
I. A Summary of the Competition Effects of Cross-Border M&As  
 
Corporate mergers and acquisitions in general may raise competition concerns by 
changing the structure of the given market in which such transactions are taking place.  
The reduction of the number of incumbent firms, and the resultant increase of the market 
share concentration, may provide the acquiring firms with sufficient market power to 
acquire the dominant market position, enabling them to engage in anticompetitive 
practices that are detrimental to the effective competition within the market. With respect 
to cross-border M&As, such concerns focus on the competition effects on both local 
consumers and local competitors of merging enterprises. However, probably because 
their FDI-related nature, cross-border M&As appear to have complex effects on a host-
country’s market structure and competition,147 which deserve a special mention before 
discussing the merger control regimes of host countries.  
 
 
                                                 
147 There are some kinds of cross-border M&As which also raise competition concerns to host economies, 
although the acquired firms are not domestic firms of host countries. For instance, a TNC with an affiliate 
in a host country acquires an enterprise in a third country that has been a source of import competition in 
the host country market; or two foreign affiliates in a host economy merge, although their parent firms 
remain separate, eliminating competition between the two affiliates and leading to a dominant market 
position (UNCTAD 2000). The features of these types of cross-border M&As do no correspond with FDI, 
and therefore are out of the scope of discussion here. 
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A. Cross-border M&As and Host-Country’s Market Structure 
 
Although cross-border M&As, unlike greenfield FDI, do not add to the number of the 
competitors in the host-country’s market at least at the time of entry, they do not 
necessarily increase the market concentration within host economies. Theoretically, there 
is the possibility that the foreign acquirers, which have no previous presence in the host 
country, engage in acquisitions of local firms motivated more by searching for new 
markets than by increasing their market power. In these cases, such cross-border M&As 
may only represent the transfer of target firms’ market shares to foreign acquirers which 
have no market shares before the transactions. There will be no market concentration 
immediately after these activities.148  
Doubtless there are many other cases where the consummation of cross-border M&As 
can result in the integration of market shares into foreign hands. And yet the competition 
within the given domestic market is not automatically affected adversely, because high 
concentration by itself does not indicate anti-competitive effects. 149  The actual 
competition impacts of cross-border M&As depend on a number of factors.  
                                                 
148 This is only the case at the time of entry, however. In long term, the foreign acquirers are likely to gain 
more market shares by forcing other domestic competitors out of the market, because foreign affiliates are 
often more efficient and productive than their local counterparts in the industries in which they operate, 
therefore bring into the market competitions that some local firms are unable to withstand. It should be 
noted that such competition effects are not exclusive to cross-border M&As.  Foreign firms enter through 
new establishments could also cause the same competition problem. 
149 Paragraph 5.28 of Australia’s Merger Guideline (available at 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/%20itemId/304397/fromItemId/341173) says “…acquisitions 
resulting in concentration levels above the thresholds are not considered to give rise automatically to a 
substantial lessening of competition. Rather, the thresholds establish the need for further qualitative 
evaluation of market conditions.” 
See also Section 92(2) of the Competition Act in Canada, which reads “…the Tribunal shall not find that a 
merger or proposed merger prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantially 
solely on the basis of evidence of concentration or market share.” 
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For example, the situation of the host-country firms being acquired can make all the 
difference. If the transaction involves the purchase of competitive domestic firms, the 
resultant increased market concentration, if any, is likely to give the combined business 
significant competitive advantages over the existing domestic or overseas rivals. The 
threat of the abuse of market power is therefore imminent as firms are by no means 
immune to the temptation to use this power to achieve dominant positions or secure 
higher levels of protection (UNCTAD, 2000). In contrast, if foreign acquirers purchase 
the ailing domestic firms which would otherwise have been forced out of the market, the 
cross-border M&As are actually playing a role in preventing the existing market structure 
from concentrating. The competition in the domestic market may even be strengthened 
by such transaction as the new owner may undertake substantial investments to revitalize 
the existing facilities, and thus import additional competition into the market. 
Some recent researches have reached the similar conclusion by taking into account other 
factors such as output changes among firms following an M&A transaction. According to 
Joshua S. Gans (2000), there is no simple relationship between concentration, 
competition and welfare, and it is entirely possible that the increase of concentration can 
improve social welfare in the event that firms in the transactions are of different sizes, 
and the outside firms are likely to respond aggressively to contractions in output by the 
merged firms.  
However, in spite of the fact that cross-border M&As do not necessarily lead to the 
increase of market concentration immediately, it should be borne in mind that these 
transactions may still cause competition problems without resulting in explicit changes in 
the host-country market structure. Taking cross-border vertical M&As as the example, 
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the foreign acquirer may raise the prices of the products within the host markets to keep 
rivals, existing or potential, from sources of supply after its acquisition of the supplier. 
The indigenous firms, which are competing with the foreign acquirer in the same industry, 
might be forced to close as the consequence of the increased costs of production. And 
barriers to new entry, either domestic or foreign ones, may also be erected as a result of 
such conducts of the foreign acquirers.  
 
In practice, competition regulators around the world have commonly recognized that 
under the circumstances of high degree of market concentration, host economies are 
always facing the threat of jeopardizing the contestability and efficient functioning of 
their markets. 150  In fact, M&As can be deliberately used to reduce the number of 
competitors in host markets when the foreign acquirer already operates in the markets. It 
has been recognized in many documents such as the newly adopted Guidelines under the 
EC Merger Regulation (EC Regulation No. 139/2004) that very large market shares - 
50% or more - may in themselves be evidence of the existence of a dominant market 
position. The absence of high post-merger market share or concentration means that 
effective competition likely remains in the relevant market sufficient to defeat the 
exercise of market power. Accordingly, the impacts of cross-border M&As on the 
structure of host market, i.e. whether they will generate market concentration, always 
attract the close scrutiny by many competition authorities for merger control purpose.151   
                                                 
150 This can be demonstrated in many case laws. See Dräger Medical AG/Air-Shields case (the UK), 
Aérospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland case (the EC), and the Philadelphia National Bank case (the US). 
151 There are the Philadelphia National Bank a number of countries where market concentration has been 
specified as an important factor considered in their merger control reviews. See the following documents as 
examples: Section 50.3(c) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia), Section 2.7(i) of the Antimonopoly 
Act 1947, as revised in 2003 (Japan), Article 2.7 and Article 7.4(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair 
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Equally important to note that, besides competition laws, there are certain policy 
measures adopted by host governments to protect an efficient market structure. Some of 
them are formulated to ensure the widely distributed market shares. For example, policies 
that encourage imports will help to decrease the degree of concentration in the market in 
which the imported products compete with those produced by the foreign affiliates 
established through acquiring domestic producers.152 Attracting more foreign firms’ entry 
into the same market, especially in the form of greenfield investment, also contributes to 
improve the market structure. There are also some governmental policies aiming to 
encourage their domestic firms to combine their operations, or to enter into joint venture 
with TNCs, in the hope that the gap in capabilities between domestic firms and foreign 
affiliates can be narrowed. Although market concentration might be increased in this case, 
the threat of the abuse of market power by foreign acquirers is less imminent because 
their domestic rivals have strengthened their competitiveness.153 
. 
These policy measures are especially applicable in the countries with weak regulatory 
framework protecting competitions. This is because, on the one hand, the worldwide 
pervasion of liberalizing FDI regime has diminished the use of FDI restrictions by host 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trade Act (Korea), Point 251 of the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud 
Control Guideline (France) and §1.5 of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (the US). 
152 In fact, import competition is an important factor that is considered by some competition authorities to 
evaluate the competition effects of the M&A transactions in question. For example, according to paragraph 
5.111 of Australia’s Merger Guideline, the Australia Competition and Consumer Commission “has not 
objected any merger where comparable and competitive imports have held a sustained market share of 10 
per cent or more for at least three years, and – as an indicative guideline – is unlikely to do so.” 
Accordingly, if the market concentration resulted from a reviewed transaction is low enough, the 
Commission will next determine whether or not there is enough import competition to discipline the market 
(paragraph 5.29). 
153 An example is that the in order to stay competitive ahead of the full market liberalization in 2007, when 
the increasing competition from foreign banks can be envisaged, Malaysia government has encouraged the 
local bank mergers since 2000, a program that merged 54 banks and financial housed into 10 groups under 
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countries to avoid the undesirable competition effects of cross-border M&As. On the 
other hand, the elimination of regulatory barriers to FDI will inevitably lead to the 
increased inflow of foreign investment in the form of cross-border M&As. Such inflows 
have the potential to erect new barriers to FDI, i.e. anticompetitive practices of dominant 
firms which are aimed to preclude competitors. The fact that many developing countries 
do not have competition laws or the resources to implement them vigorously provides 
scope for the introduction of such policy measures that may help to maintain the 
contestability and competitiveness of their domestic markets.  
 
B. Cross-border M&As and Anti-Competitive Practices 
 
Firms are often tempted to engage in anti-competitive practices once they possess strong 
competitive advantages over their rivals. In host-country markets, the competitive 
conducts of market participants, as well as the impacts of these conducts on host 
economies, seldom differ because of the firms’ nationalities. Accordingly, the host 
governments’ prohibitions against the anti-competitive behaviors usually apply to all 
firms operating within host markets, regardless of their country of origins.154  
In host countries, the merger control regime, if any, is usually a separate set of provisions 
under competition laws, which deals specifically with the competition effects of M&A 
                                                                                                                                                 
Band Negara’s supervision. See More Bank Mergers in Next Few Years, Business Times (Malaysia), 
October 24, 2002. 
154 The description of contravening behaviors of firms under competition laws varies among host countries. 
Even if the illegal competitive conducts are terms similarly in some countries, what constitute the violation 
of the competition provisions governing a particular anti-competitive practice may also differ. For example, 
despite that the abuse or misuse of market dominance is all prohibited under competition laws in the UK, 
Australia and Canada, the activities that amount to the abuse or misuse of market dominance have been 
specified differently under each regime. See Sect.18 of the Competition Act 1998 (the UK), Sect. 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Australia), and Sect. 78 and 79 of the Competition Act (Canada). 
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transactions, while the anti-competitive practices of firms are often regulated by another 
separate set of rules under competition laws. The implication of such arrangement 
suggests that anti-competitive practices are not necessarily the results of M&A 
transactions which are often accused of causing anti-competitive effects.155 Therefore, it 
is not surprising to find that there is no evidence that, at least in the long term, foreign 
firms in host markets would differ because of their entry mode in their competitive 
behaviors, as well as in the effects of such conducts– both those entering through cross-
border M&As and those entering through greenfield investments may engage in anti-
competitive practices as long as they obtain more competitive advantages than their 
competitors.156 In other words, the anti-competitive practices are not the inherent risks 
that host economies must face in cross-border M&As, nor are they the unique features to 
these transactions. 
 
However, despite that M&As are not always correlated with anti-competitive activities, it 
is undeniable that the consummation of these transactions may provide considerable 
avenues open for restrictive business practices by the combined firms. In the case of 
cross-border M&As, the worries about the high incidence of such conducts are even 
greater on the part of host countries.  
                                                 
155 Even in some countries such as Indonesia and Thailand, where the regulations of M&As are included in 
provisions governing anti-competitive practices, these transactions are not automatically treated as anti-
competitive. Only those transactions that “cause monopolistic practices” or “lessen competition” are 
considered violating competition provisions. This is different from most anti-competitive practices, the 
mere existence of which would be a breach of competition laws. In addition, the fact that the detailed 
provisions concerning M&As are stipulated in government regulations rather than in the same chapter that 
governing anti-competitive practices also reveals the attitude of competition regulators towards these 
transactions. (In practice, the implementing regulations have not been issued by Indonesian government 
and the provisions on M&A transactions have not been effectively implemented) See Article 28 and 29 of 
the Law No.5 of 1999, Ban on Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition of Indonesia, and 
Section 26 of Trade Competition Act of 1999 of Thailand. 
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For one thing, there are several typical scenarios where the foreign acquirers are in effect 
making “monopolizing M&As” which in themselves amount to anti-competitive 
practices. These may include the transaction where an investing foreign firm acquires a 
market leader in the host country which it previously competed with, or where the foreign 
firm has the incentive to suppress rather than develop the competitive potential of the 
local firm to be acquired (UNCTAD, 1997).   
For another, cross-border M&As can provide foreign firms with access to the proprietary 
assets of local firms, such as the possession of local permits and license, and the local 
distribution networks. Usually these assets are not available elsewhere in the market and 
take time to develop, which therefore complement the assets of foreign investors entering 
through M&As, and give the new firms significant competitive advantages over their 
competitors. As these foreign firms often possess more advantages, and in a speedier way, 
than those achieved by greenfield investors, there are more chances that foreign acquirers 
will abuse such advantages, most of which may fall into the scope of anti-competitive 
practices prohibited under competition laws in host countries.  
 
Accordingly, although the provisions governing anti-competitive practices under host 
countries’ competition laws are seldom applied in merger control process,157 the concerns 
of competition regulator over the potential for restrictive business practices often play an 
                                                                                                                                                 
156 WIR 2000, pp. 195 
157 It is clear that the allegations of anti-competitive market conducts by a merging party are generally 
addressed under the provisions specifically governing these practices, and do not form part of an evaluation 
under merger control rules. For example, in its advice in Frito Lay Trading / Golden Wonder (8 July, 2002), 
the Office of Fair Trade (the OFT) in the UK concluded: “.... In addition, significant concerns have been 
expressed regarding Walkers’ current trading practices, but these concerns do not arise as a result of this 
merger situation. …. We will consider them accordingly and intend to pursue the issue with the companies 
once a decision on the merger has been announced.” (The advice is available at 
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important role in merger reviews, despite that the burden of proof may be higher when 
the merger reviewing authorities rely on the analysis of such potential. 158  Taking 
FirstGroup/Scottish Passenger Rail Franchise, one of the most recent M&A case 
reviewed by the Competition Commission in the UK, the regulator expressed various 
concerns when assessing the proposed transaction as to the anti-competitive practices that 
the acquirer might engage in, such as that the acquirer might leverage its control of the 
rail franchise to extend its bus operation, or that the acquirer might introduce multi-modal 
ticketing to the exclusion of rivals.159 
 
C. Cross-Border M&As and Host Countries’ Competition for FDI 
 
As the competition for FDI among host countries mounts, and meanwhile foreign 
investors become choosier, it has been recognized that passive liberalization alone is not 
enough to attract more FDI, especially when the objective of the host country is to 
develop certain strategic industries. Various promotional programs are therefore 
implemented in many host countries to enhance their locational advantages as the 
destinations of FDI flows, such as leaving most activities open to foreign investors, or 
creating new infrastructure or supporting institutions that make investments more viable, 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Mergers+FTA/Advice/Clearances+and+referrals/Frito+Lay+Trading+Co+
GmbH+.htm. ) 
158 The OFT, one of the UK’s competition authorities, has made it clear in its advise of August 22, 2002 on 
Synopsys / Avant! that if the decisions regarding merger control are to be made based on the behavioral 
situations where the potentially anti-competitive effects of a concentration result are from conduct engaged 
in by the merged entity post-merger, such conducts must raise not merely theoretical, but “specific and 
substantive concerns”. (The advice is available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/Business/Mergers+FTA/Advice/Clearances+and+referrals/Synopsys.htm.)  
159 See the Competition Commission’s report on the proposed acquisition by FirstGroup plc of the Scottish 
Passenger Rail franchise currently operated by ScotRail Railways Limited, Section 5: Assessment of 
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or even granting foreign investors various advantages over domestic enterprises in certain 
industries.  
Whether cross-border M&As will have negative impacts on the competition of host 
countries’ markets is also associated with such promotional measures. In many cases, 
especially in developing countries, it is the host government’s desire to attract more FDI 
that provides foreign investors with sufficient powers to curtail the competition within the 
host market. 
In order to induce more FDI, many host countries agree to offer foreign investors various 
arrangements that grant market power with legal protection against competition. For 
instance, by granting exclusive establishment rights, the host governments ensure that the 
foreign investors to whom such rights are granted will only encounter the competition 
from production by local firms (UNCTAD, 1997). Other market-power inducements may 
include some fiscal concessions and financial subsidies, or even sometimes allowing a 
foreign investor to invest in, or take over, a natural-monopoly-type industry which is 
almost impossible for other competitors to enter.  
Either at the initiative of a government or at the request of the foreign investor, such 
granting is actually playing a role in accelerating the erection of barriers to potential 
competitors, and thus adversely affects the consumer welfare in the host economy by the 
lessening or absence of competition. However, if to secure the benefits of FDI, such as 
the production efficiency, the increase in productive investment and job opportunities, the 
promotion of technical progress and managerial skills, is regarded as a high priority in 
some host countries, the potential competition effects in terms of the reduction in 
                                                                                                                                                 
competitive effects of the merger, available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/2004/490firstgroup.htm.  
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consumer welfare may be considered by their governments as a necessary sacrifice in 
some strategic or key industries. 
 
With respect to cross-border M&As, the market-power inducements granted to the 
foreign acquirer may come with more serious competition costs than other modes of FDI. 
As has been stated before, foreign investments enter through cross-border M&As do not 
add to the number of competitors in the host-country market, nor do they automatically 
increase the productive investment within the host economy. By acquiring the leading 
local enterprise, the foreign acquirer may even attain the dominant position in relevant 
market immediately after the transaction. It is therefore possible that the completion of a 
cross-border M&A transaction without any inducements could give rise to competition 
concerns in the host economy. Such concerns would deepen if the transaction is 
motivated by the market-power inducement provided by the host country.  
There are a number of host countries which are in urgent need of large amount of 
investible capital to develop other aspects of their economies, and a host of governments 
which prefer to maximize immediate financial gains and reduce budget deficits. For them, 
to sell a domestic enterprise – sometimes a domestic monopoly – to foreign investors 
may be the fastest way to serve their objectives. And the utilization of market-power 
inducement could give a boost to the deals and meanwhile help to obtain the highest 
possible price for the business sold. In these cases, the long term impacts on competition 
of these transactions would be paid less attention.  
Since it is more possible that granting foreign acquirers certain market power inducement 
may result in competition concerns that outweigh the benefits such investment may bring 
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in, the host government should be particularly wary of making such offer. The costs and 
benefits should be identified as clearly as possible. And the evaluation should be 
conducted on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the principal elements of each 
cross-border M&A transaction. Also, the host government should be informed about the 
impact of their decisions on competition. It is ideal that the government could have the 
sufficient information to judge whether an investor would still make the investment even 
if not granted as much monopolistic power (UNCTAD, 1997). When such granting is 
finally unavoidable, there still exist a number of options that can be utilized to minimize 
the anticompetitive effects of FDI in general, cross-border M&As in particular, such as 
circumscribing the exclusivity granted in terms of time and scope, or setting up periodical 
review by competition authorities.160   
 
II. The Regulation of Cross-border M&As Under Competition Laws 
 
The expectation implied in a host country’s efforts to attract FDI may sometimes conflict 
with the government’s objective to protect the efficient allocation of resources within its 
domestic economy. Reconciliation of the conflict becomes the necessity, which then 
underscores the importance in formulating and enforcing competition laws. 
Recognizing that competition is an essential element of a market economy which 
provides the incentive for firms and consumers to behave in a manner that leads to 
efficiency, many countries have designed various laws to protect the competitiveness of 
their domestic market.   
                                                 
160 See UNCTAD WIR 1997, pp.186-189. 
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A. The Role of Competition Laws in Regulating Cross-border M&As 
 
a. Competition law – the further liberalization of FDI 
The fact that competition law is playing an increasingly important role in regulating FDI 
in many host countries can be attributed to the worldwide liberalization of FDI regimes. 
On the one hand, the role of traditional tools, such as screening at the time of entry, 
closing activities to FDI and foreign ownership restriction has been substantially 
downplayed, mainly because they conflict with the objective of many host countries to 
attract more foreign investment. The presence of a number of regional or international 
agreements has also made it a clear breach by their member states to adopt some 
restrictive policy measures such as performance requirements. On the other hand, as 
ensuring efficiency gains from FDI for the host economy development remains an 
priority, it becomes all the more important to the host countries that the reduced 
regulatory obstacles to the free flow of FDI are not replaced by anticompetitive practices 
of firms, be they domestic or foreign.  
 
Several literature have contributed to find evidence of the impacts of national competition 
law on FDI. Among others, Julian L. Clarke (2003) finds that there is a positive 
relationship between the existence of a competition law, the enforcement of competition 
law and FDI, and therefore a highly competitive economy may encourage inbound FDI. 
Moreover, Marcus Noland (1999) observes that the entry of destabilizing new entrants 
(domestic or foreign) can be impeded by firms acting in concert horizontally or vertically; 
merger and acquisitions, the dominant mechanism for FDI in developed country market 
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can also be impeded by the behavior and practice of the incumbent firms; and sometimes, 
the ability of private parties to actually foreclose entry is facilitated by some kind of 
government regulations that are not directly aimed at foreign investment. He then focus 
on the data from the US and Japan, and come to the conclusion that government 
competition policies and their enforcement can constrain the ability of private firms to 
engage in anticompetitive behavior and impede FDI. And therefore, “competition policies 
per se may be the general trend toward deregulation and liberalization in both goods and 
factors markets with the consequent elimination of anticompetitive practice…. This can 
be expected to have a salutary effect on both goods trade and investment … as well as 
entry by both domestic and foreign firms.” (Noland, 1999) 
 
Therefore, as the result of FDI liberalization which has created more space for firms to 
pursue their interests including the dominant market position, ensuring a well functioning 
domestic market so as to enhance its competitiveness for FDI and to optimize the impact 
of such inward FDI has been on the top of the agenda of most host countries. 
“Competition policy can thus play a major role in the process of liberalization, notably by 
ensuring that markets are kept as open as possible to new entrants, and firms do not 
frustrate this by engaging in anticompetitive practices. In this manner, a vigorous 
enforcement of competition law can provide reassurance that FDI liberalization will not 
leave a government powerless against anticompetitive transactions or subsequent 
problems.” (UNCTAD, 1997)  
The worldwide pervasion of competition laws as a means to regulate inward FDI can also 
be attributed to that these laws in principle do not discriminate between national and 
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foreign firms or between foreign firms from different national or regional origins when it 
comes to the analysis of competition effects. Thus, host countries’ breach of their 
commitments to accord foreign investors with national treatment or most-favored nation 
treatment can be avoided in the actions under competition laws. 
 
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that competition law is not a substitute for FDI 
regulations. Instead, these two are mutually supportive and complementary in the host 
government’s effort to ensure a properly functioning market. And it also must be known 
that only a few countries have developed well-functioning system of competition laws or 
have established the means to implement them fairly and effectively. This means that 
regulating cross-border M&A transactions in many other countries still needs to rely 
primarily on foreign investment laws and other temporary provisions formulated 
specifically for this purpose. 
 
b. Merger control – the main competition rules affecting FDI 
The provisions under host countries’ competition laws affect the inward FDI in two 
principal ways. On the one hand, by prohibiting anti-competitive practices in host 
markets such as raising prices or reducing output, competition laws are in effect 
regulating the host markets to eliminate as much as possible the effects of foreclosure or 
other competition restrictions, so that the inflow of FDI would not be unduly impeded.161  
On the other hand, by blocking anti-competitive M&As, competition laws are playing a 
direct role in limiting the entry of foreign investors. As cross-border M&As have 
                                                 
161 However, it has to be admitted that certain anti-competitive practices such as raising prices via a cartel 
will encourage foreign entry because of the existing high price within the host-country market.   
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dominated the entry mode of FDI (at least in the developed world), merger control 
regulations have grown in importance as a mechanism for host governments to regulate 
the inward FDI.  
Merger control rules are usually in the form of separate set of provisions under 
competition laws. In jurisdictions where there is high incidence of M&A transactions, 
merger review is even specified in separate statutes. Typical examples are the EC Merger 
Regulations – Council Regulation No. 139/2004,162 the Fair Trading Act 1973 (the FTA) 
in the UK as amended by the Enterprise Act 2002 (the EA), and Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act 1914 in the US as amended by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act 1950 (the CKA 
Act) and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 (the HSR Act).  
 
Theoretically, merger control is the government’s interference with the operation of the 
market in which shareholders buy and sell shares as they deem appropriate; by 
intervening and preventing M&A transactions, or requiring alterations to them, merger 
control is actually carried out in the public interest rather than on behalf of shareholders 
(Richard Whish, 2001). Under most merger control regimes such interventions are based 
purely on competition effects of M&A transactions. However, in some countries, M&As 
are reviewed under a “public interest” standard, i.e. consideration is extended beyond 
pure competition effects. 163  In other words, such countries might approve an anti-
competitive M&A because of its favorable effects on local employment, export or import 
performance, or any other positive externalities. In the case of cross-border M&As 
                                                 
162 Effective from 1 May 2004, it is to replace the Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 
1989.  
163 Before the enactment of the Enterprise Act 2003, the M&A transactions in the UK were assessed against 
the “public interest” test. 
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involving FDI, more problems may arise when defining the justifiable scope of “public 
interests” when the transactions come with competition cost. The trade-offs must be 
made between the economic gains from FDI and the anti-competitive effects of the 
transactions. 
Merger control regulations mainly deal with the market structure rather than behavioral 
situation, aimed at avoiding the creation of market dominance, monopolies, or even 
oligopolies that may lessen the competition. Merger review is preventive in nature as it is 
designed to prevent a structural restraint against competition prior to its occurrence. This 
is different from other investigations under competition laws, which are operative after a 
prohibited act is committed.164 The rationale behind such pre-entry merger control is 
obvious: it is far better to prevent the acquisition of market power than to attempt to 
control or to break up the market power once it exists, which is due to, among other 
things, the high cost and uncertainty of ex post facto scrutiny.165  
It therefore requires ex ante assessment of the possible effects of consolidation on the 
market structure immediately after the transaction, as well as medium or long-term 
performance of markets and firms in the host economy. In order to assess the effects of a 
merger, most merger control regulations require merging parties to notify competition 
authorities of proposed transactions that meet certain criteria and to wait for the 
competition authorities’ review before consummating those transactions.166 
 
                                                 
164  Joseph Wilson, Globalization and the Limits of National Merger Control Laws, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003, pp.44 
165 Contours of A National Competition Policy: A Development Perspective, Briefing Paper, CUTS Center 




B. Merger-Control Regulations and Cross-border M&As 
 
a. Cross-border M&A transactions that are subject to merger reviews 
Few countries apply their merger control regulations only to locally registered firms.167 In 
most host countries, cross-border M&A transactions, FDI-related or not, are regulated 
under the same merger control regulations as those applying to purely domestic ones.168 
This means that in enforcing merger-control regulations, there is no discrimination 
against M&A transactions with foreign participants because of the nationality of the 
merging parties. Nor will these regulations be used to further non-antitrust goals.169On 
the other hand, unless they satisfy the conditions for exemption, cross-border M&A 
transactions can seldom escape from the merger-review procedures on grounds of 
nationality if they exceed the thresholds prescribed in merger control laws.  
And yet whether cross-border M&As will be subject to the merger control under 
competition laws are still left to be decided by competition regulators in each host 
country. Some of them may specify provisions confining the application of their merger-
control regulations to cross-border M&As. For instance, section 35(1)(2) of the Act 
Against Restraints of Competition of 1958 (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 
                                                 
167 Up to 1997, the competition authority of Hungary only reviewed M&As between locally registered 
companies. Such merger regulations were changed in 1997 to cover M&As involving foreign and domestic 
firms. See WIR 1997, pp.193 
168 Broadly speaking, cross-border M&As refer to those M&A transactions involving parties with different 
nationalities. From the perspective of the host country, cross-border M&A transactions may include M&As 
between purely foreign firms, or the M&A of foreign firms by domestic firms, or the M&A by foreign 
firms of domestic firms. Although all of them may come with competition problems, only the last type of 
cross-border M&A transactions can be related to the inflow of FDI, which is the subject of the discussion 
here. 
169 See DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 68 ANTITRUST AND 
TRADE REG. REP.S-1(BNA) No. 1707 (6 April 1995) (Special Supp.) Para.2 (1995 International 
Guideline). Available at DOJ’s website: www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm  
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GWB170) – the main source of merger control legislation in Germany – are of particular 
relevance in cases where German companies are taken over by foreign companies or 
where foreign companies that have only minor business activities in Germany merge. 
According to section 35(1) (2) no German business establishment is required for German 
merger control to apply. Mere sales in Germany made from abroad will suffice if they 
meet the threshold, or otherwise the transaction will be exempt from German merger 
control.171  
A slightly different way is adopted by some others such as Finland. In the case of an 
M&A between two companies, the transaction is to be caught by the merger control rules 
where one of the merging companies or a company controlled by any such company is 
engaging business activities in Finland. Moreover, the requirement of being engaged in 
business activities in Finland is considered fulfilled where any of the above companies 
offer for sale goods or services in Finland through a subsidiary, a branch, a sales office or 
other establishment in Finland. Direct imports to Finland by the target company 
established abroad or by a distributor appointed by it would not lead to the application of 
the merger control rules.172  
In the United States, however, more attention seems to be paid to the effect of the M&A 
transaction concerned on the US commerce. According to the wording of the merger 
control regulations – both section 7 of the Clayton Act 173  and 1995 International 
                                                 
170 It was amended for the sixth time on 26 August 1998 and the amendment took effect on 1 January 1999. 
171 Merger control applies if the participating enterprises together recorded a turnover of at least DM 1 
billion (§ 35 (1) No. 1 GWB), and if at least one enterprise concerned recorded domestic turnover of at 
least DM 50 million (§ 35 (1) No. 2 GWB). 
172 See Finnish Competition Authority’s (FCA) Guideline on the Revised Provisions on the Control of 
Concentrations, Para. 1. The merger control regime in Finland is included in Chapter 3A of the Act on 
Competition Restrictions (303/1998, amended by 318/2004), supplemented by a series of provisions such as 
Notices, Decrees and Guidelines issued by relevant Ministries.  
173 15 U.S.C §18 
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Guideline, the US competition authorities are likely to exercise their jurisdiction over 
those transactions that have the requisite effects on US commerce. This “effect test” is 
usually met when one or both merging parties have production facilities or substantial 
distribution facilities in the United States or when the parties export their products to the 
United States.174 
It is advisable at this point to take some notice of the merger control regime in European 
Union (EU) with respect to the allocation of jurisdiction between the Commission and its 
Member States. Under the Council Regulation 139/2004 (the EC Merger Regulations)175,  
the Commission has almost exclusive jurisdiction to review concentrations with “a 
Community dimension”, i.e. the concentrations which meet the thresholds laid down in 
the Regulations.176 The competition authorities of Member States are free to exercise 
their jurisdiction over concentrations which fall below the thresholds.177 It is therefore 
clear that the Regulation was drafted in such a way as to remove the risk of an overlap 
between the respective jurisdictions of the Commission and the competent national 
authorities, intending to introduce a mechanism of merger control at the Community level 
which would obviate the need for multiple filings of concentrations. 
  
Admittedly, FDI-related cross-border M&As are less likely to cause problems with 
respect to the host countries’ jurisdiction over the transactions which involve domestic 
firms as the targets. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that there are cases where 
FDI entries in the form of cross-border M&As may attract the extraterritorial application 
                                                 
174Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritoriality in US and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 
168-171 (1999) 
175 Published in the Official Journal of the European Journal L 24, 29 January 2004, pp. 1-22 
176 Article 8 and 9 of the EC Merger Regulations 
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of competition laws of a third country other than the host and home country of the 
transaction concerned. Although countries may exercise their extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over cross-border M&As based on different test,178 they might cause similar problems to 
the transactions, 179 and thereby imposing additional burdens on the merging parties.180 
The expected profits of merging parties may be diminished. The resultant negative 
impacts could even be extended to the efficiency gains or other economic goals that the 
host countries had expected to achieved from such transactions.  
US v. Mahle GmbH et al. is an illustrative case, 181 where a German firm, Mahle GmbH, 
acquired a controlling interest of its competitor, Metal Leve S.A., of Brazil, and failed to 
file the requisite notice to the relevant US competition authorities prior to closing a 
transaction. The Federal Trade Commission of the U.S. then obtained the largest Hart-
Scott-Rodino penalties ever -- $5.6 million -- from the German and Brazilian 
manufacturers of diesel engine parts through a consent decree, which stated that Mahle 
GmbH and Metal Leve S.A. failed to comply with Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, as amended, and the pre-merger notification and waiting period 
requirements of Section 7A of the Clayton Act, as amended by the HSR Act.  
Accordingly, one of the main challenges that most host countries are facing is to “devise 
a sensible mechanism for investigating and adjudicating upon mergers having an 
                                                                                                                                                 
177 Article 12 of the EC Merger Regulations  
178  E.g., the U.S. competition authorities adopted the “effect” test, while the EU regulators rely on 
“implementation” test. See Joseph P. Griffin, supra note 174.  
179 The problems caused may include, for example, the cost of multiple filing, the workload involved in 
generating the data necessary for each filing, the delay involved in obtaining clearance from numerous 
jurisdictions, the differing procedural and substantive laws from one jurisdiction to anther. See Richard 
Whish, Competition Law, 4th edition, Butterworths, 2001, pp.724 
180 Such burden is particularly troublesome for small-to-medium-sized transactions, where the potential 
cost (including the cost of delay) may be so large as to deter the parties from even proceeding. See Donald 
Baker, Antitrust Merger Review in An Era of Escalating Cross-Border Transactions and Effects, 18 Wis. 
Int’l L.J.577, 580. 
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international dimension in a way that minimize the administrative burden on business 
while at the same time ensuring that mergers do not escape scrutiny which could have 
detrimental effects upon competition” (Richard Whish, 2001).182 
 
b. Key elements of the merger control regime  
Before considering in detail the key elements of merger control regulations, it should be 
borne in mind that merger control rules in themselves are national competition laws in 
nature, the formulation of which are solely based on the governments’ concern with the 
effects of M&A transactions on their own nation’s consumers and producers. As the 
application of merger control is expected to affect M&A transactions in such a way that 
suits the particular purposes of each government, substantive or procedural variations in 
these rules among countries are inevitable.  
Different approaches adopted by competition regulators regarding controlling the 
economic effects of M&As represent different policy goals. From the legal perspective, 
several key elements in merger control provisions, such as the requirements of 
notification and the substantive test used in analyzing transactions, are designated for 
particular policy goals. Such goals even assign the competition authorities different roles 
to play, leading them to the adoption of different enforcement policies.183  
Almost every country with merger control regime proclaims that the aim of its merger 
control provisions is to secure the competitive market structure by interfering, ex ante, 
                                                                                                                                                 
181 Civ. Act. No. 97-1404, 1997-2 Trade Cases ¶ 71,868. 
182 Further analysis on this subject please refer to Joseph Wilson, supra note 164; Richard Whish, supra 
note 179, Chapter 12, The International Dimension of Competition Law; Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, 
EC Competition Law, Chapter 17, Extraterritoriality, International Aspects, and Globalization, Oxford 
University Press 2001; Donald Baker, supra note 180; Joseph P. Griffin, supra note 179. 
183 Joseph Wilson, supra note 164. 
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with concentrations significantly lessoning competition or creating a dominant position. 
Admittedly, competition effects are usually accorded preponderant weight in the 
evaluation of M&A transactions. However, there are many other competing values 
involved in M&As deserving consideration, such as maximizing the consumer wealth, 
supporting small or medium-size enterprises of domestic industries, protecting easy entry 
into business, encourage innovation and controlling the large accumulations of economic 
or political power.184  In the case of cross-border M&As, there are even more non-
competition considerations which are related to the economic gains from FDI, such as the 
increase in financial resources, and the introduction of advanced technologies and 
managerial skills. Whether these non-competition factors should be taken into account in 
assessing M&A transactions is largely left to be decided by the competition regulators, 
which are responsible for applying merger control provisions in conformity with the 
national development objectives.  
Merger reviews conducted by competition authorities in host countries, whether 
including the examination of non-competition factors or not, are especially relevant to the 
way and the extent that foreign acquirers are allowed to enter the host markets. In view of 
the growing trend where the conventional FDI entry screening by host countries are 
substantially reduced worldwide, the legality of a cross-border M&A transaction under 
the host country’s merger control regulations virtually decides the entry of the foreign 
investor involved.  
 
Notification of the Transactions   
                                                 
184 Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy – The Law of Competition and Its Practice, Second 
Edition, West Group, 1999 pp.71 
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(i) Pre-merger notification – mandatory vs. voluntary 
The merger review procedures in most jurisdictions usually begin with notification of the 
transactions by the merging parties to relevant competition authorities. There are a 
number of countries where notification requirements are mandatory, i.e. every qualifying 
M&A transaction must be notified by merging parities if the specified thresholds are 
exceeded. Failure to comply with such requirements may incur a significant amount of 
fines. For example, in the US, the HSR Act contains detailed provisions specifying that 
parties to a proposed M&A transaction must file a pre-merger notification form and pay a 
filing fee, if certain threshold circumstances and other jurisdictional requirements are 
met.185 Once the notification from is filed, the parties cannot close the transaction until an 
initial waiting period has elapsed. Similar requirements can also be found in the merger 
control rules in Korea and Canada.186 
Meanwhile, there are some other countries where no pre-notification is required. The UK 
is the typical example. According to the newly promulgated Enterprise Act 2002, which 
represents a major reform of the structural framework for UK merger control, notification 
of qualifying M&As remains voluntary, i.e. there is no requirement on the parties to seek 
the government’s prior approval to the transaction. 187 
It is noteworthy that although it is a general rule that the application of merger control 
does not differ because of the nationality of merging parties, in certain countries M&As 
                                                 
185 15 U.S.C.A §18a(a) 
186 For Korea, see Article 12 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (No.7315), and Article 18 of 
the Enforcement Decree of the Act (No.17564). For Canada, see R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 s. 114.  
187 UK ST 2002 c40 Pt 3 c 5 s 96 – 102, see also Merger – Procedural Guidance, para.3.1, pp.8. This is an 
official document published by the OFT, which is designed to provide general information and advice to 
companies and their advisers on the procedures used by the OFT in operating the merger control regime set 
out in the EA 2002. 
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involving foreign parties are subject to special notification requirements. Take Australia 
as the example. A key feature of Australian merger control is that under current law there 
is no formal notification process like that required under the HSR Act in the United 
States.188 However, for M&As involving non-Australian acquirers, in addition to the 
Trade Practice Act 1974 (the TPA), the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 
(the FATA) comes into play.189 Section 26 and 26A of the FATA make it compulsory for 
foreign acquirers to notify transactions under Section 18 and Section 21A,190 unless these 
transactions are exempted by legislation or regulations. 191  Obviously, compared to 
domestic M&As, cross-border M&As in Australia are subject to stricter regulatory 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, it seems that the Australian government’s imposition of such 
requirements is not derived from the concern that foreign M&As are more likely to cause 
competition problems. Instead, the FATA is adopted more as a mechanism to control 
foreign investments.192  
 
Although compulsory pre-notification is often criticized for imposing a substantial 
additional cost on the parties to the proposed transaction, it is still a prevailing regulatory 
mechanism used in many merger control regimes. The legislative history and the nearly 
30 year experience of enforcement of the HSR Act in the US is an illustration showing 
                                                 
188 There is no pre-notification requirement in the merger control provisions under the Trade Practice Act 
1974 (Commonwealth of Australia 51/1974), the major Australian antitrust statute covering a wide range of 
activities. In addition, see the ACCC’s assessment of merger, published on ACCC’s official website: 
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/268261/fromItemId/6204. (ACCC -- Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission) 
189 Commonwealth of Australia 92/1975 
190 I.e. transactions where foreign acquirers acquire, or increase, a substantial shareholding of an Australian 
corporation and transactions where foreign interests acquire an interest in Australian urban land 
191 Besides the FATA 1975 itself, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (statutory rules 
1989 No.177 as amended), which were made under the FATA 1975, are the major provisions specifying 
exempted transactions.  
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the benefits result from the pre-merger notification mechanism. Documents that are 
dedicated to the analysis of the pros and cons of pre-merger notification have agreed that 
despite the criticisms, such mechanism has revolutionized the ability of the antitrust 
agencies to review the transactions within time frame and to take timely steps to block 
those with competition problems, thereby reducing post-merger litigation. And it is also 
suggested that such efficiency gains are able to be translated into consumer savings and 
benefits to business communities (Andrew G. Howell 2002, Joe Sims and Deborah P. 
Herman 1997, William J. Baer 1997, James W Mullenix 1988). 
On the other hand, under voluntary pre-notification system, the onus is on the parties to 
assess whether the proposed transaction may be subject to objection on competition 
grounds, and if so, whether it is necessary to seek prior comfort or clearance from the 
relevant authority, rather than take the risk of being required to undo the transaction or 
divest assets subsequently. In practice, most major M&A transactions under the UK 
system are cleared before they are implemented, even without the threat of fines. 193 “The 
financial risks of forced divestment are enough to ensure prior consultation with 
competition authorities in virtually every important case.”194   
From the perspective of host governments, a merger control system with mandatory pre-
merger notification requirement seems to be preferable to deal with the transactions that 
involve foreign acquirers purchasing domestic firms. In addition to its function under 
competition laws, the compulsory notification of the transactions, which usually involves 
                                                                                                                                                 
192 Different from the TPA, which is applied mainly by the ACCC to deal with competition matters, the 
FATA is mainly applied by the Treasurer of Australia to deal with foreign investment proposals.  
193 There are many ways that parties to an M&A can ask the OFT to consider the transaction, including 
informal advice, confidential guidance, pre-notification discussion, statutory voluntary pre-notification and 
informal submissions/common notification form. A detailed introduction of these notification methods can 
be found in the Merger – Procedural Guidance, supra note 195, para. 3.4-3.29, pp. 8-16.  
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extensive fillings of information and required documents, becomes an efficient and 
economical way that a host government can obtain the detailed information about the 
incoming foreign investors. This can be of special importance since more and more 
countries have gradually given up the FDI-screening process in order to show their 
welcoming attitudes towards foreign investment. 
 
(ii) Notification Thresholds 
The selection of an appropriate threshold is crucial, since too low a threshold would 
overburden the competition authorities by forcing them to review a large number of cases, 
while too high a threshold would allow the entry of a number of M&As with competition 
problems (UNCTAD, 1997). The thresholds should also include those used to exempt the 
otherwise reportable transactions, in order to minimize unnecessary interference and limit 
the number of cases screened by the competition authorities.  
Generally, the very first criterion should be that the transaction must qualify as a merger 
or acquisition under the given merger control provisions.195 And then the size of the 
transaction or the participating parties (or both) is relevant. The factors taken into account 
often include the value of the transaction, the total assets of the merging parties, or the 
turnover of the parties within particular geographic areas. 196  
                                                                                                                                                 
194 Mark Furse, Competition and the Enterprise Act 2002, Jordans, 2003, pp. 42, note 1, cited Livingston, D 
Competition Law and Practice (London FT LAW and Tax, 1995, para 42.01) 
195 Usually, the transaction itself must satisfy certain thresholds, in excess of which a change in control will 
occur. For example, the HSR Act requires that in order to trigger the pre-notification requirements, as a 
result of the transaction, the acquiring entity must hold an aggregate total amount of the voting securities 
and assets of the acquired entity in excess of specified amount (15 USCA § 18a(a)). In the UK, besides 
thresholds in terms of turnover or market shares, the EA 2002 also requires that two or more enterprises 
have ceased to be distinct enterprises at a time or in circumstance as specified (UK ST 2002 c41 Pt 3 s 23).  
196 There are no notification thresholds under the UK merger control regime. Yet unless either a certain 
market share would be achieved or increased by the merger, or the assets of the “target” company exceed a 
certain level, the OFT has no power to refer such transaction to the Competition Commission. For merger 
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There is no lack of studies comparing various thresholds. Among others, the notification 
thresholds employed in the Merger Regulations in the EU which are based on the world-
wide and community-wide turnover of the merging parties have attracted some 
criticisms:197 
Such thresholds, based solely on turnover, are likely to catch more transactions having no 
effect on the Common Market than would thresholds based on annual sales and total assets (J. 
Wilson, 2003). 
The corollary of having a simple jurisdictional test is that concentrations between undertakings 
which obviously do not impede effective competition in the Common Market may be brought 
within the Regulation and be subject to mandatory notification. Thus many mergers will be 
notifiable even if they have no effect on competition (A. Jones and B. Sufrin, 2001). 
  
However, the special jurisdictional condition must be considered when assessing the 
effects of such turnover thresholds. As a matter of fact, one of the major policy goals of 
EC Merger Regulation is to ensure that “multiple notifications of a given concentration 
are avoided to the greatest extent possible”. 198 In other words, within the EU, the 
notification thresholds for merger control purpose should be able to provide for a bright 
line test distinguishing between mergers that could be reviewed by the competition 
authorities of the individual Member States and those that would be reviewed by the 
Commission alone. 
Compared to the tests based on asset value or market share, the EU’s turnover thresholds 
have some merit in identifying those concentrations where the parties involved carry on 
significant commercial activity in more than one Member State of the EU. In addition, 
                                                                                                                                                 
notification purpose, Taiwan uses a market share test. The US uses a “size of party” or “size of transaction” 
test. The EU, Netherlands, and Switzerland use a turnover test. 
197 Article 1 (2)(3) and Article 5 of EC Regulations 139/2004 
198 See para.14 of EC Regulation 139/2004, and see also para.12 “….Multiple notification of the same 
transaction increases legal uncertainty, effort and cost for undertakings and may lead to conflicting 
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the use of them can also avoid all the problems associated with defining product and 
geographic markets at the initial jurisdictional stage which are likely to easily cause 
uncertainty and conflicts of jurisdiction (C. J. Cook and C. S. Kerse, 2000). As a result, 
the trans-community mergers are actually facilitated by reducing the risk of “multiple 
jeopardy”—a situation in which a merger, despite having been cleared by the competition 
authorities of some states, can still be blocked by others.199  
Recently, a few countries have made amendments to their merger control provisions, the 
main content of which is to raise the notification thresholds, with the aim to reduce the 
number of pre-merger notification filings.200 For many developing countries, where there 
are merger control regimes, to raise the notification thresholds could actually kill two 
birds with one stone.  
One the one hand, as compared to local M&A transactions, foreign acquisitions of local 
enterprises are usually much bigger in size, in terms of either the transactions themselves 
or the foreign acquiring companies. The increase in notification thresholds would not 
have significant effect on cross-border M&As. In other words, the host governments can 
maintain their control over inwards foreign investments in the form of M&As. 
On the other hand, for many local enterprises most of which are medium or small size, 
notification of M&As can be a time-consuming and costly process which may 
substantially add to the transaction cost. As under new thresholds a substantial amount of 
transactions will no longer need to be notified, more domestic M&As may be encouraged. 
                                                                                                                                                 
assessments. The system whereby concentrations may be referred to the Commission by the Member States 
concerned should therefore be further developed.” 
199 C.J. Cook and C.S. Kerse, E. C. Merger Control, London: Sweet&Maxwell, 2nd  edition, 1996, pp.61 
200 These countries include, among others, the US, Germany, Australia, Canada, etc. In particular, the 
Australian government made changes to the thresholds for notification of acquisitions of shares and assets 
of Australian businesses under the FATA 1975. 
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This is beneficial to the host countries’ objectives to improve the international 
competitiveness of their domestic business and to create their own “national champions” 
with the scale to compete internationally.    
 
Substantive Evaluation 
At the heart of the whole merger review process is the analysis of an M&A transaction by 
competition authorities in order to decide whether or not such transaction will cause anti-
competitive effects. A number of matters may be potentially relevant to the assessment, 
depending on the types of transactions concerned (horizontal, vertical or conglomerate) 
and the legislative goals of each merger control law. Different objectives of competition 
laws of individual jurisdiction may lead to different approaches taken by the competition 
authorities to analyze the M&A transactions in question (J. Wilson, 2003).  
 
(i) The prevailing substantive criteria used to analyze M&A transactions 
When estimating anti-competitive consequences of an M&A transaction, there are two 
prevailing tests – the “creation or strengthening of a dominant position” test (dominance 
test) and the “substantial lessening of competition” test (SLC test). As essentially the 
evaluating process is about prediction, a “good” test should be the one that would enable 
competition authorities to predict accurately the likely effect of a proposed M&A in such 
a way which stands up to scrutiny (R. Whish, 2002). 
There are some researches concentrating on the differences of the contents of these two 
tests, such as the thresholds applied to determine the potential anti-competitive effects of 
the transactions, the flexibilities they allow in application, the legal certainties they can 
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provide and the effects of their application on economic efficiency (OECD, 2003). In 
contrast, after comparing the results of the application of the SLC test in the US with 
those of the dominance test in the EU, 201  Monti (2002) suggested that despite the 
differences in the precise wording, these two tests have produced broadly convergent 
outcomes. The European Commission itself in its Green Paper has also reached the 
similar conclusion which reads: “…. experience in applying the dominance test has not 
revealed major loopholes in the scope of the test. Nor has it frequently led to different 
results from SLC-test approaches in other jurisdictions.”202 
However, there is a tendency among countries employing the dominance test to make 
changes towards SLC test. For instance, Australia has made the replacement in 1993 and 
New Zealand did the same thing in 2001. Even the European Commission is currently 
considering switching from the dominance to the SLC test. The EC’s consideration of 
such replacement was first ignited by the different assessments of in the case of 
GE/Honeywell by the US Department of Justice on the one hand and the European 
Commission on the other, which gives rise to the discussion as to whether the EC regime 
should be aligned more closely with that of the US. And moreover, the criticisms against 
                                                 
201 Although some discussions have concluded that there is no pure or completely standardized dominance 
or SLC test (OECD, 2003), the Merger Regulation of the EU is traditionally known for its focus on the 
creation or strengthening of market power, while the US merger test is deemed to be the arch-typical 
example of SLC test.  
It is noted that the wording of neither of these two merger control laws have actually specified the tests 
their competition authorities employ. For example, after referring to creating or strengthening a dominant 
position, the EU Merger Regulation continues with: “….as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it….” (Article 2(2) of Merger 
Regulation) Similarly, the crucial part of S7 of Clayton Act of the US proscribes the acquisition the effect 
of which “…may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”  
However, in practice, the European Commission has downplayed the second branch of its test, and the US 
competition agencies have concentrated on the SLC effects. Brazil, France and Korea may be the better 
examples of countries employing the hybrid test. See OECD, Substantive Criteria Used for the Assessment 
of Mergers, a document comprising proceedings of a Roundtable held by the Competition Commission of 
OECD in October 2002, DAFFE/COMP(2003)5, pp. 7 
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the dominance test advanced by the advocates of SLC test may give the EU another 
impetus.203 
From the perspective of economic effects, there is little substantive difference between 
these tests. It is difficult to conclude that which one is the optimal criterion for M&A 
appraisal. However, from the legal perspective, certain inherent features of these two 
tests could actually produce different decisions in a given transaction. For example, one 
of the arguments against the dominance test is that by applying the SLC test, in contrast 
to the dominance test, the competition authorities would take more consideration of the 
competition condition in the market as a whole rather than the market position of the 
companies concerned, thereby the possible efficiency gains can be used to justify the 
transactions (Bundeskartellamt, 2001). In fact, unlike in the US, the efficiencies defense 
in the EU was not considered after a determination has been made that the M&A 
transaction would have anti-competitive effects.204 In this regard, the dominance test may 
not be an appropriate criterion that can be employed to evaluate FDI-related cross-border 
M&As. This is because analyzing such transactions often require a lot of balancing work, 
which of course includes the consideration of the potential efficiency gains from the 
transaction in question, so as to yield the optimal results for both the participating firms 
and the host countries.  
In spite of all these contention as to the differences in the substantive contents between 
the dominance and the SLC test, there is an oft-repeated argument that what really counts 
                                                                                                                                                 
202  European Commission, Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation, (EEC) No 4064/89, 
COM(2001) 745/6 final, 11 December 2001, para. 167 
203  For the main arguments against the dominance test, see German Federal Cartel Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) Prohibition Criteria in Merger Control—Dominant Position versus Substantial 
Lessening of Competition? A Discussion Paper for the meeting of Working Group on Competition Law on 
8 and 9 October 2001, pp.2. Also available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/ProftagText-engl.pdf 
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is how and in what circumstances these tests are applied. According to a German Federal 
Cartel Office discussion paper, the differing evaluations or decisions under these two 
tests are due to some factors such as the potential differences in the competition policy 
“schools” or purpose of protection, political or personnel influences, different approach 
to define relevant market, the willingness to apply new economic theories and the 
requirements of the courts or other control instruments (Bundeskartellamt, 2001).  
An illustrative example in this regard can be found in the US where the SLC test is 
employed. Theoretically the SLC test is claimed to be associated with a more serious 
legal certainty problem than the dominance test (OECD, 2003). However, there seems to 
be not much such evidence found in the US. This can be attributed to the numerous 
Guidelines or Notices issued by its competition authorities providing the public with the 
detail information as to how the SLC test is applied, by which to a large extent the defect 
implied in the SLC test is remedied. 
Similarly, solutions to certain defects of the dominance test can be found in the EU. 205 
Under such test, there is little scope for any form of balancing exercise within the 
appraisal process itself which would admit factors unrelated to competition in the EU, 
even that economic progress does not justify any detriment to competitive market 
                                                                                                                                                 
204 For example see para.189 of the Commission’s decision in Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier, Case No 
IV/M. 1313 OJ [2000] L 20/1, [2000] 5 CMLR 296.  
205According to the existing Merger Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 a merger is to be prohibited if it 
“creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be 
significantly impeded”. As a modification to the dominance test, the newly adopted EC Merger 
Regulations( Regulation No.139/2004 which replaced Regulation No. 4064/89) requires intervention in 
relation to mergers which “would significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position” in the markets concerned (para. 26).  
It is suggested (para. 25)that the wording of the test was changed to make clear that the test also covers 
cases where the merging firms would be in a position to raise prices, and thus exercise significant market 
power, without necessarily being “dominant” in a way hitherto recognized by the European Courts (e.g., 
not being the company with the largest market share. 
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structure206 (C.J. Cook and C.S. Kerse, 2000). However, the Commission is authorized to 
accept commitments from the parties to modify their transactions so that transactions 
likely to result in competition concerns according to the dominance test are not 
necessarily prohibited outright (Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, 2001)207. A draft Notice 
has also been issued to provide guidelines as to the contents as well as the procedures of 
the offer of such commitments by the parties.208 Thereby the inflexibilities allegedly 
implied in the dominance test can be alleviated to a certain degree. 
 
(ii) Issues considered in substantive evaluation process 
Put aside the debate as to whether matters unrelated to competition should be considered 
during the assessment process, in practice, the judgments that have been made by most 
competition authorities are predominantly based on the competition effects of the M&A 
transactions on both local consumers and local competitors of merging firms. Even under 
the broader standard – the public interests test which was formerly used by the UK—the 
assessment of the likely effect of an M&A on the competition is generally accorded great 
weight in determining whether or not challenge the transaction evaluated (OECD, 2003). 
Accordingly, factors related to the competitive consequence of an M&A transaction, be it 
domestic or international, are always within the consideration of the competition 
authorities.209 In fact it is the type of a proposed transaction that decides what should be 
                                                 
206 See e.g. the Article 8, decision in MSG Media Service, para. 100&101 
207 See Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation. It is crucial, however, that the commitments offered by the 
parties are sufficient to prevent the dominant position from being created or strengthened or to prevent 
effective competition from being impeded. The Commission does not, otherwise, have power to authorize a 
concentration which has been found to be incompatible with the common market. See Nestlé/Perrier.  
208 [2000] 4 CMLR 794 
209 These factors may include, among other, the market shares of merging parties, the existing competitive 
condition between merging parties, the possibilities of anti-competitive practices engaged by the combined 
entities post-merger, the barriers to entry and expansion, the number of competitors in the markets, etc.  
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considered among these factors in order for a sound prediction.210 And generally it makes 
no difference between the inward cross-border M&As and the other transactions in terms 
of the issues that are taken into account for the analysis of their competition effects. For 
example, like a domestic vertical M&A, a vertical cross-border M&A will usually be 
analyzed in terms of the market shares involved, the likely foreclosure of rivals (local or 
foreign), and the substitute supplies or assets available to rivals (UNCTAD, 1997).211 
 
Even though M&As may produce various anti-competitive consequences, it is undeniable 
that these transactions may also create substantial benefits to the economy. This requires 
that when assessing an M&A transaction, factors unrelated to the competition effects of 
the proposed transaction should be taken into account. Theoretically, the intervention of 
competition authorities with the M&A transactions for reasons other than competition 
ones may per se be directly antagonistic the process of competition (Richard Whish, 
2001). In practice, however, competition itself may not be the ultimate end that most 
merger control regimes are formulated to meet. By allowing or prohibiting M&A 
transactions, countries could protect or maintain the effective competition within their 
local markets or industries so as to attain the goals such as the promotion of customer 
welfare (e.g. lower prices of products or services) or/and the improvement of economic 
                                                 
210 For example, the Korea government has made it clear in its Notification on M&A Review Guidelines that 
the factors the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) takes into account vary depending on the type of transaction. 
In particular, the market share of acquiring and/or acquired company plays an important role in all types of 
merger reviews; vertical merger review concentrates on the foreclosure effect while conglomerate merger 
review focuses on potential competition; in a horizontal merger, factors such as foreign competition, entry 
barrier, the likelihood of collusive behavior, and similar products/adjacent market are included. See Part 
VII of the FTC’ Notification 1999-2, which is issued in accordance with Article 7 Section 5 of Korea’s 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act 
211 For the detailed analysis about the factors taken into consideration to estimate the anticompetitive 
consequences of M&A transactions in general, see Areeda Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis – Problems, Text, 
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efficiency (e.g. cost or resource savings). Consequently, in the cases where the 
implementation of certain M&As may be beneficial to the achievement of such goals, it 
becomes important on the part of the government to predict the potential effects of the 
transactions concerned as accurately as possible and then weigh all those benefits against 
any detriment to the competition, to find out whether the loss owning to the impediments 
to the competition can be offset by greater gains in other respects. It is thus 
understandable that elements other than pure competition issues have a role to play in the 
process of substantive evaluation under merger control.  
In some countries such as the US and Canada, it is explicitly specified in laws that the 
efficiency defense and the failing firm defense can be used to justify an M&A transaction 
which may be blocked otherwise.212 Also in the UK, efficiency consideration can used to 
save the M&A transactions which may give rise to substantial lessening of 
competition.213 Even in the EU where balancing exercises seldom took place previously, 
the new Merger Regulation has recognized the efficiency of M&A transactions and 
required the Commission to “publish guidance on the conditions under which it may take 
efficiencies into account in the assessment of a concentration’ (EC Regulation 139/2004, 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Cases, 5th edition, Aspen Law & Business, 1997, Chapter 5; Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 184, 
Chapter 9, 10 and 13. 
212 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, §4 and §5.1 (the U.S), and Part 8 and 9 of Canada’s Merger 
Enforcement Guideline, issued by Canadian Competition Bureau, September 2004. Nevertheless, some 
differences can be found between the efficiency defense in these two regimes. In the US, such efficiencies 
must be large enough to reverse the potential harm to consumers caused by the transaction in the relevant 
market, e.g. by preventing price increases to consumers, while in Canada there is no such consumer welfare 
requirements.  
213 The EA 2002 has defined such efficiency consideration as “customer benefits” in the form of “lower 
prices, higher quality or greater choice of goods or services in any market in the United Kingdom” or 
“greater innovation in relation to such goods or services” (Article 30 (1) of the EA 2002). Also see the 
OFT’s advice on Hilton/British Sky Broadcasting case, 27 September 2001, available at 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/business/mergers+fta/advice/clearances+and+referrals/bskyb-hilton.htm.  
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Para.29).214 In these cases, the potential efficiency gains are often considered by the 
competition agencies as the countervailing benefits of the M&A transactions being 
evaluated.215 In essence, these arguments for the clearance of questionable transactions 
are still based on the grounds of maintaining a competitive business environment.  
It should be noted that an M&A transaction could nevertheless be prohibited even if it 
does not lead to any competition problems. Such cases usually happen in the EU where 
an M&A with a Community dimension that has been cleared by the Commission can still 
be blocked by the individual Member States insofar as it is deemed by the Member States 




(iii) Substantive evaluation of the inward cross-border M&As 
Notwithstanding the special nature of cross-border M&As, the regulation of these 
transactions under merger control provisions in most countries does not differ from that 
of domestic M&As, especially at the stage of substantive evaluation in merger review 
process.217 Nevertheless, the inherent features of merger assessment process, combined 
                                                 
214 See Part VII of Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal of the European Union, 5 February 2004, 
C31/5-C31/18. In particular, this Guideline requires that efficiencies must be timely and passed on to 
produce benefits to consumers. More importantly, Part VIII of the Guideline also specifies the failing firm 
defense, which has not been found in Merger Regulations.  
215  These efficiency gains may include, among others, economies of scale, integration of production 
facilities, enhanced research and development capability, plant specialization and lower transportation costs, 
as well as the importance to prevent productive assets from being taken out of production. See Joseph 
Wilson, supra note 164, pp.196-198. 
216 See Article 21(4) of the EC Merger Regulation. 
217 In Japan, although cross-border M&As are subject to a different notification system, the substantial test 
used for M&A assessment is applied equally to domestic and cross-border transactions. See Notification 
System Concerning M&As by Companies outside Japan, available at the official website of Fair Trade 
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with the very nature of cross-border M&As as the compound of FDI and M&A 
transactions, still pose significant problems to the host countries. On the one hand, the 
competition authorities of the host country assessing a proposed transaction must apply 
merger control provisions regardless of the nationality of merging parties. On the other 
hand, the fact that implementing such transactions implies the occurrence of FDI has 
imposed additional pressure on competition authorities – if the transaction is blocked for 
its potential anti-competitive effects, the investment involved together with the potential 
gains may be consequently excluded; or if the clearance under merger control laws is 
granted, in the absence of other effective control, the economic power of the foreign 
acquirers could still pose serious threat to the growth of the host country’s domestic 
industries even though they are not caught by the merger control. 
As regards the assessment of FDI-related cross-border M&As, besides those associated 
with the competition effects, there seems to be a hodge-podge of factors related to the 
economic, social even political objectives of the host countries needed to be considered, 
which may include, among others: 
• the possibility that the controls of local industries pass to overseas companies; 
• employment consequences; 
• the need to preserve the separate identity of leading local companies and to create 
(or preserve) national champions; and 
• the expectation to enhance international competitiveness of domestic enterprises 
involved or threatened, etc.218 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commission of Japan: http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/legislation/ama/merger_notification/merger_notification.html.  
218 See Donald Baker, supra note 180; and Richard Whish, supra note 179, pp. 730-732. 
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It seems to be inappropriate to include above considerations into M&A assessment under 
merger control provisions since merger control has been first and foremost legislated to 
protect effective competition and consumer welfare. From the standpoint of a host 
country, the above elements can be used to justify the allowance of an inward M&A 
transaction the implementation of which may cause impediments to competition. On the 
same grounds, however, the entry of a foreign acquirer can be blocked even though such 
entry does not come with any competition problems. In addition, the prospective nature 
of M&A evaluation requires ex ante judgments on possible impacts of such transactions 
on competition. It will be much more complicated when there is more than pure 
competition effects needed to be predicted.  
Therefore, for many countries which take FDI as necessary to develop their economies, 
meanwhile lack experiences in dealing with cross-border M&As, an option is to separate 
the regulation of foreign M&As from that of domestic M&As, i.e. to regulate cross-
border M&As under foreign investment regime rather under competition laws. An 
illustrative example is in Australia, where cross-border M&As are regulated under FATA 
1975 by the Treasurer, in addition to the merger control provisions in the TPA 1974 
generally governing all M&As in the Australia. Under the FATA 1975, the Treasurer 
may make an order prohibiting foreign acquisitions and takeovers of Australian business 
if he considers the result of the proposed transaction is ‘contrary to the national 
interest’.219And according to Australian Foreign Investment Review Board, “national 
interest” may include: 1) the important interests that have been defined by existing 
                                                 
219 See article 18(2)and (4) and 19(2)and(4) of the FATA 1975. However, the presumption is that foreign 
investment proposals are in the national interest and should go ahead. This reflects the positive stance of 
successive Australian Governments towards foreign investment. 
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government policy and law (e.g. environmental regulation and competition policy); 2) 
national security interests; and 3) economic development.220 
For countries where there are no general merger control provisions under competition law, 
such as Malaysia and China, the need to optimize the impacts of cross-border M&As on 
host economies also requires regulatory provisions governing cross-border M&As from 
the aspects of both foreign investments and competitions.221 For instance, in Malaysia 
where there are no provisions for impacts of M&As on competition, 222  any M&A 
transactions involving foreign interests are required to be approved by Foreign 
Investment Committee (the FIC). The FIC has guidelines limiting foreign equity 
participation in companies registered in Malaysia.223 Even though these guidelines focus 
on distributive issues, it is suggested that its implementation has effects on 
competition. 224  And the purpose of such guidelines is to ensure that the pattern of 
ownership and control of private enterprises in the country is consistent with government 
policies such as the New Economic Policy / National Development Policy.225 The new 
Guidelines are also claimed to have encapsulated the spirit of the Economic Stimulus 
                                                 
220 See Foreign Investment Review Board Annual Report 2003-04, pp.8, supra note 94. 
221 A detailed discussion of China’s regulation of cross-border M&As is in next Chapter. 
222 The legal framework for regulation of mergers and acquisition in Malaysia is provided by two statutes, 
namely, the Securities Commission Act 1993 (Part IV Division 2) and the Malaysian Code on Take-Overs 
and Mergers 1998, which were primarily enacted to protect investors’ interest. However, there are no 
provisions in these statutes for the competition effects of M&As. 
223 The newest guidelines are effective from 1 April 2004, including Guideline on the Acquisition of 
Interests, Mergers and Takeovers by Local and Foreign Interests, and Guideline on the Acquisition of 
Properties by Local and Foreign Interests.  It should be noted that the FIC guidelines are not law or public 
policy and are usually enforced administratively. 
224 Limits on foreign equity participation constrain the amount of resources that domestic firms can enlist 
from foreign investors to compete in the market. See Cassey Lee, Competition Policy in Malaysia, Centre 
on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series No.68, June 2004.  
225 See para.2 of the 1999 FIC Guidelines.  
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Package, which was announced by the Malaysian government to bolster competitiveness 
and counter the effects of a downturn in economic activity.226 
 
In summary, regardless of its FDI-related nature, cross-border M&As in themselves have 
different impacts on the competition within the host market from pure domestic M&As. 
The fact that they are closely associated with FDI has posed more challenging problems 
to host-country regulators. For most developed countries where cross-border M&As have 
become common business activities, the regulators are predominantly concerned with the 
anti-competitive consequences of these transactions, and thus these transactions are 
primarily regulated under merger control provisions with competition laws. For many 
less developed and developing countries, cross-border M&As may be regarded more as a 
form of FDI, from which host economies can derive substantial benefits. As competition 
effects of cross-border M&As may be relatively downplayed in these countries, these 
transactions are more likely to be regulated under foreign investment regimes, which may 




CROSS-BORDER M&As IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES – 
THE CASE OF CHINA 
 
I. Cross-border M&As in the Developing World 
                                                 
226 See Wong&Partners, Guide to Mergers and Acquisitions 2004/2005: Malaysia, pp.3. 
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Most M&A activities in developed countries, domestic or foreign, take place in the 
industries under competitive pressure as a result of deregulation, technological innovation 
or large R&D expenditures, and are thus intended for strategic repositioning. Within 
developing countries, however, where there is lower level of economic development, as 
well as the underdeveloped financial markets, the development of cross-border M&As 
shows substantial differences in both style and substance.  
Firstly, the practices of many TNCs to acquire the indigenous business in developing 
countries are largely associated with the changes in national regimes of incentive and 
regulations towards general economic liberalization (J. C. Ferraz and Nobuaki 
Hamaguchi, 2002). Many developing countries have realized that a liberalized FDI 
regime is essential to attract more foreign investments, which, according to the 
experiences of many newly industrialized countries, could be used for economic 
development of the host states. Meanwhile, there is a very strong revealed preference on 
the part of leading international companies to enter countries by the M&A route, and 
restricting this route may well mean keeping out valuable FDI. Therefore, although 
developing countries are growing in importance to be the destination of inward cross-
border M&As, there is little evidence showing that their attitude toward these 
transactions have been radically changed.  
Secondly, many cross-border M&As in developing countries are playing a role that 
greenfield FDI may not be able to play, at least within a desired time frame. Cross-border 
M&As are particularly beneficial to host economies when it prevents potentially 
profitable assets from being wiped out, which cannot be achieved by local investment 
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because of the domestic financial constraint.227 This is especially the case of M&As 
involving either privatization of state-owned enterprises or sales of financially troubled 
firms in developing countries, which can be supported by the upsurge of cross-border 
M&As in Latin America which is primarily driven by the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises that need significant upgrading,228 and in East Asia which consists mainly of 
the “fire-sales” of deeply distressed firms because of the financial crisis.229   
In many developing countries which are undergoing economic restructuring, foreign 
acquisitions of their state-owned enterprises have facilitated and thus become the integral 
part of their privatization programs and economic transformation. Governments are 
therefore playing the dual role as both the regulators and the selling parties, which make 
them less hostile to the transactions where domestic ownership are transferred to foreign 
hands. And under some other exceptional circumstances, such as the Asia financial crisis 
in late 1990s, these countries may welcome cross-border M&As, because these 
transactions may be the optimal approach to serve the urgent needs of distressed firms for 
liquidity and restructuring and play a role in rescuing these ailing companies.  
 
Thirdly, developing countries are predominantly host rather than home countries for 
cross-border M&As, which means that their firms are mostly the selling parties to the 
                                                 
227  Joao Carlos Ferraz and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, Introduction: M&A and Privatization in Developing 
Countries – Changing Ownership Structure and Its Impact on Economic Performance, The Developing 
Economies XL-4, December 2002, pp.383-399 (stating that “the surge of cross-border M&As in 
developing countries is even more associated with regulatory framework changes which are strongly linked 
with macroeconomic management such as public finance restructuring or the prevention of massive 
private-sector bankruptcy.”) 
228 According to WIR 2000, The Latin American and Caribbean region continued to dominate cross-
border M&A sales by developing countries. In the year of 1998-1999, Argentina and Brazil were the 
largest sellers in both of which with privatization was the main vehicle. 
229 According to WIR 2000, After the Asian financial crisis, cross-border M&As in the five main crisis-hit 
countries, accounting for more than 60 per cent of the Asian total in 1998-1999. Foreign acquisitions in the 
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transactions, taken over by foreign companies from developed countries.230 This poses 
serious challenges to the ability of these host economies to withstand the undesired 
effects of cross-border M&As, such as the weakening of domestic entrepreneurship, the 
increasing reliance of domestic industries on foreign technologies and inputs, and the loss 
of control over the direction of national economic development. 231  Although it is 
suggested that the domestic assets of developing countries are more efficiently used when 
transferred from domestic to foreign ownership (Lipsey, 2000), there is still great fear on 
the part of these host economies that the rapid internationalization of the ownership 
structure may jeopardize the achievement of their development objectives.  
 
Lastly, capital markets in developing countries are still immature, showing low levels of 
transactions and liquidity. And governmental policies in this area are usually quite 
restrictive. As a result, financially motivated transactions are rare, and those carried out 
through public tender offer or the purchase of shares in stock exchanges of the host 
countries are less likely to take place. There is also little chance that foreign acquirers 
would be motivated by technology-seeking, because few developing countries 
predominate in the field of leading-edge technologies. More commonly then, most 
foreign buyers are interested in searching for newly opened market opportunities in 
developing countries.232 It is therefore understandable that in developing host countries, 
less attention is paid to the protection of shareholders and capital market order. By and 
large, these host governments are concerned more about whether the transaction would 
                                                                                                                                                 
Republic of Korea exceeded $9 billion in 1999, making it the largest recipient of M&A-based FDI in 
developing Asia. 
230 WIR 2000, pp.198 
231 WIR 2000, pp.xxv 
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add to the productive capacity of local industry, or whether the development of the 
competing indigenous firms would be affected adversely by the entry of foreign acquirers, 
etc.  
 
As such, there is little possibility that cross-border M&As would be regulated in the same 
way in developing countries as in the developed world, where regulators mostly focus on 
the competition effects and seldom discriminate between domestic and foreign 
transactions with the aim to create a level playing field for all the participants in the 
market. Even within the developing world, the economic development is also uneven, 
which produces differences among countries in the development priorities and the 
interests to be protected. Therefore, it is not surprising that in some developing countries 
such as Korea and Brazil, cross-border M&As are well regulated under a comprehensive 
merger control regime, while in some others such as Malaysia, these transactions are still 
largely governed under the foreign investment laws.  
Although the current legislation governing cross-border M&As differs from country to 
country in the developing world, there is a clear trend towards structuring a legal 
framework centered with merger control regime. It is noted that recently, the most 
significant progress in such a legal regime construction are being made in China, the 
largest developing country and world’s largest FDI recipient. Therefore, the rest of this 
Chapter will be a detailed review and discussion of China’s M&A legal regime as well as 
its recent development. 
 
II. FDI in China — the Growing Trend Towards Cross-border M&As 
                                                                                                                                                 
232 Joao Carlos Ferraz and Nobuaki Hamaguchi, supra note 227. 
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Since the open door policy was introduced in 1979, the People’s Republic of China has 
witnessed a tremendous increase in FDI.233 It is well recognized that the growth in FDI 
has brought about an unprecedented improvement in the country, especially with respect 
to its economic development.234 Since the Chinese government has in the early 1990s                              
emphasized the need to seize opportunities to further expand and develop its economy, 
which was followed by the introduction of more measures to create an environment 
conducive to FDI, there is good reason to believe that in the following decades China will 
continue to make it a matter of national priority to attract more inward foreign 
investments. Moreover, China’s accession to the WTO has also foreshadowed the 
sustained increase of the inward FDI in future. It has been predicted that by the year 2010 
annual foreign direct investment inflows into China could reach US$100 billion if China 
were to fully implement the WTO agreements and complementary domestic economic 
reforms (OECD, 2002).235 With the ongoing dominance of M&As in the global flows of 
FDI, in China, one of the developing countries absorbing the largest amount of foreign 
investments in the last decade, second in the world only to the America, a surge of cross-
                                                 
233 Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China show that FDI inflows into China increased rapidly 
with an annual growth rate of nearly 20 percent from 1984 to 1991, and surged from US $11.01 billion in 
1992 to US $52.74 billion in 2002. See Section 17-13 of China Statistical Yearbook 2003, complied by 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistics Press 2003, pp.671 
234 Studies conducted to examine the profound impacts of FDI on economic progress in China have found 
evidence as to the contribution of inward FDI to various aspects of China’s economy, such as China’s 
domestic capital formation, employment opportunities, export promotion, technology transfer, productivity 
improvement, competition etc. See OECD, China in the World Economy – The Domestic Policy Challenges, 
a study undertaken in the framework of the ongoing OECD-China program of dialogue and cooperation, 
2002, pp.323-329.  
235 These reforms include further reductions in trade and investment barriers and liberalization of domestic 
markets, reform of state-owned enterprises, and strengthened protection of intellectual property rights. See 
OECD, ibid, pp. 323-358. 
 114
border M&As in the near future seems inevitable.236 According to M&A Asia, following 
3 years during which foreign M&As of Chinese enterprises ran about US dollars 5 billion 
per year (10 percent of FDI), a surge of such transactions has been witnessed in the first 
half of 2004, reaching US dollars 7.3 billion (Figure 1). 
 
Note: “Inwards foreign acquisitions” only include those direct acquisitions of local Chinese companies by 
international companies and financial investment groups, which have been publicly announced. 
Source: Asian Capital Journal, M&A Asia (www.asianfn.com)  
 
The trend towards the proliferation of cross-border M&As is convincing for several 
reasons. Firstly, the attraction of China as the destination of FDI due to its huge domestic 
market may be enhanced for that more industries that used to be closed will be open, 
especially service sectors in which the cross-border M&A transactions are most active. 
This may be the results of both the government’s adherence to the open-door policy and 
                                                 
236 According to WIR 2004, China became the world’s largest FDI recipient in 2003, overtaking the United 
States, traditionally the largest recipient.  


























its compliance with the commitments made as a WTO member state.237 Secondly, as the 
economic strength of China grows, foreign investors “no longer view China’s market as 
an interesting intriguing sideline, but regard conducting business in China as a 
fundamental part of their business strategy.” 238  The fact that of the 500 largest 
multinational corporations, 400 of them have invested in China reveals that it has been 
imperative for foreign firms to attain an advantageous market position in China in a short 
period. Obviously for foreign investors the short cut to obtaining such competitive 
advantages is to acquire or merge with an existing business, i.e. to enter China by way of 
cross-border M&As. And thirdly, the ongoing reforms within the economic, political and 
legal systems of China lend further impetus to such trend. The reform of state-owned 
enterprises, a major part of the Chinese government’s effort to restructure the domestic 
industries and move towards the market economy, have made available numerous target 
firms in almost all industries to be acquired or merged with; the reforms of the legal 
framework are striving to create a coherent and investor-friendly legal environment that 
can provide considerable certainties and protections to cross-border M&A transactions -- 
they may include eliminating restrictions on investment vehicles or simplifying the 
approval procedures, promulgating new systematic regulations governing cross-border 
M&As, amending existing laws concerning foreign investment, and drafting anti-trust 
laws. 
 
                                                 
237 China has made a broad range of commitments to open up its services sector to foreign investments, 
these sectors including financial, distribution, business, communication, tourism and travel related, etc. For 
detailed information, please refer to Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, Annex 9: 
Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services, circulated on WTO website in documents 
WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 and WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm.  
238 W.H. Miller, China Boom: This Time It Is For Real, Industrial Week, 1 November 1993, pp.45.  
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It has been pointed out that while remaining a very important host for investments from 
developing countries and economies, particularly the East and Southeast Asian 
economies, China will become an increasingly important destination for investments 
from the developed countries as it strengthens intellectual property rights protection, 
opens more economic sectors – especially the services sector – to foreign direct 
investment, and encourages cross-border M&As (OECD, 2002). This again has 
accentuated a boom in cross-border M&A activities in China in the near future, simply 
because the Chinese government has been trying hard to attract more FDI with a higher 
quality which are mainly brought by large multinational enterprises (MNEs) from 
developed countries, and cross-border M&As are the increasingly important means by 
which these MNEs carry out their FDI. On the other hand, however, it is also implied that 
currently in China cross-border M&As by foreign investors are still being 
underdeveloped, which have only been allowed in an experimental fashion with very 
strict restrictions. This can be supported by the fact that there had only been less than 50 
M&A transactions taking place between foreign investors and Chinese firms from August 
1998 to May 2003.239  
The underdevelopment of cross-border M&As in China can be attributed to a number of 
reasons, and the most important one of them may be the unfavorable legal climate. Given 
the growing importance of cross-border M&A as a mode of FDI entry into China, a 
thorough examination of China’s current legal condition concerning cross-border M&A 
practice would be advisable. The next section will be a summary of the rules and 
regulations that may be relevant to the cross-border M&A activities in China; Sections III 
will be a further analysis into the noteworthy aspects of the recent legislative 
                                                 
239 CAITEC, supra note No.6.  
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development to see how the new laws would affect the cross-border M&As in China; 
Section IV will discuss the competition law aspects of cross-border M&As in China, with 
emphasis on the prospects of merger control laws that are yet to be enacted; The last 
section will look into the reasons why cross-border M&As have been underdeveloped in 
China thus far, and some suggestions for improvement will also be included. 
 
III. The Emerging Legal Regime Governing Cross-border M&As in China 
 
At present, the legal rules and policies governing activities of cross-border M&As in 
China are still incomplete and confusing as they are formulated in a piecemeal fashion, 
consisting of a series of specialized laws a number of which are entitled “Interim 
Provisions”. This is hardly surprising given that China today is still at its early stage of 
cross-border M&As when practice usually precedes the law, and the relevant rules and 
regulations are mostly formulated out of experience gathered by the Chinese authorities 
in the course of their dealing with these transactions.  
The laws applicable to the transactions where foreign investors propose to acquire or 
merge with Chinese enterprises are depending on the case-by-case situation varying with 
the elements of the transactions. For example, different combinations of laws may apply 
according to the different ownership structures (e.g. state-owned, private-owned or 
foreign-invested) or corporate structures (e.g. joint stock companies or limited liability 
companies) of the target Chinese enterprises; when the proposing transaction are to be 
carried out on securities market, some special rules other than the Securities Law may 
apply, especially when the transfer of state or legal person shares to foreign investors is 
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involved; the sectors in which the transactions take place are also relevant as some of 
them may subject to different regulations from others (e.g. the financial sector). 
 
A. Laws Regulating Cross-border M&As in General 
 
a. Basic Rules in Company Law 
The PRC Company Law 1993 (revised) is considered containing the most fundamental 
rules upon which the regulatory framework for corporate M&A activities in China is built. 
Although consisted of only 7 short articles, Chapter 7 of the Company Law, which is 
entitled Company Merger and Division, specifies the principles governing all M&A 
transactions between companies in China. Under Article 184, company mergers and 
division may be carried out through absorption where the target company dissolves after 
the takeover or new establishment where a new company will be formed with the 
dissolution of all the parties involved. The rest articles in this Chapter deal with the 
approval authorities, assets and debts assumption, notice and disclosure, adjustment of 
registered capital and change of business registration. 
In practice, however, it should be noted that at the time when the Company Law was 
promulgated, M&A transactions in China especially those with foreign participations 
were not as common as they are today. The provisions in the Company Law concerning 
M&A transactions were actually drafted out of the inexperience of the Chinese 
government authorities in dealing with these transactions. It is therefore understandable 
that these rules are far from being able to clarify the complicated issues arising from 
cross-border M&A transactions today.  
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b. Early Legislation for Mergers and Acquisitions 
It is a prominent feature of China’s legal framework governing cross-border M&A that 
the majority of the extensive rules and regulations are pertinent to the transactions 
involving SOEs. The first regulation in this regard was issued in 1989 entitled the Interim 
Provisions of Sale of Small Scale State-owned Enterprises (the Sale Provisions) 240 . 
Article 6 stipulates that all business firms, including foreign-invested enterprises are 
entitled to purchase the SOEs which fall within the scope of those allowed to be sold 
according to Article 4.  
Another early legislation governing M&A transactions is the Interim Provisions 
Concerning Enterprise Mergers (the Merger Provisions) promulgated by the same state 
authorities in the same year. Unlike the Sales Provisions that only apply to sales of small 
scale SOEs, the Merger Provisions govern M&As between different sized enterprises 
under different ownership.  
It is interesting to know through these two provisions that at the early stage when M&As 
were practiced in China, they were considered and utilized as a means to save the deeply 
troubled PRC domestic enterprises, especially SOEs. Both these two provisions have 
specified that the main targets of M&As should be those insolvent or close to bankruptcy, 
or those have suffered loss for a long time, or those sold for the purpose to rationalize 
industrial structure.241Hence, as foreign firms in recent year have started to buy into 
profitable PRC domestic enterprises in addition to ailing business, the importance of 
these laws in regulating cross-border M&As will be decreased. 
                                                 
240 They are issued jointly by then the State Commission of Economic System Reform (the SCESR), the 
State Asset Management Bureau (the SAMB) and the MOF on February 19 1989. 
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c. The First Legislation Exclusive for Cross-border M&As  
Recently China has taken a big step forward in the construction of legal system governing 
cross-border M&A – that is, The Provisional Rules on Mergers with and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the Provisional Rules on Foreign M&As),242 
which went into effect on 12 April 2003, were issued jointly by the Minister of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC – now the Ministry of Commerce, 
MOFCOM), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the State 
Administration of Taxation (SAT) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). 
Before the Provisional Rules were issued, there was no adequate legal basis for foreign 
investors to engage in the type of M&A activities covered under the Provisional Rules, 
although in practice local government authorities had approved a number of transactions 
on a case-by-case basis. It is therefore for the first time that the Provisional Rules, 
consisting of 26 articles and focusing primarily on M&A transactions between foreign 
and domestic PRC entities, provide a legal basis for the acquisition by foreign investors 
of assets from, and equity interest in, PRC domestic enterprises.  
Admittedly, the Provisional Rules, applicable to transactions involving domestic 
enterprises with any kind of ownership structures, are the first attempts by the Chinese 
government to clarify systematically most of the principal issues surrounding the inward 
cross-border M&As, including the competition concerns arising therefrom. And for the 
first time they make it clearly that every one of the M&A methods addressed in these 
                                                                                                                                                 
241 See Article 4 of the Sales Provisions and Article 3 of the Merger Provisions. 
242 Decree [2003] No.3 of the MOFTEC, the SAIC, the SAT and the SAFE. 
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rules results in the establishment of Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIEs).243 As such, it is 
fair to say that the Provisional Rules lie in the center of the whole legal framework 
governing cross-border M&As in China. Given the significance of this legislation, a more 
detailed discussion will be in the subsequent section. 
 
B. Laws Concerning Foreign Direct Investments 
 
Cross-border M&As in China, as in any other countries, are subject to the FDI laws in the 
host country. China’s legal framework for foreign investment is first established by a 
series of specialized legislation governing the setting up of FIEs and they have been 
revised recently. In other words, foreign companies are permitted to own or carry on a 
business in China only through specific business forms (referred to as FIEs) that are 
distinct from domestic business forms and are often governed by an entirely different 
legal regime (referred to as FIE laws).  
These FIE laws, specifying the investment vehicles that foreign buyers are allowed to use, 
include the joint venture laws i.e. Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (the EJV Law) 
in 1979, the Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises Law (the WFOE Law) in 1986 and the 
Co-operative Joint Venture Law (the CJV Law) in 1988244as well as the Implementing 
                                                 
243 In China, FIEs include the Equity Joint Ventures (EJVs) in which the parties’ rights and interests are 
generally delineated in proportion to their respective equity investments, the Contractual Joint Ventures 
(CJVs) in which the parties respective rights and interests are determined in accordance with the terms of 
their contract, the Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises (WFOEs) and Foreign-invested Companies Limited 
by Shares (FICs) which are essentially joint stock companies. In order for the FIE status, each of them must 
have a minimum 25% foreign equity investment. The FIE status with at least 25% foreign equity 
investment is very important in China for that the various preferential tax and other policies only applicable 
to FIEs (although there are new regulations recognizing those FIE status with less than 25% foreign equity 
investment which is not eligible for preferential tax and some other preferential treatment).  
244 All of these joint venture laws have been revised recently on March 15 2001, October 31 2000 and 
October 31 2000 respectively.  
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Rules for each of them245, and the laws facilitating the use of corporate form vehicles by 
foreign investors such as the Provisional Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the 
Establishment of Foreign Investment Companies Limited by Shares on January 10 1995 
(the FIC Regulations)246 and the Regulations on the Establishment of Companies with an 
Investment Nature by Foreign Investors on June 10 2003 ( the Holding Company 
Regulations)247. 
Besides the FIE laws, there exists a web of restrictions and governmental approval 
requirements applying to FIEs from their establishment through their dissolution, 
including those concerning taxation, exchange control, imports and exports, IP protection, 
labor, environment protection etc. Some of them apply generically to all FIEs, while 
some others apply only to specific FIEs. It is advisable for foreign acquirers to acquaint 
themselves with these rules and regulations before choosing the investment vehicles in 
the M&A transactions. 
 
C. Laws Affecting Market Access of Foreign Investors 
 
The issue of market access for foreign investors who are proposing M&A transactions is 
actually twofold. For one thing, cross-border M&As as a mode of FDI entry must be 
carried out in accordance with the industrial policies which specify that in some 
industries foreign investors are welcome, while in some others they are restricted. For 
                                                 
245 See the Decree [2001] No.311of the State Council, the Decree [1995] No.6 of the MOFTEC and the 
Decree [2001] No.301 of the State Council. 
246 Decree [1995] No.1 of the MOFTEC. 
247 They are promulgated as the Decree [2003] No.1 of the MOFCOM and effective on July 10 2003; on 
February 13 2004, they are revised and promulgated as the Decree [2004] No.2 of the MOFCOM, and 
effective 30 days later. 
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another, based on the target enterprises they have chosen, foreign acquirer must also 
satisfy certain regulatory requirements, failure to meet which could lead to the 
inaccessibility of the market in China. This is considered unique to China’s transition 
economy. 
With respect to the former, two main rules must be strictly followed by all kinds of 
foreign investment projects including those in the form of cross-border M&As: the 
Provisions on Guiding the Direction of Foreign Investment (the Guiding Provisions)248 
and the Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment in Industries (the Catalogue 2002)249. 
First promulgated in1995, both of them have been revised in 2002 pursuant to the 
China’s commitment and obligation as a WTO member as well as the government’s 
strategy of Western Region Development. Although the new versions of these two rules 
reflect China’s determination of further opening to foreign investments, there are still 
restrictions imposed on foreign ownership in a number of industries, which constitute one 
of the major hurdles for cross-border M&As in China. Some analyses as to the new 
features of the Interim Provisions and the Catalogue will be provided later in this Chapter. 
 
Even if a foreign investor is welcome under the above industry policies, it does not mean 
that this foreign firm is automatically allowed to buy into any PRC domestic enterprises 
within the industry. In other words, the entry of foreign acquirers into China is subject to 
additional restrictions depending on the types of the targets they have chosen in the M&A 
transactions. The entrants must be qualified under relevant rules in order to start the 
                                                 
248 Decree [2002] No.346 of the State Council. 
249  Order [2002] No.21 of the State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC, now the State 
Development and Reform Commission, (the SDRC), the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), 
and the MOFTEC. 
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purchase of the targets. However, it should be pointed out that most of such restrictions 
apply only to the transactions with the acquired parties being state-owned enterprises or 
those involving foreign purchase of state-own assets or shares. This can be easily 
explained by the fact that the dominance of state ownership as well as the ongoing 
economic reform in state sector in China have led to a large number of state-owned 
enterprises becoming the major targets of foreign M&As. In addition, the Chinese 
government has adopted an extremely cautious approach to deal with these transactions 
so as not to cause any loss of state assets. 
Among a number of laws that are potentially relevant in this regard, two important new 
regulations are worth mentioning. One is the Provisional Regulations on Utilizing 
Foreign Investment in Restructuring State-owned Enterprises (the SOE Restructuring 
Regulations)250, which cover various types of M&A transactions that can be used by 
foreign investors to restructure SOEs; and the other is the Circular on Issues Concerning 
the Transfer of Ownership of State-Owned Shares and Corporate Shares in Listed 
Companies to Foreign Investors (the Circular 2002)251 , which regulates the foreign 
M&As involving the purchase of non-tradable shares in Chinese listed companies. Both 
of them contain detailed prescription as to the qualifications that foreign acquirers must 
satisfy in order to carry out the proposed transactions.  
 
D. Special Provisions Governing Cross-border M&As 
 
                                                 
250 Decree [2002] No.42 of the SETC, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the SAIC and the SAFE. Effective 
on January 1, 2003. 
251 The Circular was jointly issued by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the MOF and the 
SETC on November 1, 2002 (ZhengJianFa [2002] No.83). 
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Besides the rules and regulations applying generally to all the cross-border M&As, there 
are a host of special laws in China relevant to these transactions, the application of which 




a. Laws Relevant to Foreign M&As of Chinese Listed Company 
Although not as flourished as in developed countries, M&As undertaken through 
purchase of the shares of target firms have been slowly developed in China. Generally, 
laws governing the purely domestic M&As involving listed companies are also 
applicable to foreign M&As of Chinese listed companies. Most of these laws exist within 
the regulatory framework of the Chinese securities market, at the center of which is the 
Securities Law of 1998. The 17 articles in Chapter IV of the Securities Law entitled 
Takeover of Listed Companies are the most fundamental rules which prescribe the basic 
principles as to the substantive and procedural issues surrounding M&As of Chinese 
listed companies either by local or foreign parties. Under the Securities Law, acquisition 
may be carries out either by tender offer or by agreement or through public bidding. And 
the rules governing transactions through tender offer apparently follows the model of the 
United States developed in its Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Williams Act of 1970 as 
the later Amendment.252  
                                                 
252 Xian Chu Zhang, A Same Game with Different Rules: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in the 
People’s Republic of China, supra note 9, pp. 286. 
 126
And the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies Procedures ( the Procedures) 
promulgated by the CSRC on September 28 2002253, which are also applicable to the 
M&As of Chinese listed companies regardless of the nationalities of the buyers, have in 
effect particularized the basic principles provided in Chapter IV of the Securities Law. 
Besides, a body of notices, opinions and circulars issued by the CSRC concerning the 
information disclosure in the M&As of Chinese listed companies are also applicable to 
the transactions involving foreign buyers. 
 
Apart from these general rules, some unique features in China’s securities market have 
rendered certain foreign M&As subject to additional restrictions. For example, state 
shares and legal person shares (or corporate shares), which are differentiated from 
individual shares, have made over two thirds of the total issuing of the common stocks 
held by domestic parties known as A shares in China. However, these shares can not be 
traded on the open market and transferred to other class holders without state authority’s 
approval,254 which according to the government is designed to prevent public ownership 
from being lost.255 This as a result necessitates a series of regulations concerning the 
foreign purchase of the state shares and legal person shares of Chinese listed companies 
in the M&A transactions, which may be known as, among others, the Several Opinions 
on Foreign Investment Issues Relating to Listed Companies, November 8 2001 (the 
                                                 
253 Decree [2002] No.10 of the CSRC. Effective on December 1st 2002. 
254 See Article 93 of the Securities Law. 
255 According to Mr. Liu Hongru, then Chairman of the CSRC, safeguarding the dominant position of the 
public ownership and preventing state assets from being harmed were principles that the Chinese securities 
market had to follow. See ibid, pp. 284, footnote 45.  
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Several Opinions)256, the Tentative Provisions on Investment within China by Foreign-
invested Enterprises, July 25 2000 (the Tentative Provisions)257 and the Circular 2002. 
 
b. Laws Relevant to Foreign M&As of PRC Domestic Financial Institutions 
In view of the strategic significance of financial industries, it is a tradition that foreign-
investment-related activities in these industries in China are subject to a separate line of 
regulations, 258   which are filled with stringent restrictions and onerous approval 
requirements. In the field of cross-border M&As, most of the current legislation (e.g. the 
Provisional Rules on Foreign M&As and the 2002 Notice) fail to clarify whether they 
will apply to M&As of domestic financial institutions by foreign financial institutions.  
A recent legislation Administration of Investment and Equity Participation in Chinese-
invested Financial Institutions by Offshore Financial Institutions Procedures (the 
Procedures)259, promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (the CBRC) 
on December 8 2003 and effective on December 31 2003, is deemed to be a milestone in 
this area. For the first time, a legal framework and transparent requirements for foreign 
acquisition of PRC banking and financial companies is given.  
Although the Procedures do not relax the strict approval requirements that have long been 
imposed on foreign investment and equity participation in the Chinese financial sector, 
they do clarify a number of basic legal requirements for such investment, including the 
maximum foreign shareholding held by a single investor, the preconditions to be met by 
                                                 
256  They are issued by the MOFTEC (now the MOFCOM) and the CSRC (WaiJingMaoZiFa [2001] 
No.538). 
257 Decree [2000] No.6 of the MOFTEC and the SAIC. Effective on September 1 2000. 
258 E.g. the SOE Restructuring Regulations have made it clear that they are applicable to the use of foreign 
investment for reorganizing state-run enterprises except financial enterprises and listed companies. 
259 Order [2003] No.6 of the CBRC. 
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the foreign investors, the approval requirements, the application procedures, 
documentations and the pricing and payment.260 
 
c. Laws Relevant to Foreign M&As of FIEs 
It is until recently that legal provisions are made for the foreign M&A transactions where 
the acquired parties are existing FIEs in China. The laws addressing this lack include, in 
addition to the Provisional Regulations, the Regulations on the Merger and Division of 
Foreign-invested Enterprises (Revised) 261 issued on November 22 2001(the M&D 
Regulations) and the Several Provisions on Changes in Equity Interest of Investors in 
Foreign-invested Enterprises issued on May 28 1997 (the FIE Restructuring 
Provisions) 262 . Although in theory these laws permit a broad range of possible 
transactions, there has been only limited experience to date with the transactions under 
these regulations. This has indicated that the domestic Chinese enterprises are still the 
main targets of foreign buyers, and thus laws governing foreign purchase of domestic 
Chinese business are still the pillar of China’s legal system for cross-border M&As. 
 
IV. Important Legislative Developments Affecting Cross-border M&As in 
China 
 
A cursory review in the preceding section of the legal structure within which foreign 
M&As of Chinese domestic enterprises take place has, on the one hand, reflected the 
                                                 
260 For a detailed discussion as to the Procedures, please refer to Christina Choi and Carmen Kan, Giving a 
Boost to Foreign Equity Participation in Domestic Financial Institution, China Law and Practice, March 
2004, pp.11-16. 
261 Decree [2001] No.8 of the MOFTEC and the SAIC. 
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progress that has been made by Chinese government in creating a legal environment 
conducive to these transactions. On the other hand, it also exposes some weaknesses in 
this system, such as the lack of uniformity due to the involvement of various 
promulgating governmental authorities and the instability as most rules and regulations 
are labeled “provisional”.  
Nonetheless, the most noteworthy aspect of this legal framework is that the majority of 
the legislation introduced above was promulgated relatively recently, primarily in the 
years following China’s WTO accession.  Since it is an obligation of a WTO member 
state to lift various restrictions concerning trade and investment, the Chinese government 
might be anticipating a boom in inwards FDI including cross-border M&A activities 
within its territory in a short period. As a result, these laws were probably rushed out 
without much deliberation as China was in urgent need of legal instruments to deal with 
the upcoming surge in cross-border M&A transactions, a new subject in China that were 
not previously covered by legislation. It is therefore not entirely clear at the current stage, 
based on the empirical evidence, whether these recent legislative developments are 
effective as it has only been a short period since they came into effect.  
However, from a theoretical standpoint, a discussion as to how cross-border M&A 
transactions in China may be regulated under the current legal regime is necessary and 
possible. The following subsections may serve as a rough attempt in this regard. 
 
A. FDI Screening that Affects Cross-border M&As 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
262 WaiJingMaoFa [1997] No.267 
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Although considerable obstacles to foreign investments have been removed due to 
China’s attempt to liberalize its FDI regime, the FDI screening system remains rather 
restrictive. The requirement has hardly been changed that all forms of inward FDI are 
subject to the step-by-step examination and approval procedure regardless of the nature 
of the projects, the amount of capital involved and the industries the foreign investments 
flow. Things become more complicated in respect of foreign investments in the form of 
cross-border M&As, which are subject to a two tier FDI screening process: one generally 
applies to all forms of FDI, the other applicable specifically to cross-border M&As.  
 
 
a. General FDI Screening 
According to China’s FDI-related legislation, which take the form of separate legislative 
enactments for different investment vehicles together with some laws applying generally, 
making foreign investments in China is in effect to establish and run an FIE. Therefore, 
the process of screening the entry of foreign investors is actually the decision-making by 
the relevant governmental authorities as to whether or not to grant approval to the 
application for setting up an FIE. As a result, if the foreign investor enters the Chinese 
market via the M&A route, the screening process applying such entry may vary with the 
character of the entity after the transaction in several respects,263 according to the laws 
governing these business forms (e.g. the EJV Law, the CJV Law etc.), such as the 
authorities in charge of the examination and approval264 and the criteria for granting 
                                                 
263 See Article 6 of the Provisional Rules on M&As. 
264 E.g., the setting up of a foreign investment company limited by shares must be approved by authorities 
at national level (namely, the MOFCOM), while establishing an EJV or a CJV can be approved at local 
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approvals265. The advantage of such multiform legislation is that foreign investors can be 
certain of the requirements for the particular form of investments they have chosen, while 
the disadvantage is that, especially for M&A transactions, such legislative division 
produces difficulties to coordinate activities of different enterprises.  
In addition, the amount of capital involved in the FDI projects and the industries in which 
such projects are undertaken would have an impact on the screening process. The cut-off 
point between approval by central and local authorities is a project size of US$30 million. 
Projects valued at more than US$30 million must be submitted for approval to 
MOFCOM at national level. Projects with a value exceeding US$100 million must also 
be submitted to the State Council for approval. However, such division of authority is not 
absolute -- if a project is in an industry classified as restricted it must be submitted to 
higher authorities even if it is below the US$30 million threshold; conversely, if it is in 
the encouraged catalogue and is regarded as not having future side effects it may be 
approved by the local authority and merely filed in the State Council offices even if it is 
larger than US$30 million.266 
Besides, foreign entries into several special industries are subject to a separate line of 
examination and approval process in which additional conditions and procedure 
requirements may apply. For instance, extra approvals from the ministries in charge of 
                                                                                                                                                 
level as authorized. See respectively Article 9 of the FIC Regulations, and Article 6 of the Implementing 
Rules of both the EJV Law and the CJV Law. 
265 E.g., according to Article 3 of the WFOE Law, the establishment of WFOEs is forbidden or restricted in 
certain industries; Article 7 of the FIC Regulations has stipulated that the registered capital of a foreign 
investment company limited by shares shall be at least RenMinBi (RMB) 30 million. 
266 OECD, supra note No.2, pp.65  
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those industries must be obtained; special qualifications may be needed on the part of 
foreign investors; and more documents may be required to be submitted for scrutiny.267  
  
b. Market Access and Ownership Restrictions within Industries 
It is a distinct feature of China’s FDI regime that there are detailed industrial guidelines 
directing the flow of foreign investments among its domestic industries. Despite 
becoming disenchanted in many countries recently, this type of industrial policy designed 
to promote specific industry sectors is still playing an essential role in the FDI screening 
process in China. The requirements to comply with these industry policies when setting 
up an FIE exist in almost every FIE law; and ensuring that the making of a foreign 
investment is in conformity with these industrial guidelines is one of the primary 
responsibilities of the examining and approving authorities. 
Following China’s accession to the WTO, the main industrial guidelines268 – i.e. the 
Guiding Provisions and the Catalogue 2002 – have been revised in accordance with 
China’s commitments and obligations to liberalize its FDI regime.269  
Firstly, the alterations found in these new versions represent a major step forward in 
China’s further openness of its domestic market and industries as well as its effort in 
attracting more FDI inflows. 
                                                 
267 See the Principles and Procedure for the Approval of Establishing Foreign-invested Enterprises in 
Certain Industries, WaiJingMaoZiFa [1996] No. 752. 
268 There are some other industrial guidelines whose scope of application are limited to certain types of FDI, 
such as the Catalogue of the Industries, Products and Technologies that are Highly Encouraged Currently, 
Decree [2000] No. 7 of the SETC and the SDPC, and the Catalogue of the Advantageous Industries for 
Foreign Investment in the Central-Western Region of China, Decree [2000] No.18 of the SETC, the SDPC 
and the MOFTEC, as revised by Decree [2004] No.13 of the SDRC and the MOFCOM. 
269 The classification of foreign investment projects remains fourfold: encouraged, permitted, restricted and 
prohibited. As before, only three catalogues are published, those for encouraged, restricted and prohibited 
projects. Projects that do not fall into the classifications listed in these catalogues can be presumed to be 
permitted. 
 133
• The number of types of projects included in the 2002 Catalogue of Encouraged 
Foreign Investment Industries has been increased to 262 from 186 in the 1997 
Catalogue, while the number of those included in the Restricted Catalogue has 
been reduced to 75 from 112. 
• Industries used to be closed are open to foreign investments for the first time 
though they are listed under the Restricted Catalogue.270 
• More opportunities are available for foreign investors to qualify their projects, 
which are originally classified as permitted, as the ones under the Encouraged 
Catalogue.271 
Secondly, the changes also reflect the commitments that China has made as a WTO 
member and the recent major development objectives of Chinese government. 
• The industries which are to be open according to the commitments for WTO 
accession are listed as the Attachment to the Catalogue 2002. The particulars 
relating to the opening of these industries, such as the scope of business, the 
time frame for the phase-out of restrictions, and the business form allowed etc., 
are also specified therein. 
• The principles to encourage and promote the foreign participation in developing 
the western regions of China have been added to the Guiding Provisions;272 
correspondingly, there are new provisions in the Catalogue 2002 based on 
                                                 
270 E.g. the telecommunication companies (see Art.V (7) of the Restricted Catalogue and Art.II (4) of the 
Attachment to the Catalogue 2002), and the construction and operation of network of gas, heat, water 
supply and water drainage in large and medium sized cities (see Art.IX (1.1) of the Restricted Catalogue) 
271 See Art.10 of the Guiding Provisions. 
272 See Art.11 of the Guiding Provisions. 
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which preferential terms may be accorded to foreign investments made in the 
western regions.273 
Article 4 of the Provisional Rules on Foreign M&As – the most important legislation 
governing all cross-border M&A transactions in China -- has made it clear that a foreign 
investor that acquires a PRC domestic enterprise shall satisfy the requirements of the 
industrial policy. As a result, the Guiding Provisions and the Catalogue 2002, which have 
classified industries into different catalogues, are playing the crucial role in deciding 
whether and how a cross-border M&A transaction can be carried out. 
Like any other forms of FDI, cross-border M&As are prohibited in the industries listed in 
the Prohibited Catalogue.274 Similar to other countries, this catalogue includes industries 
where national control is considered desirable such as those relating to national security 
and culture, or those key for maintaining the social order. Besides, prohibitions are also 
imposed on a few traditional craft such as the production of green tea, traditional Chinese 
machines, rice paper etc, with the intention to ensure the continued existence of these 
activities because they are deemed to be part of the national heritage.  
For those foreign acquirers who are planning to enter the industries classified as 
Encouraged, Permitted or Restricted, the foreign ownership restrictions imposed by the 
Catalogue 2002 have more important implications. Any cross-border M&A transaction 
may not result in a foreign investor owning all of the equity in an enterprises in an 
industry in which wholly foreign-owned enterprises are not allowed; in industries where 
the Chinese party is required to have a controlling interest or a relative controlling 
                                                 
273 For example, in certain industries (e.g. several sectors in the mining and quarrying industry, see Art.II of 
the Catalogue 2002) FDI projects are allowed to be wholly foreign-owned in the western region, while 
elsewhere only CJV or EJV-form is permitted.  
274 See Article 4 of the Provisional Rules on Foreign M&As. 
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interest, the Chinese party shall continue to be in such controlling position after the 
transaction.275 
 
c. Screening Process Applying Exclusively to Cross-border M&As 
Cross-border M&As as a whole are subject to the general screening process that apply to 
all kinds of FDI in China, while a substantial portion of them are governed by an 
additional line of examining and approving process. The need for further scrutiny of these 
transactions is considered to be rooted in China’s transition economy with the state 
ownership being dominant and the capital market being underdeveloped. This is 
understandable as it is observed that the cross-border M&As coming under additional 
scrutiny are generally those involving transfer of the state ownership (e.g. buying into a 
state-owned enterprise by a foreign investor, or the purchase of state-own shares or 
assets), as well as those carried out on the securities market.  
Comprehensive rules are contained in the SOE Restructuring Regulations governing the 
examination and approval process of foreign investors’ restructuring of SOEs using 
M&A methods.276 These rules have specified the qualifications that must be met by 
foreign investors,277 the documents required to be submitted for examination278 and the 
approval procedures. 279  Under the Circular 2002, the qualification requirements for 
                                                 
275 Ibid. 
276 See Article 3 of the SOE Restructuring Regulations. 
277 See Article 5, ibid. 
278 See Article 9 (1), ibid. 
279 The approval procedures for such transactions are twofold. One is for the approval of restructuring of 
SOEs, which includes the submission of the reorganization plan to the relevant department of the SDRC for 
examination and the submission of an acquisition agreement entered into by the reorganizing party of the 
SOE and the foreign investor to the MOF for approval. The other is the regular examination and approval 
procedures for FIEs in accordance with the relevant FIE rules and the PRC Company Law. See Kathleen A. 
Flaherty, supra note 82. 
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foreign acquirers280 and the additional approval procedures281 are also mandated in the 
transactions where state or legal person shares are transferred from local to foreign hands.  
 
d. Towards A More Effective Screening Mechanism for Cross-border M&As 
Being a developing economy, China has of course a range of industries in which foreign 
investments with new establishments are preferable to cross-border M&As. This may 
include, besides the strategic industries that are closely related to national security, a 
number of underdeveloped industries which can be easily dominated by foreign investors 
entering through M&As, such as many services sectors; or a few industries which have 
been dominated by foreign business, such as automobiles, telecommunication, 
pharmaceutical, computer industries, etc. Cross-border M&As in these industries, if 
without proper restrictions, can easily result in the weakening of national enterprises and 
the industry development falling under foreign control, which may give rise to further 
apprehension regarding an erosion of national economic sovereignty.  
Despite the rigorousness of the FDI screening in China, foreign investors entering into 
Chinese market are in effect provided with substantial scope to decide the form of their 
entries. From the perspective of industry policies, as the entry screening rules have made 
no difference according to the entry mode of foreign investors, there is not enough 
legislative backing for regulating the entry of foreign acquirers into specific industries. 
The Catalogue 2002 only specifies the foreign ownership restrictions or the permitted 
investment vehicles (e.g. CJV or EJV only) in the regulated industries. Foreign acquirers 
                                                 
280 See Article 3 of the Circular 2002. 
281 See Article 4 of the Circular 2002. Apart from the approval from the SETC concerning issues in relation 
to industrial policy or enterprise reorganization, the application for transfer of the ownership of state-owned 
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are free to enter any industries or sectors like greenfield investors, subject merely to 
ownership restrictions and requirements for business forms, as long as these industries 
and sectors are not listed in the Prohibited catalogue. In other words, under the current 
entry screening system in China, there is few effective control over foreign investments 
in the form of cross-border M&As in industries or sectors where foreign purchase of 
domestic business need to be restricted.  
Hence, such industry policies are expected to be modified to fit the upcoming surge of 
cross-border M&As. For one thing, it is necessary to clarify in industry policies that 
foreign M&As of Chinese business must be in line with China’s national economic 
development strategies and the ongoing restructuring of domestic industries. In particular, 
based on the current Catalogue, the government should specify the industries that are 
open to cross-border M&As, as well as those where these transactions are prohibited or 
restricted. For another, it is advisable that the scrutiny and approval process for foreign 
M&As in regulated industries are conducted on the case-by-case basis. This is because a 
foreign M&A of a domestic enterprise usually involves the inflow of FDI, which can still 
be very valuable for the developing economy in China in spite of its other negative 
effects, and such benefits are more likely to be preserved under the case-by-case 
examination procedures. 
 
Moreover, with respect to certain type of cross-border M&As involving the transfer of 
state-owned and corporate shares in Chinese listed companies, there are also several 
                                                                                                                                                 
shares shall be subject to review and approval by the MOF, and any important development in this respect 
shall be reported to the State Council for approval. 
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weaknesses in the governing regulation (i.e. the Circular 2002,see Appendix I) regarding 
the screening of foreign acquirers’ entry: 
• It fails to define clearly what kinds of “foreign investors” are covered by its 
provisions. Although according to an official from the CSRC, such “foreign 
investors” include foreign persons and foreign firms, as well as existing FIEs in 
China,282 official documents have yet to be provided for formal clarification. 
• The qualification requirements set forth in Article 3, which must be satisfied by 
the foreign investors proposing to acquire state-owned and corporate shares in 
Chinese listed companies, are too vague to be applied properly. There is a lack of 
supplementing rules clarifying what constitutes “a strong capacity in operation 
and management and adequate financial strength, a good financial status and 
reputation, and the ability to improve the structure of governance of the listed 
corporation and to promote its sustainable development”. Neither is it clear from 
the provisions that which governmental agency will be responsible for deciding 
whether a foreign investor in question is qualified under Article 3. 
• The involvement of a number of government authorities in the examination and 
approval procedures, including the MOF, the CRSC, the SETC, the SAFE, 
etc.(Article 4) makes the entry screening a complex and time-consuming process, 
the results of which therefore become unpredictable. 
As such, these rules can hardly provide a uniform and transparent standard for market 
access of foreign investors. Instead, the governing authorities are left substantial 
                                                 
282 See “Relevant Laws and Cases Concerning Foreign Acquisitions of State-owned and Corporate Shares 
in Domestic Listed Companies”, a statement made by Feng Henian, Depute Director of Dept. of Legal 
Affairs under the CSRC, in a press conference held under the “2003 Foreign M&As of Domestic 
Enterprises Ministerial Forum”, 20 August, 2003.  
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discretion to decide whether or not to grant the approvals. Such uncertainties are very 
likely to discourage many foreign investors that are interested in making M&A 
transactions in Chinese market. It is therefore imperative for Chinese government to 
officially clarify all the controversies, by publishing supplementing rules or establishing a 
coordinating agency, so as to clear the way for the upcoming surge of cross-border 
M&As.  
 
B. The Provisional Rules on Foreign M&As – Progress or Regress? 
 
Ever since the promulgation of the Provisional Rules for Foreign M&As (the Provisional 
Rules, see Appendix II), the controversy surrounding the impact of these rules on the 
development of cross-border M&A transactions in China remains unabated. Admittedly, 
there is now clear administrative guidance for foreign M&As of Chinese enterprises, by 
which foreign acquirers may avoid the awkward efforts to justify M&A transactions 
under other FDI laws and regulations. The overall increase in clarity on these transactions 
has arguably led to greater predictability and accountability, which may reduce 
perception of regulatory risk and opportunity for local corruption. Nevertheless, 
complaints are also heard that these rules have provided more occasions for greater 
restrictions on cross-border M&A transactions in China, because many aspects of these 
transactions that used to be regulated unsystematically are now subject to a whole series 
of examinations and approvals by the regulatory authorities. 283  Moreover, several 
provisions in the Provisional Rules are too ambiguous to be applied properly, creating 
                                                 
283 Peter A. Neumann, Private Acquisitions by Foreign Investors in China: Is the Party Finally Over? 
China Law & Practice, April 2003, pp.17 
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new uncertainties. And some may even be inconsistent with the existing laws, while no 
clarification has been made as to whether the new rules prevail in the case of conflict. 
Many foreign investors may therefore yearn for the former governing regime, more 
workable though immature, with the flexibility resulting from the lack of the laws to 
which they had grown accustomed.   
As some observers have concluded that whether the Provisional Rules will fill certain 
regulatory gaps or restrict and chill a once promising market for M&A transactions in 
China is depending on one’s perspective (Peter A. Neumann, 2003), it may be advisable 
to provide a comprehensive and thorough survey of the key features of these rules.284  
 
a. Applicability and Scope 
Although the Provisional Rules are entitled with the term “merger and acquisition” (bing 
gou 并构), they are confined to acquisitions of PRC domestic enterprises (other than the 
FIEs) and remain silent on mergers. The cross-border M&A transactions that are dealt 
with by these rules can be divided into two basic categories: share and asset 
acquisition.285  
• Share acquisitions either through (i) acquisitions by agreement of equity in a 
domestic enterprise and its conversion into an FIE; or (ii) subscription to the 
registered capital increased of a domestic company and the conversion of such 
company into an FIE. 
                                                 
284 The antitrust provisions in the Provisional Rules are excluded from the examination in this section, and 
will be included in the following section which is concentrated on the competition aspects of cross-border 
M&As in China. 
285 Article 2 of the Provisional Rules 
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• Asset acquisitions either by (i) the establishment of an FIE and the purchase of the 
assets of a domestic enterprise for use by the FIE; or (ii) acquisition of assets of a 
domestic enterprise by a foreign investor by agreement and injection of those 
assets as registered capital into a new FIE. 
Ostensibly, the Provisional Rules set forth a framework uniformly governing the foreign 
M&As of Chinese enterprises, be it state-owned or private-owned. However, prior to the 
Provisional Rules, among the transactions listed above only those where foreign investors 
acquire unlisted private-owned enterprises were not addressed specifically by relevant 
laws. Either transactions with the acquired parties being listed companies or transactions 
involving foreign acquisitions of SOEs (listed or unlisted) were regulated respectively by 
a whole set of rules and regulations. In this sense, a substantial portion of the Provisional 
Rules seem only to reiterate the government control over foreign M&As of Chinese 
enterprises which has already been imposed by various existing laws.  
Regardless of the potential overlap between the Provisional Rules and existing provisions 
governing cross-border M&As, it has to be admitted that the new rules represent an 
improvement in China’s legal system. So far cross-border M&As in China are still 
governed by fragmentary legislation, a fashion in which many other business activities 
are regulated in China. The promulgation of the Provisional Rules has just indicated the 
intention of Chinese lawmakers to centralize the regulation of these transactions to avoid 
the unnecessary conflicts and delay. This is a good beginning towards a more uniform 




b. The Regulatory Control by the Authorities  
As China’s reorganization of its ministries and reshuffling of responsibilities for foreign 
investments occurred shortly after the promulgation of The Provisional Rules,286 there 
was some confusion as to how these new and reorganized ministries would implement 
the existing and new rules. In this regard, it is a pleasure to find that the Provisional 
Rules have clearly stated that the MOFCOM (previously MOFTEC) is the approval 
authority responsible for the acquisition of domestic enterprises by foreign investors. 
However, under the Provisional Rules, the approval jurisdiction of the governmental 
authorities – i.e. the MOFCOM – is implicitly or explicitly extended:  
• MOFCOM’s regulatory control over share acquisition has been expanded. In 
addition to the well established requirements of foreign investment approvals 
when a new FIE is set up, certain situations not previously covered, in particular 
those acquisitions of equity interests of less than 25% in Chinese enterprises, now 
clearly require approval from MOFCOM (Article 5).  
• The Provisional Rules have also expanded MOFCOM’s control over asset 
acquisition by mandating that MOFCOM shall regulate and approve all asset 
acquisitions, including the acquisition of non-state-owned assets. Prior to these 
rules, acquisition of operating assets by an FIE involving no state-owned assets 
was largely unregulated and generally no approval (from authorities) requirement 
applied, provided that the transaction did not entail any industry restrictions 
(Article 14-16).  
                                                 
286 The SETC and the MOFTEC have been dissolved, and various departments below them have been 
merged with other ministries, including the newly established MOFCOM and the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (the SASAC), as well as the SDRC formerly known as the 
SDPC. 
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• Moreover, under the provision imposing payment schedules, the MOFCOM (and 
its local branches) is the approval authority which decides whether or not to grant 
extension to the time limits of the payment in question (Article 9). 
Although it still remains to be seen how the expansion in MOFCOM’s regulatory control 
over cross-border M&As will affect the development of these transactions in China, it has 
been questioned whether the motivation behind such legislation is merely an effort of the 
MOFTEC to reassert its approval and regulatory authority.  
 
c. New Appraisal Requirements 
An appraisal requirement now is imposed on all acquisitions of PRC domestic enterprises 
by foreign investors, including those involving the transfer of non-state-owned assets 
which subject to no appraisal requirement previously. Moreover, such appraisal must be 
conducted by an asset appraisal institution in accordance with internationally accepted 
appraisal methods. In any case, the assignment of equity interests or sale of assets to 
foreign investors shall not be permitted at a price that is manifestly lower than the 
appraisal result (Article 8).287  
Worries have been widely expressed as to the effects of this requirement. First of all, the 
purpose of any appraisal requirements should be to protect shareholder interests. 
However, it seems that Chinese government’s aim through such requirements is to 
protect the value of domestic assets even though it may be detrimental to the relevant 
                                                 
287 According to the Tentative Procedures for Administration of the Assignment of Enterprise State-owned 
Assets and Equity, Decree [2003] No.3 of the SASAC and the MOF (issued on December 31 2003), if the 
price of any state-owned equity is lower than 90% of the value in the valuation report, the transaction 
should be suspended and consent from the SASAC or its relevant branch is required. This is a deviation 
from the earlier practice under which the SASAC only confirms the valuation report but does not interfere 
with the price of the transaction. 
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shareholder interests. This is especially the case in private transactions – i.e. those 
involving no state-owned assets or interests. Since it is forbidden to sell an enterprise at a 
price below the value determined by the outside appraisal, the shareholders are in effect 
deprived of the right to negotiate the prices with the buyers. It has been pointed out that 
such appraisal requirements will make aggressively low asset pricing difficult, which 
may render the transactions where foreign investors acquire private-owned assets much 
less attractive to be carried out.288 Secondly, the use of the term “internationally accepted 
appraisal methods” has also added to the confusion as to how this appraisal requirement 
will be implemented given the substantial differences between international and PRC 
accounting standards.  
 
d. Payment Schedules 
Unlike the previous practice where the payment schedules were left to be negotiated 
between buyers and sellers, the Provisional Rules now impose a basic rule that purchase 
consideration should be paid in full within three months for both share and asset 
acquisitions. This may be extended, only under special circumstances and subject to 
special approvals, to at least 60 percent payable within six months of issuance of the FIE 
business license, and the balance payable within one year (Article 9).   
The imposition of these short payment schedules has provoked considerable criticism for 
its arbitrariness. Such requirements are even thought to represent a retreat from a general 
trend of ongoing market-oriented reforms in China and may in effect deter many 
potential foreign investors which are more willing to use “earn-out” payment formulas, 
                                                 
288 Peter A. Neumann, supra note no 283 
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A careful review of key features of the Provisional Rules might be helpful in making an 
objective assessment of the general significance of these rules. Firstly, it is apparent that 
the promulgation authorities contemplated providing formal and comprehensive 
regulatory guidance through this legislation for cross-border M&As in China which were 
previously handled in an ad hoc manner. 289  At present, given the short period of 
application, it is not entirely clear that whether the benefits of these new rules 
contemplated by the promulgating authorities will outweigh the negative effects arising 
from additionally imposed requirements.  
Nevertheless, being the most important legislative development in this regard, several 
steps forward reflected in these rules should not be neglected, especially the inclusion of 
antitrust provisions for merger control, which have never existed in any other legislation 
in China. Although these provisions (Article 19-22) have been criticized as fraught with 
problems, they represent the first attempt of Chinese government to use the competition 
law to regulate inwards FDI, as part of its efforts to make China’s legal system market-
compatible and to further encourage foreign investment activities.290 
                                                 
289 For example, this appears to be the first official authorization for foreign investment in China through 
acquisitions of registered capital in Chinese limited liability companies, although there are many examples 
of such transactions approved by relevant ministries in charge of particular industries (such as insurance 
and banking industries).  
290 Further discussion of these anti-trust provisions will be provided in pp.145, V. China’s Merger Control 
Regime – The Newly Developed Mechanism Dealing with the Competition Concerns of Cross-border 
M&As. 
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In addition, leaving aside the actual effects of the Provisional Rules on cross-border 
M&As in China, the government’s attempt to centralize the regulation of these 
transactions and eliminate the potential conflicts and delays has been manifested. Under 
the Provisional Rules, the MOFCOM and the SAIC (and their provincial level 
subordinates) have been empowered exclusively to be responsible for both the standard 
examination and approval procedures for all covered transactions and the anti-monopoly 
review process of transactions with potential anti-competitive effects.291  Besides, the 
Provisional Rules also include a provision subjecting almost all the M&A transactions 
with a potential impact on competition in China, including those falling out of the 
coverage of these rules, to a uniform antitrust scrutiny. 292  Although the expected 
improvements in uniformity and efficiency by these new efforts may be limited, it is still 
admirable that the Chinese government has determined to streamline and increase 
certainty and transparency in the regulation of cross-border M&As, which is consistent 
with the general direction of the ongoing legal reform in China.  
 
Secondly, as foreign investors are increasingly apt to start their business in China with 
cross-border M&As, many of the government’s policy goals surrounding FDI should be 
reflected in, and served by the regulatory system governing these transactions. Therefore, 
a sound legal regime regulating cross-border M&As in China shall not only create an 
environment that is attractive to foreign investors, but also provide favorable conditions 
for optimizing the use of these inward investment in improving various aspects of China’ 
                                                 
291 See Article 5 of the Provisional Rules. 
292 According to Article 24 of the Provisional Rules, the acquisition of foreign investors of existing FIEs 
continues to be governed by the FIE Restructuring Provisions; for matters not provided for therein, such as 
the anti-monopoly control of the transactions, the Provisional Rules will apply.  
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economy, including increasing employment, expanding the tax base, encouraging exports 
and raising the technical sophistication of manufacturing. Obviously, improvements in all 
of these areas are more likely to be achieved under a highly sophisticated, broadly 
consistent and clearly articulated FDI regime. In this sense, the Provisional Rules, which 
are comprised of merely 26 articles lacking clarity, with most key terms undefined, seem 
to be a futile effort.  
 
Lastly, as an early attempt by Chinese government to regulate cross-border M&As, the 
Provisional Rules are tentative in nature from the very beginning. The experience from 
the countries where cross-border M&As are commonplace suggests that it is a growing 
trend for the host countries to provide a free environment for M&As including those 
involving foreign investors. The antitrust regime, rather than any other rules and 
regulations, should play the major role in regulating these transactions. As Chinese 
officials have indicated that the passage of a modern antitrust law is a top priority for 
China as it continues to upgrade its legal system to international standard, the Provisional 
Rules, which include both FDI rules and antitrust principles, will inevitably be replaced 
by a pure merger control regime to regulate cross-border M&As in China.  
 
V. China’s Merger Control Regime – The Newly Developed Mechanism 
Dealing with the Competition Concerns of Cross-border M&As  
 
Fearing to discourage the inflow of much-needed foreign capital, the Chinese government 
was always hesitant to take any action to prevent the negative repercussions of foreign 
 148
investment. Among others, the monopoly-related problems arising therefrom had been 
paid least attention.  Recently, starting with the promulgation of the Provisional Rules, 
which incorporate several anti-trust provisions, China has made a move to carry on a full-
scale antitrust campaign that has been suspended for a long time. It is interesting to note 
that the resolve to construct an anti-monopoly regime in China was evoked more by 
foreign investors’ anti-competitive behaviors than those of domestic enterprises. The 
pressing need to upgrade the competition safeguards against the formation and abuse of 
the dominance by foreign business in China’s domestic market was stressed lately by a 
report from the SAIC. This report has highlighted the government’s ongoing concern 
with monopoly practice by big foreign companies in China.293 More importantly, the 
SAIC proposed that relevant authorities: 
• Make the best use of the existing laws and regulations to approach the monopoly-
related problems; 
• Introduce, as soon as possible, new regulations specifically targeted at 
monopolistic practice by multinationals; and  
• Accelerate the promulgation of Anti-monopoly Law.294 
As foreign investor are showing a growing interest in M&A transactions as a channel to 
establish their long-term presence in China, to fill the legal vacuum that has long existed 
in the area of merger control, which constitutes an essential component of competition 
law system, is now a priority of Chinese lawmakers.  
 
                                                 
293  In May 2004, the SAIC published a two-page report on the competition-inhibiting practice of 
multinationals. This report sets forth specific examples of monopoly trade practices and pinpoints the 
responsible multinationals such as Kodak, Microsoft and Tetra Pak.  
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A. Merger Control in China 
 
A Study on the competition policies in transitional economies (Bing Song, 1995) 
suggests that Chinese economy was characteristic of market segmentation and a low 
degree of industrial concentration. Under these circumstances, the generally small size 
and low competitive capacity of Chinese enterprises has made it impossible for them to 
acquire national dominance by way of M&A transactions. In other words, domestic 
M&A transactions in China do not pose immediate dangers to the competitiveness of the 
market at least at national level. Moreover, in the hope of breaking down segmentation 
and turning around the unprofitable SOEs, M&A transactions were even officially 
encouraged by Chinese government. As few M&As were done with the aim to increase 
market power, any possible anti-competitive effects that may accompany these 
transactions are, presumably, downplayed, as long as such combinations were beneficial 
to the “business cooperation across provinces”, or could help to save the deeply troubled 
SOEs.295 It is therefore understandable that the lack of merger control in China was not 
alarming in the days when cross-border M&As were still rare occurrences. 
Interestingly, the impetus behind the construction of merger control regime in China 
comes from a growing concern for the viability of domestic industries under the 
foreseeable intensified competition within Chinese market. At present, Chinese business 
entities are still small and weak. Even those large in size have operated under a protected 
domestic environment and enjoyed various preferential treatments. It is hardly possible 
for these enterprises to compete with the foreign conglomerates with technical expertise, 
                                                                                                                                                 
294 Tang Zhengyu, Chen Jiang and Hua Sha, Towards an Anti-monopoly Law: China Vows to Upgrade its 
Competition Safeguards, China Law & Practice, July/August 2004, pp.18 
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efficient management and ample capital, most of which possess a formidable power 
sufficient to acquire the dominance in China’s domestic market and crush many of 
China’s infant industries.296 Cross-border M&As, which may provide the fastest way for 
foreign investors to establish their presence in China, are deemed to be facilitating the 
formation of such foreign monopoly powers. In practice, foreign M&As of Chinese 
enterprises resulting in dominant market position in foreign hands have been noted every 
now and then.297 
As such, although technically China’s merger control is a mechanism for precluding 
market concentration or the acquisition of market dominance, its implicit focus seems to 
be placed on protecting domestic enterprises from being squeezed out more than 
preventing the lessening of competition within domestic market. And the inclusion of 
such policy goals other than pure competition ones into merger control regime has been 
hotly-debated and intensely-condemned, as it may lead to several undesirable 
consequences. 
For the one thing, with the intention of protecting domestic enterprises facing increased 
competition from foreign investors, the merger control rules tend to be formulated and 
applied in a way that discriminate against foreign investors. Since Chinese enterprises are 
                                                                                                                                                 
295 Bing Song, Competition Policy in A Transitional Economy: the Case of China, 31, Stan. J. Int’l L. 387. 
296 Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution In China: A Third Way For Competition 
Regime? 24. Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 107 
297 E.g., In March 1998, Kodak purchased the assets of two SOEs, Xiamen Fuda Photographic Materials 
and Shantou Era Photo Materials Industry Corp for a sum of US$380 million, resulting in Kodak’s holding 
of 80 and 70 percent shares in each company respectively. Under a “basket agreement” concluded in these 
transactions, other three state-owned photographic filmmakers were refrained from forming any joint 
venture with any foreign investors before 2001. As a result, only Fuji of Japan and Lucky, the biggest state-
owned filmmaker, were left on the market because of Kodak’s exclusive market position. Such dominance 
was even stabilized after China had classified film-making as a highly restricted industry for foreign 
investors. These transactions led to Kodak’s 70% market share in film product in 2001, and had helped 
Kodak as the second comer to quickly surpass Fuji on the Chinese market. And in 2003 when such 
agreement has expired for 2 years, Kodak’s market share still remains more than 50%.  (Source of Data: the 
MOFCOM) 
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generally relatively small scale when compared to foreign firms, the government 
authorities can justify the exclusion of domestic enterprises from merger control simply 
by setting the thresholds triggering merger review in a way that is favorable to Chinese 
enterprises. Consequently, in the name of protecting the competitiveness with domestic 
market, merger control in China may be in effect an FDI mechanism that contravenes the 
spirit of national treatment principle, an essential non-discriminatory notion of WTO 
rules. 
For another, if merger control is used to serve the purpose of protect domestic industries 
in China, the decision-making as to whether to block a cross-border M&A transaction is 
likely to be highly subjective. Whether the result of an M&A transaction may undermine 
the market position of the indigenous enterprises competing with the foreign acquirer 
varies from industry to industry. It is therefore hardly possible that an objective criterion 
can be applied uniformly to transactions in all industries. As such, the decision as to 
whether a cross-border M&A turn out to be a threat to domestic enterprises seeking to 
gain a foothold in the market is left to the discretion of the reviewing authorities, and the 
results of such review are usually unpredictable. The risks associated with carrying out 
cross-border M&As in China are therefore increased, which is apparently inconsistent 
with the government’s eagerness to make China a popular destination for foreign 
investments. 
 
Despite some inherent limitations, the regulatory efforts in addressing the competition 
concerns of cross-border M&As is an undeniable breakthrough in China’s construction of 
the legal regime governing these transactions. From the short-term perspective, to 
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structure the merger control regime on such ground as safeguarding domestic industries 
can be justified by the China’s overriding need to develop its economy. Against the 
backdrop of the global economic slowdown, China’s steady growth, as well as its WTO 
commitments to open up an array of previously protected industries in the near future, 
has sped up the foreign penetration of Chinese market. The resultant intensification of 
competition is of double-edged nature. While Chinese government have counted on 
competition to improve the performance of domestic firms and boost economy growth, 
the concerns over these domestic firms’ ability to survive before they are well-established 
are still frequently voiced by policy-makers. Besides, as the ongoing reforms and 
reorganizations of various aspects in China’s transitional economy can not be 
accomplished overnight, it may be inappropriate to require an advanced merger control 
system in China at this stage as those in the developed economies.  
 
B. The Current Legislation on Merger Review and A Proposed Merger Control Regime  
 
a. Antitrust Review Requirements in the Existing Legislation 
Prior to the Provisional Rules, there is only a glancing mention of the concept of antitrust 
review and hearings concerning foreign acquisition of Chinese enterprises in the SOE 
Restructuring Regulations – they require foreign investors to declare in their restructuring 
plan their percentage of market shares in the same industry in China, and authorize 
SDRC to hold a hearing in the event it determines that the restructuring would cause 
anticompetitive effects or result in a monopoly.298 For foreign investors, these provisions 
merely add to their confusion as there is no further explanation as to what kind of 
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situation will be determined as causing anticompetitive effects or result in a monopoly for 
the purpose of the hearing. Neither is it clear from these provisions whether the hearing is 
of any consequence to the granting of approvals by relevant authorities.  
 
The formal attempt by Chinese regulators to exercise antitrust jurisdiction over cross-
border M&A transactions starts off with the promulgation of the Provisional Rules. 
Although in many ways the Provisional Rules as a whole serves as a convenient 
summary of existing rules regarding foreign purchase of Chinese business, the new 
contents they add to the existing legal system in the form of anti-monopoly measures are 
of special significance. For the first time, these provisions establish an anti-monopoly 
review process for certain types of cross-border M&As and provide legislative backing to 
block transactions that are perceived to have anti-competitive or market concentration 
effect. This is an important step forward towards bringing China’s M&A regulatory 
environment into conformity with international practice.  
Compared to the SOE Restructuring Regulations, the requirements included in these rules 
take it a step further, which expressly provide thresholds that will trigger notification 
(Article 19) and hearings (Article 20), reporting requirements for offshore M&A 
transactions (Article 21) and the exemptions (Article 22), presenting a potential 
compliance issue that foreign investors proposing M&As in China should be take notice 
of.  
Unfortunately, however, it is very likely that these merger review regulations will raise 
more problems and doubts than they can resolve in practice. There are too many issues 
                                                                                                                                                 
298 See Article 9 (1) of the SOE Restructuring Regulations.  
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remained to be clarified, posing significant challenges for foreign investors preparing, 
submitting and defending their filings for merger review: 
• As to the triggering thresholds for mandatory reporting of M&A transactions, the 
size of the parties and their affiliates as measured by business turnover, 
cumulative annual number of acquired businesses, market share or size of assets, 
and the effect of the transaction on market concentration as measured by 
combined market share are relevant.299 However, the time period over which to 
measure China business turnover is not specified. It is also unclear about how to 
measure the Transacting Parties’ market share in China, which is even 
aggravated by the absence of any criteria to define the term “market”.  
• Little detail about the procedure for notification and review of covered 
transactions has been provided, such as that which party is responsible for 
reporting the transaction; when the transaction meeting the thresholds must be 
reported;300 what information must be provided to the MOFCOM or SAIC; how 
and on what basis the MOFCOM or SAIC will review and approve or disapprove 
a proposed transaction;301 how long the merger review may take, etc. 
• No mechanism has been provided to deal with non-compliance with the reporting 
or other requirements, resulting in a variety of uncertainties as to whether any 
such non-compliance might incur administrative or civil fines, a cease and desist 
order, reversal of a transactions, or even criminal penalties; whether a foreign 
                                                 
299 These thresholds apply to both onshore and offshore transactions. See Article 19 and 21. 
300 For offshore transactions, Article 21 expressly require that the parties to a reportable transaction notify 
MOFCOM/SAIC of their merger plan before it is publicly announced or at the same time that it is 
submitted to regulators in the country in which the transactions will occur.  
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investor would have adequate opportunity to rebut adverse evidence; or whether 
a foreign investor will have any legal recourse in the case of an unfavorable 
decision. 
• There is a lack of clarity regarding the division of responsibilities between the 
MOFCOM and the SAIC, and thus it is not assured that these two authorities will 
employ consistent and transparent reviewing standards, methods and procedures. 
Apart from the lack of clarity and details, these antitrust provisions have also attracted 
substantial criticisms in some other aspects, such as that there is substantial room for 
subjecting foreign M&A transactions to merger review independent of their competition 
significance;302 or some of the thresholds for mandatory notification are only indirectly 
related to market concentration, exceeding which alone is of little competition 
significance.303 
In the absence of implementing rules or detailed official guidance, the existence of such a 
large number of unaddressed issues has substantially devalued the merger control regime 
under the Provisional Rules. On the one hand, it would be impractical for the responsible 
authorities to enforce these provisions systematically and effectively -- the concept that 
the MOFCOM/SAIC decisions should be made “according to law” is meaningless 
without a well-articulated antitrust law. And this may provide many potential 
opportunities for administration discretion to affect the review and decision processes on 
                                                                                                                                                 
301 The test for substantive evaluation of covered transactions is only prescribed in the vague terms in 
Article 20 and 21, which reads “… cause excessive concentration in the domestic market, impede or disturb 
rightful competition and harm domestic consumers’ benefits”.  
302 According to Article 19, the MOFCOM and the SAIC are empowered to require, upon the request by 
domestic competitors, relevant government authorities or industry association, a foreign acquirer to file a 
report for merger review, if the MOFCOM or the SAIC is of the opinion that the foreign M&A transaction 
will “involve a very large market share” or there exist factors that will “affect market competition or the 
people’s livelihood and national economic security”. 
303 Such as the turnover criterion and the number of transactions criterion stipulated in Article 19 (1) (2). 
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the grounds other than competition concerns. On the other hand, being fraught with 
opaqueness and uncertainties, the whole merger control system poses substantial risks to 
foreign investors contemplating M&A transactions that may potentially affect market 
conditions in China. Currently most foreign M&As subject to these provisions have to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and more importantly, no decisions under these 
provisions have been made public. These foreign investors are left no choice but to rely 
on their own interpretation or certain informal opinions from government officials, which 
obviously can only provide limited guidance.  
 
Admittedly, many of the problems in the existing merger control regime framed by the 
antitrust provisions in the Provisional Rules result mainly from the Chinese government’s 
lack of skills and experience in the area of merger control. They can be and must be 
overcome in the near future. Nevertheless, it seems to be unreasonable at the current 
stage to require Chinese government to structure a merger control regime employing the 
standards as those adopted in many mature antitrust jurisdictions (mostly developed 
countries) to regulate cross-border M&As.  
For example, under the antitrust provisions in the Provisional Rules, each applicable 
notification thresholds will independently trigger mandatory merger notification and 
approval process. Such a mechanism may subject to the merger control regime the 
transactions where the value involved are insignificant or where foreign investor is not 
the controlling shareholder after the transaction. Thus, the scope of potential reporting 
obligation is much broader in China than in many other jurisdictions, which has been 
criticized for overloading the government agencies with transactions without competition 
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concerns. However, it should never be neglected that China is still a developing economy 
with a number of relatively weak industries, where many foreign firms can attain the 
monopolistic position without sizeable M&A transactions. It is therefore justifiable at 
present for the Chinese government to structure a merger control regime to bring under 
regulatory control as much as possible transactions that may pose threats to China’s 
domestic industries, which can be easily achieved by lowering the thresholds for 
mandatory notification.  
   
In conclusion, the existing merger control regime dealing with the competition concerns 
arising from cross-border M&As is still to a large degree a work-in-progress. These 
provisions seem to be rushed out to lessen the urgency to prevent expansion of foreign 
investors into dominance, while encouraging the growth of domestic firms. 304 
Clarification and interpretative guidance are urgently needed to maximize the practical 
utility of the policy positions embodied in these rules. And along with a functioning 
merger control regime taking shape, substantial improvements in other aspects such as 
the establishment of the administrative structure for merger control are also expected.  
It seems to be ironic that so much attention and efforts have been focused on the 
improvements to the current merger control regime, which has been labeled with 
“provisional” from the beginning and will possibly be replaced in the near future by the 
more comprehensive merger control scheme under the drafting Anti-Monopoly Law. 
However, before the promulgation of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the antitrust provisions in 
the Provisional Rules will still be playing the key role in addressing the competition 
                                                 
304 See Editorial, Anti-monopoly: Promoting Competition by Legislation, China 21st Century Bus. Herald 
March 26, 2003. 
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concerns of cross-border M&As. Therefore, consultation with experienced counsel will 
be important in confirming the policy views and the presence of a PRC antitrust filing 
requirement for proposed transactions, especially during this transitional period before 
more detailed implementing regulations are promulgated. 
 
b. Merger Control Regime in the Draft of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law 
In light of a growing need to regulate anti-competitive practices, the MOFCOM 
submitted the draft of PRC Anti-Monopoly Law (the Draft) to the State Council in 
February 2004 in an effort to accelerate the passage of a more complete, reasonable and 
well articulated piece of legislation, which will be aimed to protect the competition 
within Chinese market at a national level without discriminatory effect against foreign 
investors.  
Among others, this Draft contains a chapter entitled with the term “concentration” rather 
than “merger” (the Merger Chapter), which reveals the drafter’s intention to “target a 
wide spectrum of measures that result in enterprise integrations and combinations”.305 
Once the Draft is passed, it is hoped that an effective merger control regime can be 
established through this chapter.  
A detailed comparison has been made between the Merger Chapter in the Draft and the 
antitrust provisions in the Provisional Rules (Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, 2003).306 As 
a whole, the Merger Chapter turns out to be a more systematic merger control regime, 
which has set forth the basic elements such as the obligation to apply for approval, the 
                                                 
305 Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, supra note 296. 
306 Their discussion was based on the latest two drafts, which came out in April and October, 2002, 
respectively. Only Chinese versions were circulated and the English translation in their discussion was not 
official.  
 159
standards for substantive merger reviews and sanctions in the event of non-compliance. 
However, several unique features entrenched in China’s legal system from the days of 
planning economy can still be found in this Merger Chapter. For example, the 
requirement that an M&A transaction cannot be consummated without approvals from 
competition authorities appears to be much stricter than the common practices in other 
countries – that is, a waiting period is imposed after which the M&A can proceed in the 
absence of objection from competition authorities. This reflects the government’s desire 
to impose tight control over these business activities.  
In addition, the competition authorities are still left considerable scope for making 
discretionary decisions under the Merger Chapter. This is a problem existing throughout 
China’s legal system, which has been long condemned for causing opaqueness and 
uncertainties. A case in point is the use of the term “special” from time to time without 
further explanation as to what constitutes such “special”.307 And the adoption of “public 
interest” standard in the substantive evaluation of M&A transactions has exacerbated this 
problem, since “public interest” is a catch-all term “subject to wide interpretation to the 
fullest possible degree,” 308  and such interpretation will be left to the discretion of 
competition authorities based on a case-by-case situation if a well articulated guideline in 
this regard is missing.309 
 
                                                 
307 E.g., “special approvals” can be granted by competition authorities when a concentration found to 
eliminate or limit competition within a specified area is advantageous to the national economy and public 
interests.  
308 Youngjin Jung and Qian Hao, supra note 296. 
309 According to the latest publicly circulated draft of the Anti-Monopoly Law, a proposed transaction will 
not be approved if it would (1) exclude or restrict market competition; (2)hinder the healthy development 
of the national economy; or (3) harm social and public interests.  
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In summary, it is expected that once promulgated, the Merger Chapter in the Draft will 
represent a significant milestone in China’s construction of its merger control regime. 
Unlike any existing antitrust provisions governing cross-border M&As, the Merger 
Chapter will not be specifically aimed at curbing foreign monopolies. Instead, foreign 
investors will be afforded equal opportunities and subject to same regulatory control as 
domestic firms when carrying out M&A transactions in China. In this sense, the Merger 
Chapter will be more consistent with China’s policy goal to enhance its attraction to 
foreign investments.  
In the long term, based on the experience from countries with mature legal framework 
governing cross-border M&As, it seems to be an irreversible trend that merger control 
regulations will grow into the mainstay of China’s legal system regulating foreign 
acquisitions of domestic enterprises. As China’s first piece legislation in this regard, it is 
not surprising that the Draft may be incomplete or even problematic. As it is still open to 
suggestions for improvement, it remains to be seen that whether the potential drawbacks 
in the current version of the Draft can be diminished.  
VI. The Environment for the Development of Cross-border M&As in China 
 
At the very beginning of China’s economy opening, cross-border M&A transactions were 
often frustrated because of the great gap between the goals of Chinese government and 
foreign investors. From the government’s perspective, foreign M&As shall play a role to 
discharge the government’s burden to turn around the financially troubled SOEs from 
loss-makers to profit-contributors. Therefore, the SOEs available for foreign investors to 
takeover are usually those deeply troubled for a long time. However, most foreign 
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investors proposing M&A transactions were with the intention to find suitable partners or 
target enterprises with good market positions in China in order to ensure the viability of 
the business after the transactions. As a result, these investors were deterred from 
engaging in M&A transactions due to the different expectations, high cost in settling 
former employees and limited autonomy in the future operation.310 
Although many foreign investors have been encouraged by the increasing maturity of 
China’s business and legal environment in recent years, their concerns over the high risks 
in cross-border M&As in China remain unabated. On the one hand, the regulatory regime 
in China is changing, which is even accelerated by the WTO accession, towards being 
more conducive to cross-border M&As. On the other hand, the political and economic 
reasons for the government to maintain controls in many aspects render the scope and 
rapidity of such change unpredictable, making it difficult to determine precisely what is 
permitted and how it may be best accomplished. Therefore, the insecurity and uncertainty 
surrounding cross-border M&As arising from numerous regulatory obstacles pose the 
major threats to the current developments of these transactions in China.  
 
A. The Government’s Ambivalence towards Cross-border M&As  
 
The Chinese government is fully aware of the positive side of cross-border M&As: as a 
form of FDI, these transactions could bring international competition based on the market 
discipline into China and revolutionize the inefficient domestic management system, in 
addition to providing urgently needed foreign capital and modern technology; as a 
                                                 
310 X. C. Zhang, supra note 252, pp.289. 
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strategy for corporate restructuring, they also play an important role in optimizing 
resource and maximizing shareholders’ investment return in China.311  
However, the aggressive penetration of foreign acquirers into Chinese market causing 
undesirable changes in ownership structure has also put the government on alert. Foreign 
companies already dominate, among others, the markets of computers, cables, sedan cars, 
rubber, switchboards, beer, paper, elevators, pharmaceuticals, and detergent.312Worries 
about not only the foreign monopolies but also the growth of domestic industries, 
national economic safety and even the leading position of public ownership are therefore 
mounting. Such fear and hostility are further fueled by certain foreign investors’ taking 
advantage of the loopholes in the legislation and the inexperience of domestic enterprises 
as well as their relatively weak bargain positions to make unfair deals against Chinese 
parties.313  
As a result, in the struggle between above benefits and costs, China’s attitude towards 
cross-border M&As is confusing, leading to an implausible conclusion that these 
transactions are encouraged in China within the acceptable scope. This seems to be 
pointless since what constitute the “acceptability” remains substantially unanswered.  
In practice, whether a cross-border M&A will be permitted is largely dependent on the 
judgment of the approval authority as to whether the transaction in question conforms to 
the requirements to develop economy in China, and meanwhile does not place the public 
interest in jeopardy. Such decisions can be highly subjective, since no standards for 
                                                 
311 Shi Jiansan, Discussions on Cross-border M&As, Lixin Accounting Publishing House, 1999, pp. 239-
240. 
312Lu JiongXing, Studies of China's Foreign Investment Law, 2001, pp.167 
313 The widely reported “China Strategic Phenomenon” is the case in point. For detailed introduction and 
further discussion, please refer to Hu Shuli, China Strategic Phenomenon: Analysis and Consideration 
Concerning Introduction of Foreign Capital for Domestic Reform, The Reform, March 1994, pp.74-84. 
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making them, if any, have been published. In short, such ambivalent attitude has always 
been haunting the government’s hope to introduce consistent and definitive regulations 
and further liberalize the approval process.  
The fact that the legal framework governing cross-border M&As is consisted of a large 
number of “provisional” or “tentative” rules and regulations has indicated the 
government’s intention to modify them whenever it deems appropriate. This can be 
further illustrated by certain actions taken by the governmental authorities, which have 
resulted in unpredictable changes in the regulatory environment. In August 1995, 
Japanese firms Isuzu Co and Itocho Corp acquired an existing 40.02M legal person 
shares of minibus maker Beijing Light Bus Co. Ltd by taking advantage of certain 
regulatory loopholes, resulting in their holding a combined 25 percent stake in the 
Chinese company. Soon after this transaction, the CSRC as the responsible government 
authority issued a circular to suspend such foreign acquisition of state or legal person 
shares on the ground that without sufficient legal protection, state assets might be washed 
away through such transactions. This famous “95’ Ban” was not lifted until the issuance 
of the Circular 2002, which represented the re-opening of market for foreign acquisitions 
of domestic listed companies.  
The onerous approval process for cross-border M&As has also reflected the 
government’s wish to keep the development of these transactions under its control so that 
they would not deviate from the “acceptable” scope. For instance, a foreign acquisition of 
a state-owned equity must be subject to the following approvals in addition to the 
necessary corporate authorization and approvals: 
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• The SASAC Approval – if the acquisition involves state-owned equity in any 
listed company or company the shareholding of which is directly held by the 
SASAC, such transaction should be approved by the SASAC; otherwise, the 
relevant local branch of SASAC is required to approve the acquisition. 
• The MOFCOM Approval – a proposed acquisition shall be submitted for 
MOFCOM’s review for its compliance with the Catalogue 2002, which is an 
upfront condition for almost any transactions; the establishment of a foreign-
invested enterprise as a result of the acquisition is also required approval from the 
MOFCOM, regardless of whether the foreign investor’s share in such enterprise 
will exceed 25 percent or not; in addition, foreign investors are required to file an 
anti-trust report with the MOFCOM and the SAIC when they fall within the scope 
for such fillings.314 
• CSRC Scrutiny -- in the case of acquiring state-owned equity in listed company. 
• SAFE Approval – in the case where the transaction is carried out through equity 
swaps.  
• Approvals from authorities in charge of the industry in which the transaction is 
carried out – in the case where license is required; among others, if the acquired 
party is a domestic financial institution, an approval from the CBRC is required. 
These approval procedures are, at best, time consuming and potentially burdensome. 
Transactions subject to such multiple procedures are therefore exposed to additional 
delay and bureaucratic disagreement. It is also no uncommon for the government 
                                                 
314 Although the thresholds for such filing stipulated in the Provisional Rules are quite ambiguous, and the 
MOFCOM does not appear to review such filing, it is always prudent that foreign investor file a report as 
required so as avoiding any uncertainty.  
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agencies to withhold, condition or delay the approvals in order to help Chinese 
enterprises to obtain the favorable negotiation position in the transactions.  
 
In summary, it is crucial to realize that the government’s ambivalent attitude is the root 
cause of various regulatory obstacles to the development of cross-border M&As in China. 
The key to an accurate risk assessment before carry out a specific transaction lies therein. 
Although it is barely true to say that the current legal regime has been the conclusive 
reflection of the government’s intention, foreign investors proposing M&As are always 
strongly advised to abide by the requirements specified in various laws so as to avoid as 
much as possible uncertainties and risks.  
 
B. The Regulatory Weaknesses  
 
Thus far, there has been a wide range of rules and regulations constituting a roughly 
workable legal regime regulating cross-border M&A activities in China. However, this 
legal framework has long since attracted a lot of criticism and complaints for the 
existence of various legal conundrums. Any attempt to remove the regulatory obstacles 
that may hinder the development of cross-border M&As in China should be made with 
serious attention to the existing regulatory weakness. 
As stated above, a cross-border M&A in China is potentially subject to a number of 
approval requirements. In other wards, quite a few governmental authorities share their 
approval jurisdiction over these transactions. As each of them has the authority to issue 
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guidelines concerning the procedures and requirements for its own approval process, 
there is a strong likelihood of conflicts among these rules.  
For example, the Circular 2002 provides that after partial transfer of ownership of state-
owned shares or legal person shares in listed companies to foreign investors, the 
companies concerned remains Chinese-owned enterprises even if the proportion of 
foreign-owned shares in these companies have exceeded 25 percent of the registered 
capital, and their legal status remains unchanged.315 In order words, these companies may 
not be entitled to the preferential treatments for FIEs after the transactions. As a result, 
the following transfer of ownership of state-owned or legal person shares in these 
companies shall not be subject to the approval of the MOFTEC (now the MOFCOM) 
because they are still domestic companies.  
However, the Circular 2002 was jointly issued by the CSRC, the MOF and the SETC on 
November 1 2002 without consent of the MOFTEC. On December 30 of the same year, 
the MOFTEC, the SAT, the SAIC and the SAFE jointly issued the Notice on Issues 
Related to Improving the Administration of FIEs in Terms of  the Approval, Registration, 
Foreign Exchange and Taxation Control (the Improving Notice)316, which provides that 
the acquisition by foreign investors of shares in Chinese domestic enterprises of any 
types and in any forms of ownership shall be subject to approval under the procedure for 
approving projects of FIEs, and the enterprises concerned shall be converted into FIEs 
with the approval of competent authorities.317  
Obviously, with respect to the nature of the enterprises after their shares are acquired by 
foreign investors, these two notices have conflicting provisions. Since no clarification has 
                                                 
315 Article 9 of the Circular 2002 
316 WaiJingMaoFaFa [2002] No. 575 
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been made, it remains unclear which of these two notices will be prevailing in their 
application.  
In practice, foreign investors have been frequently confused by these conflicting rules. 
Additional time and effort are therefore required in order to seek clarification, leading to 
the increase in the transaction costs. The elimination of these conflicts is therefore 
imperative for increasing the conduciveness of China’s legal environment for cross-
border M&As.  
Some other legal pitfalls have also been exposed by several cross-border M&A cases. An 
analysis of the Nimrod and Isuzu  cases suggests that there are unclear regulatory 
boundaries among PRC regulatory bodies in situations involving the transfer of state-
owned or legal person shares to foreign investors.318 And a comparison among the Isuzu, 
Kodak and Ford 319cases indicates that there is a lack of standardization and uniform 
practice in China’s legal framework. In addition, X.C. Zhang (2000) found that the 
existence of legal vacuum in many areas in China is an important reason for the 
government’s deep involvement in arranging most of foreign M&A transactions; detailed 
rules governing M&As on the securities market, as well as anti-trust law, property right 
law etc. are urgently needed.  
                                                                                                                                                 
317 Article 5 of the Improving Notice 
318  In 1994, the Nimrod Group of companies, a U.S registered private investment and industrial 
management firm acquired 25.4% of Chinese state-owned shares in Sichuan Guanghua Chemical Fibre for 
RMB 73.5M. The transaction was approved by the SAMB. Some six months later, the CSRC penalized the 
company on the ground that the transaction violated the securities rules to protect state shares by 
suspending the trading of Guanghua’s shares on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The suspension was lifted 
after the CSRC found that it had no firm grounds in impugn the acquisition. 
319  In September 1995, Ford Motor Co purchased a 20% stake in Jiangxi Jiangling Motors Corp by 
acquiring 80% of approximately 25% new issue of “B” shares by Jiangling Corp. The purchase was 
approved by CSRC. A waiver was obtained from the relevant authorities to allow Ford to acquire more 
than 15% of the new issue.  
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Most of these regulatory weaknesses can be attributed to the government’s inexperience 
in dealing with cross-border M&As, while some others have their root in the overall 
backwardness of the whole legal system. The former can be overcome as the Chinese 
government becomes experienced over time, and the latter shall be addressed along with 
the sweeping reforms of China’s legal system.  
 
C. Suggestions and Conclusion 
 
a. Restructuring the Basic Framework 
New developments in the China’s legal environment for cross-border M&As are already 
underway, which have kept pace with the progression of China’s reform towards market 
economy. Although in the foreseeable future the Chinese government is very likely to 
retain many unique “Chinese features” in formulating, applying and enforcing the laws 
for the regulation of these transactions, it has been continually indicated that the 
lawmakers in China are committed to learning from international experiences and 
upgrading the legal system to international standards. Based on the preceding 
comparative studies of international practices, the following are some suggestions for 
further improvements of China’s legal framework governing cross-border M&As.  
 
The fundamental question is whether cross-border M&As should be regulated separately 
from purely domestic M&As. It has been a growing trend in most developed countries 
such as the UK and the US that all types of M&A transactions are treated primarily as 
private transactions and not regulated differently because of the nationality of transacting 
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parties. Nevertheless, in China, a developing economy where national industries are still 
in their infancy and domestic enterprises generally lack international competitiveness, 
there is no economic basis for such pattern of regulation. Accordingly, it is far preferable 
for the Chinese government to place its regulatory emphasis on the FDI-related aspects of 
cross-border M&As. This means that foreign investment legislation, including industry 
policies, should play a major role in regulating these transactions in China.  
 
So far, the main body of legislation for foreign investments consists of three FIE laws, 
complemented by a range of ministerial regulations, most of which are designed for 
greenfield investments, while cross-border M&As are subject to a separate Provisional 
Rules which include provisions for both FDI approvals and merger control. In other 
words, the majority of China’s FDI legislation is not playing an effective role in 
regulating cross-border M&As to serve various economic goals that that government has 
expected to achieve through foreign investments. Therefore, it is necessary in the first 
place for the Chinese government to enact a comprehensive and uniform foreign 
investment law covering greenfield investments, cross-border M&As and other forms of 
FDI, to replace the three FIE laws and other fragmentary legislation. This new legislation 
should focus on issues such as the examination and approval procedures for various 
forms of FDI, market access and industrial guidance for foreign investors, the treatments, 
incentives and protections, the settlement of disputes, etc. Other issues such as the 
formation and termination of an FIE which are currently governed by FIE laws should be 
incorporated into the Company Law or Partnership Law.  
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Additional attention must be paid to transactions where state-owned enterprises are 
targets, which have been strictly regulated by the Chinese government. Experience from 
some developing countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile, which have been 
successful in their privatization programs shows that it is more advisable for host 
countries to impose less restrictions and provide more incentives so as to induce foreign 
acquirers to behave favorably to host economies. It is therefore expected that many 
existing fragmentary restrictions which have discouraged foreign investors from entering 
the public sectors will be eliminated, and more incentives regarding the technology 
transfer, employment assurance, sequential investments, etc. will be provided 
systematically under the above-mentioned new foreign investment law.  
 
Upon the restructuring of FDI regime, which lies at the heart of the legal framework 
governing cross-border M&As in China, it is a matter of course to make adjustments to 
other relevant laws and regulations. It is equally important to note at this point that to 
treat cross-border M&As mainly as a mode of foreign investment should not justify 
subjecting these transactions to a totally different legal system from those governing 
domestic transactions, which may easily result in contravention of the national treatment 
principles. Accordingly, the Provisional Rules, which are applied exclusively to foreign 
investors entering through M&As, should play no more than a transitional role, and must 
be abolished when appropriate. The merger control provisions thereof are expected to be 
replaced by a more systematic anti-monopoly law, which applies uniformly to both 
domestic and cross-border M&As. Besides, based on the experience of countries with 
mature competition laws, it is also expected that under the new merger control regime, a 
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specialized anti-monopoly body will be created with authority over all transactions that 
may affect market concentration, including those without foreign investment. 
 
In summary, China’s legal regime governing cross-border M&As can be basically 
structured as such: 
i). Foreign investment law governing the entry of foreign acquirers, including both 
restrictions and incentives that are aimed to optimize the effects of cross-border M&As 
and attract more foreign investment;  
ii). Merger control under a comprehensive anti-monopoly law which applies all M&A 
transactions regardless of the origin of participating parties; 
iii). Other legislation concerning the administration and supervision of foreign invested 
enterprises such as foreign exchange control, taxation, employment, etc.; and 
iv). Other legislation governing the process of transactions, including the company law, 
securities law, contract law, etc. which also apply equally to both domestic and cross-
border M&As.  
Compared to the existing legal regime, the most distinctive feature of such a framework 
is that while the general regulations of cross-border M&As are merged into the FDI 
regime and other regulatory systems, there can still be provisions specific to these 
transactions. Firstly, there is a uniform entry regulation consisting of FDI screening 
mechanism and industry policies, which may generally preclude the undesirable foreign 
investments including those in the form of cross-border M&As; when necessary, there 
can be additional conditions attached to the examination and approval of cross-border 
M&As if the transaction is related to sensitive or strategic industries or involves a 
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Chinese SOE. Secondly, although all forms of FDI may subject to, or eligible for, certain 
restrictions or incentives, there can be separate provisions aiming specifically to eliminate 
negative effects of cross-border M&As or to induce foreign acquirers to behave in a way 
that those adverse effects can be offset. Lastly, under a merger control regime where 
domestic and cross-border M&As are regulated equally, there still can be provisions 
specifying factors to be considered when cross-border M&As are reviewed. This may 
provide legislative backing for the Chinese government to approve the transactions where 
the economic benefits involved therein outweigh their competition costs. 
 
b. Conclusion 
The fact that China, as the largest recipient of FDI, has such a low rate of cross-border 
M&As makes it necessary to study and find the reasons for the underdevelopment of 
these transactions. At the stage of an emerging market and transitional economy, cross-
border M&As may not be the best way for China to absorb and utilize FDI to 
development its economy. However, as cross-border M&As dominating the global flow 
of FDI has been an irreversible trend, it is in China’s interest to create a conducive legal 
and business environment for cross-border M&As. The WTO accession has provided an 
opportunity for China to accelerate its reform in economic, political and legal areas. As 
such, it can be expected that the M&A regulatory regime will experience some 
fundamental reform in the upcoming years and eventually be transformed into a rule-
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Circular of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the State Economy and Trade 
Commission (SETC) on Issues Related to Transferring State-owned 
Shares and Institutional Shares of Listed Corporations to 
Foreign Investors 
 
ZhengJianFa [2002] No.83 
November 1, 2002 
 
In order to introduce advanced management experience, technologies and capital funds from 
overseas, accelerate the pace of economic restructuring, improve the structure of corporate 
governance of listed corporations, enhance international competitiveness, protect lawful rights 
and interests of investors, and promote the sound development of the securities market, with the 
approval of the State Council, a circular on issues related to transferring state-owned shares and 
institutional shares of listed corporations to foreign investors is given hereunder: 
 
1. Transferring state-owned shares and institutional shares of listed corporations to foreign 
investors shall follow the principles listed below: 
(1) Abide by state laws and regulations; safeguard national economic safety and social public 
interests, prevent state assets from erosion, and maintain social stability; 
(2) Accord with requirements for strategic adjustment of the national economic distribution and 
the state's industrial policies, and promote the optimum distribution of state-owned capital and 
fair competition; 
(3) Adhere to the principles of openness, justness and impartiality, and protect the lawful rights 
and interests of shareholders, especially those of small and medium shareholders; 
(4) Attract medium- and-long-term investments, prevent short-term speculation, and maintain the 
order of the securities market. 
 
2. Transferring state-owned shares and institutional shares of listed corporations to foreign 
investors shall accord with requirements of the Industrial Guide for Foreign Investment. State-
owned shares and institutional shares of the industries to which foreign investment is forbidden 
shall not be transferred to foreign investors; for those of the industries which must be controlled 
or relatively controlled by Chinese shareholders, Chinese shareholders shall remain in a 
controlling or relatively controlling position after the transfer. 
 
3. A foreign investor to whom state-owned shares and institutional shares of a listed corporation 
are to be transferred shall possess a strong capacity in operation and management and adequate 
financial strength, a good financial status and reputation, and the ability to improve the structure 
of governance of the listed corporation and to promote its sustainable development. The method 
of open competitive bidding shall be adopted in principle in transferring shares held by the state 
and legal persons in listed corporations to foreign investors. 
 
4. Transfer of state-owned shares and institutional shares of listed corporations to foreign 
investors involving industrial policy and enterprise reorganization shall be checked and ratified 
by the SETC. That involving the administration of state-owned equities shall be checked and 
ratified by the MOF. Important matters shall be reported to the State Council for approval. 
Transferring state-owned shares and institutional shares to foreign investors shall comply with 
relevant provisions of the CSRC on acquisition of listed corporations and information disclosure. 
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Any region or institution shall not approve transfer of state-owned shares and institutional shares 
of listed companies to foreign investors without proper authorization. 
 
5. Parties in a transfer shall, in accordance with law, present approval documents of the SETC 
and the MOF for the transfer and payment certificate of the foreign investor to the securities 
registration and settlement institution for procedure of equity transfer registration and to the 
administration for industry and commerce for procedure of shareholder alteration registration. 
Before the transfer proceeds are paid up, the securities registration and settlement institution and 
the administration for industry and commerce shall not handle the procedure of transfer and 
alteration registration. 
 
6. Parties in a transfer of state-owned shares and institutional shares of a listed corporation to a 
foreign investor shall go to the SAFE office for foreign exchange registration of foreign 
investment before the equity transfer. In case re-transfer of foreign equity is involved, parties in 
the re-transfer shall go to the SAFE office for alteration of the foreign exchange registration of 
foreign capital before the equity transfer. 
 
7. Foreign investors shall pay the transfer price in freely convertible currencies. Foreign investors 
that have already invested in the Chinese territory may, after checked and ratified by SAFE 
offices, pay with RMB profits obtained from their investment. Foreign investors may re-transfer 
their acquired shares 12 months after the transfer price is paid up. 
 
8. The transferors shall, within prescribed time limits, sell the foreign exchange proceeds obtained 
from transferring state-owned shares and institutional shares with the approval of the SFAE office 
that is to be asked for by presenting the approval documents for the transfers. After acquiring the 
state-owned shares and institutional shares of listed corporations, foreign investors may, after 
verification by SAFE offices, purchase foreign exchange for overseas remittance with the net 
profits distributed by the listed corporations, proceeds obtained from equity re-transfer, and funds 
obtained from the termination and liquidation of the listed corporations. 
 
9. After transferring state-owned shares and institutional shares to foreign investors, the listed 
corporations shall still stick to original relevant policies, and shall not enjoy the treatment granted 
to foreign investment enterprises. Proceeds from the transfer of state-owned shares shall be 
treated and used according to relevant regulations of the state. 
 
10. Provisions of this circular apply to transfer of state-owned shares and institutional shares of 
listed corporations to investors in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Macao 
















Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, the State Administration of 
Taxation, the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce and the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange 
[2003] No.3 
The Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors (hereinafter referred to as the "Provisions"), reviewed and adopted at the First Ministry 
Meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the People's Republic of 
China on January 2, 2003, is hereby published and will come into force on April 12, 2003. 
Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation: Shi Guangsheng 
Director General of the State Administration of Taxation: Jin Renqing 
Director General of State Administration for Industry and Commerce: Wang Zhongfu 
Director General of State Administration of Foreign Exchange: Guo Shuqing 
March 7, 2003 
 
Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic 
Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
 
Article 1 The Provisions are formulated in accordance with the laws and administrative 
regulations governing foreign investment enterprises and other relevant laws and administrative 
regulations to promote and regulate foreign investors' investment in China introduce advanced 
technologies and management experience from abroad, improve the utilization of foreign 
investment, rationalize the allocation of resources, ensure employment and safeguard fair 
competition and national economic security. 
 
Article 2 For the purpose of the Provisions, mergers and acquisitions of a domestic enterprise by 
foreign investors shall mean that foreign investors, by agreement, purchase equity interest from 
shareholders of domestic enterprise with no foreign investment (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Domestic Company") or subscribe to the increase in the registered capital of the Domestic 
Company with the result that such Domestic Company changes into a foreign investment 
enterprise (hereinafter referred to as "Equity Merger and Acquisition"); or the foreign investors 
establish a foreign investment enterprise and then, through such enterprise, purchase the assets of 
a domestic enterprise by agreement and operate such assets, or the foreign investors purchase the 
assets of a domestic enterprise by agreement and use such assets as investment to establish a 
foreign investment enterprise to operate such assets (hereinafter referred to as "Asset Merger and 
Acquisition"). 
 
Article 3 In mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises, foreign investors shall comply with 
the laws, administrative regulations and departmental rules and adhere to the principles of 
fairness, reasonableness, compensation for equal value, and honesty and good faith, and shall not 
create excessive concentration, eliminate or hinder competition, disturb the social economic order 
or harm the societal public interests. 
 
Article 4 In mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises, foreign investors shall comply with 
the requirements regarding the investors' qualifications and industrial policy as set forth in the 




In the case of industries where no wholly foreign ownership is allowed under the Guidance 
Catalog of Foreign Investment Industries, any merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise 
engaging in the industry shall not lead to the foreign investors' wholly ownership of all equity 
interest in the acquired enterprise. In the case of industries which require the Chinese party to be 
controlling or relatively controlling, the Chinese party shall remain to be in the controlling or 
relatively controlling position in the acquired enterprise after any merger or acquisition of the 
domestic enterprise engaging in such industries. In the case of industries where operation by 
foreign investors is prohibited, no foreign investors may merge with or acquire any enterprise 
engaging in such industries. 
 
Article 5 Any merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise by foreign investors to set up a 
foreign investment enterprise shall be subject to the approval of the examination and approval 
authorities in accordance with the Provisions, and procedures for change registration or 
establishment registration shall be handled with the registration authorities. The contribution 
made by the foreign investors to the registered capital of the foreign investment enterprise 
established after the merger or acquisition shall generally not be less than 25% of the registered 
capital. Except as provided otherwise by the laws or administrative regulations, if the contribution 
made by foreign investors is less than 25% of the registered capital, the foreign investment 
enterprise shall be subject to the examination, approval and registration in accordance with the 
currently applicable examination and registration procedures for the establishment of a foreign 
investment enterprise. When issuing the foreign investment enterprise approval certificates, the 
examination and approval authority shall add a notation "foreign investment proportion less than 
25%". When issuing the foreign investment enterprise business licenses, the registration authority 
shall add the notation "foreign investment proportion less than 25%". 
 
Article 6 For the purpose of the Provisions, the examination and approval authority shall be the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of the PRC (hereinafter referred to as 
"MOFTEC") or the administrative authority in charge of foreign trade and economic cooperation 
at the provincial level (hereinafter referred to as the "Provincial Examination and Approval 
Authority"), and the registration authority shall be the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce of the PRC (hereinafter referred to as "SAIC") or its authorized local industrial and 
commercial bureaus. 
 
If the foreign investment enterprise established after the merger or acquisition falls into a specific 
type or a specific industry subject to MOFTEC approval in accordance with the laws, 
administrative regulations and departmental rules, the provincial examination and approval 
authority shall submit the application documents to MOFTEC for examination and approval and 
MOFTEC shall decide to approve or disapprove the application in accordance with the law. 
 
Article 7 In the case of Equity Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the foreign 
investment enterprise established thereafter shall succeed to the creditor's rights and liabilities of 
the merged or acquired Domestic Company. 
 
In the case of Asset Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the domestic enterprise selling 
assets shall assume all its original creditor's rights and liabilities. 
 
The Foreign investors, merged or acquired domestic enterprises, creditors and other parties may 
reach separate agreements regarding the disposition of the creditor's rights and liabilities of the 
merged or acquired domestic enterprises, provided that the agreement shall not result in any 
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damage to any third party interest or societal public interest. Any agreement on the disposition of 
the creditor's rights and liabilities shall be submitted to the examination and approval authority. 
 
The domestic enterprise selling assets shall, within 10 days of the adoption of the resolution to 
sell its assets, gives notice to its creditors and makes a public announcement on a newspaper at 
the provincial level or above with national circulation. A creditor of the domestic enterprise may, 
within 10 days from the date of receipt of such notice or publication of such public announcement, 
requests the domestic enterprise selling assets to provide the corresponding security. 
 
Article 8 The parties to a merger or acquisition shall determine the transaction price on the basis 
of the result of the evaluation of the equity interest to be transferred or of the assets to be sold 
conducted by the asset evaluation institution. The parties to a merger or acquisition may agree on 
an asset evaluation institution established within the territory of China in accordance with the law. 
Asset evaluation shall be conducted by adopting internationally recognized evaluation methods. 
 
Where the merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise leads to any change in the equity 
interest formed by the investment of state-owned assets or resulting in any transfer of the property 
right in state-owned assets, evaluation shall be conducted and transaction price shall be 
determined in accordance with the relevant regulations governing the administration of state-
owned assets. 
 
It is prohibited to transfer equity interest or sell assets at a price obviously lower than the 
evaluation result for the purpose of transferring the capital out of China in a disguised way. 
 
Article 9 In case of a merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise by foreign investors to set up 
a foreign investment enterprise, the foreign investors shall, within 3 months from the date of 
issuance of the foreign investment enterprise business license, pay the full consideration to the 
shareholder(s) transferring equity interest or to the domestic enterprise selling assets. If the above 
time limit needs to be extended under special circumstances, the foreign investors shall, upon the 
approval by the examination and approval authority, pay 60% or more of the total consideration 
within 6 months and full considerations within 1 year from the date of issuance of the foreign 
investment enterprise business license, and shall distribute the proceeds in proportion to the actual 
capital contribution. 
 
Where the foreign investors conduct Equity Merger and Acquisition and the foreign investment 
enterprise established after such mergers and acquisitions increases its registered capital, the 
investors shall set forth a time schedule for capital contribution in the contract and the articles of 
association of the foreign investment enterprise. If it is set forth that the capital contribution shall 
be paid up in one lump sum, the investors shall make the contribution within 6 months from the 
date of issuance of the foreign investment enterprise business license ; or if it is set forth that the 
capital contribution shall be paid by installments, the investors' first installment shall not be less 
than 15% of their respective capital subscription and shall be made within 3 months from the date 
of issuance of the foreign investment enterprise business license . 
 
In case of an Asset Mergers and Acquisition by foreign investors, the investors shall set forth the 
time schedule for capital contribution in the contract and the articles of association of the foreign 
investment enterprise to be established. If the investors intend to establish a foreign investment 
enterprise and purchase and operate such assets of a domestic enterprise through such enterprise, 
the investors shall pay the part of its capital contribution equal to the price of such assets within 
the time schedule specified for consideration payment in Paragraph 1 of this Article and the 
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remaining part of its capital contribution shall be paid within the time schedule agreed upon in 
accordance with Paragraph 2 of this Article. 
 
Where foreign investors establish a foreign investment enterprise through merger or acquisition 
of a domestic enterprise, and the proportion of the foreign investors' capital contribution is less 
than 25% of the registered capital, if the investors pay their capital contribution in cash, the full 
contribution shall be made within 3 months from the date of issuance of the foreign investment 
enterprise business license; if the investors pay their capital contribution in kind or in industrial 
property rights and so on, full contribution shall be made within 6 months from the date of 
issuance of the foreign investment enterprise business license. 
 
The instruments of payment of any consideration shall be in compliance with the provisions of 
the relevant state laws and administrative regulations. Where a foreign investor intends to use any 
stock it has the right to dispose of or any RMB assets it legitimately possesses as the instrument 
of payment, such payment shall be subject to the approval of the foreign exchange administration 
authority. 
 
Article 10 Where a foreign investor acquires any equity interest held by a shareholder of a 
Domestic Company by agreement, after the Domestic Company has changed into and established 
as a foreign investment enterprise, the registered capital of such foreign investment enterprise 
shall be the registered capital of the original Domestic Company and the proportion of the foreign 
investor's capital contribution shall be the proportion of the equity interest acquired by the foreign 
investor in the original registered capital. Where a Domestic Company subject to Equity Merger 
and Acquisition an Equity Merger and Acquisition also increases its capital at the same time, the 
registered capital of the foreign investment enterprise established upon the Merger and 
Acquisition shall be the sum of the registered capital of the original Domestic Company and the 
increased capital. The foreign investors and the other original investors of the acquired Domestic 
Company shall determine the proportion of their capital contribution respectively to the registered 
capital of the foreign investment enterprise based on the evaluation of the Domestic Company's 
assets. 
 
Where foreign investors subscribe to any increased capital of a Domestic Company, after the 
Domestic Company has changed into and established as a foreign investment enterprise, the 
registered capital of such foreign investment enterprise shall be the sum of the registered capital 
of the original Domestic Company and the increased capital. The foreign investors and the other 
original shareholders of the acquired Domestic Company shall determine the proportion of their 
capital contribution respectively to the registered capital of the foreign investment enterprise 
based upon the evaluation of the Domestic Company's assets. 
 
If a natural person shareholder of the Domestic Company subject to Equity Merger and 
Acquisition has been a shareholder of such Domestic Company for more than 1 year, the person 
may, upon approval, continue to be a Chinese party investor of the foreign investment enterprise 
established after the change. 
 
Article 11 In case of an Equity Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the ceiling for the 
total amount of investment of the foreign investment enterprise established upon the Merger and 
Acquisition shall be determined according to the following proportions: 
(1) no more than ten sevenths (10/7) of the registered capital of the foreign investment enterprise, 
if the registered capital is less than US$ 2.1 million; 
(2) no more than twice the registered capital, if the registered capital is between US$ 2.1million 
and US$ 5 million; 
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(3) no more than two and a half times the registered capital, if the registered capital is more than 
US$ 5 million but less than or equal to US$ 12 million; or 
(4) no more than three times the registered capital, if the registered capital is more than US$ 12 
million. 
 
Article 12 In case of an Equity Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the investors shall 
submit the following documents to the examination and approval authority with corresponding 
jurisdiction of approval based on the total amount of investment of the foreign investment 
enterprise established upon the Merger and Acquisition: 
(1) the resolution adopted by the shareholders of the domestic limited liability company subject to 
the Merger and Acquisition unanimously approving the Equity Merger and Acquisition by the 
foreign investors, or the resolution adopted by the shareholders' meeting of the domestic company 
limited by shares subject to the Merger and Acquisition approving the Equity Merger and 
Acquisition by the foreign investors; 
(2) the application of the Domestic Company subject to the Merger and Acquisition to be 
changed in to and established as a foreign investment enterprise in accordance with the law; 
(3) the contract and the articles of association of the foreign investment enterprise established 
upon the Merger and Acquisition; 
(4) the agreement for the purchase of the shareholders' equity interest or subscription for the 
increased capital of the Domestic Company by the foreign investors 
(5) the audited financial report for the most recent fiscal year of the Domestic Company subject to 
the Merger and Acquisition; 
(6) identification documents or incorporation certification and creditworthiness certification of 
the foreign investors; 
(7) explanation of the situation regarding the enterprises the Domestic Company subject to the 
Merger and Acquisition has invested in; 
(8) the business licenses (duplicates) of the Domestic Company subject to the Merger and 
Acquisition and enterprises it has invested in; 
(9) the plan for the re-settlement of the employees of the Domestic Company subject to the 
Merger and Acquisition; and 
(10) documents required to be submitted under Articles 7 and 19 of the Provisions. 
 
Where any permission given by any other government authority is required in connection with the 
business scope or business scale, or obtaining of any land use right by the foreign investment 
enterprise to be established upon the Merger and Acquisition, the relevant documents of such 
permission shall be submitted simultaneously. 
 
The business scope of any company the Domestic Company subject to the Merger and 
Acquisition originally invested in shall comply with the requirements of relevant foreign 
investment industrial policies. Adjustments shall be made in case of noncompliance. 
 
Article 13 The equity interest purchase agreement or the agreement to increase the capital of the 
Domestic Company as set forth in Article 12 of these Provisions shall be governed by the 
Chinese law and shall contain the following main contents: 
(1) information regarding each of the parties to the agreement, including its full name, address, 
and the name, position and citizenship of its legal representative, etc.; 
(2) proportions and the price of the equity interest to be acquired or the increased capital to be 
subscribed; 
(3) term and methods of performance of the agreement; 
(4) rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement; 
(5) liabilities for breach of the agreement and settlement of dispute; and 
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(6) the date and the place of the execution of the agreement. 
 
Article 14 In the case of an Asset Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the total amount 
of investment of the foreign investment enterprise established upon the Merger and Acquisition 
shall be determined on the basis of the transaction price of such assets and the actual scale of 
production and operation. The proportion between the registered capital and the total amount of 
investment of the foreign investment enterprise to be established shall be consistent with the 
relevant regulations. 
 
Article 15 In the case of an Asset Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the investors shall 
submit the following documents to the examination and approval authority with the 
corresponding jurisdiction of approval, based on the total amount of investment, enterprise type, 
and industry of the foreign investment enterprise to be established and in accordance with the 
laws, administrative regulations and departmental rules governing the establishment of foreign 
investment enterprises: 
(1) the resolution by the property rights holders or the agency of authority of the domestic 
enterprise approving the sale of such assets; 
(2) the application for the establishment of the foreign investment enterprise; 
(3) the contract and the articles of association of the foreign investment enterprise to be 
established; 
(4) the asset purchase agreement executed between the foreign investment enterprise to be 
established and the domestic enterprise or the asset purchase agreement executed between the 
foreign investors and the domestic enterprise; 
(5) the articles of association and the business license (duplicates) of the domestic enterprise 
subject to the Merger and Acquisition; 
(6) certification proving that the domestic enterprise subject to the Merger and Acquisition has 
given notice and the public announcement to its creditors; 
(7) identification documents or incorporation certification and creditworthiness certification of 
the foreign investors; 
(8) the plan for the re-settlement of employees of the domestic enterprise subject to the Merger 
and Acquisition; and 
(9) documents required to be submitted under Articles 7 and 19 of the Provisions. 
 
Where any permission given by any other government authority is required in connection with the 
purchase and operation of the assets of the domestic enterprise as specified in the above 
paragraph, the relevant documents of such permission shall be submitted simultaneously. 
 
If foreign investors purchase any assets by agreement with the domestic enterprise and invest 
such assets to set up a foreign investment enterprise, such assets shall not be used for operation 
purposes until and unless the foreign investment enterprise has been duly established. 
 
Article 16 The asset purchase agreement set forth in Article 15 shall be governed by the Chinese 
law and shall contain the following main contents: 
(1) information regarding each of the parties to the agreement, including its name and address, 
and the name, position and citizenship of its legal representative, etc.; 
(2) list and the price of the assets to be purchased; 
(3) term and methods of performance of the agreement; 
(4) rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement; 
(5) liabilities for breach of the agreement and settlement of dispute; and 
(6) the date and the place of the execution of the agreement. 
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Article 17 Except as otherwise provided for in Article 20, where foreign investors establish a 
foreign investment enterprise through merger and acquisition of a domestic enterprise,, the 
examination and approval authority shall, within 30 days upon its receipt of all the documents 
required to be submitted, decide according to law whether to approve the application for the 
establishment. Upon such approval, the examination and approval authority shall issue the foreign 
investment enterprise approval certificate. 
 
If the examination and approval authority decides to approve foreign investors' acquisition of 
equity interest of a Domestic Company from its shareholders, the examination and approval 
authority shall concurrently copy the relevant approval documents to the local foreign exchange 
administration authority of the transferor and of the Domestic Company respectively. The foreign 
exchange administration authority in the locality of the transferor shall complete the foreign 
capital foreign exchange registration procedures for the transferor's receipt of foreign exchange 
and shall issue the foreign capital foreign exchange registration certificate certifying the payment 
of the consideration for the above acquisition by the foreign investors. 
 
Article 18 In the case of an Asset Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the investors shall, 
within 30 days of its receipt of the foreign investment enterprise approval certificate for, apply to 
the registration authority for the establishment registration and obtain the foreign investment 
enterprise business license. 
 
In the case of an Equity Merger and Acquisition by foreign investors, the acquired Domestic 
Company shall apply to its original registration and administration authority for the change of 
registration and obtain the foreign investment enterprise business license in accordance with the 
Provisions. If the original registration and administration authority has no jurisdiction of 
registration and administration, it shall, within 10 days upon its receipt of the application 
documents, deliver such documents to the registration and administration authority with such 
jurisdiction, accompanied by the registration files of the Domestic Company. The acquired 
Domestic Company shall submit and be responsible for the authenticity and effectiveness of the 
following documents at the time of its application for the change of registration: 
(1) the application for the change of registration; 
(2) the resolution adopted by the shareholders' meeting of the acquired Domestic Company in 
accordance with the Company Law of the PRC and its articles of association, approving the 
transfer of equity interest or the increased capital; 
(3) the agreement for the purchase of the shareholders' equity interest or subscription for the 
increased capital of the Domestic Company by the foreign investors 
(4) amended articles of association of the Domestic Company or any amendment to the original 
articles of association and the contract of the foreign investment enterprise to be submitted as 
required by law; 
(5) the foreign investment enterprise approval certificate ; 
(6) identification documents or incorporation certification and creditworthiness certification of 
the foreign investors; 
(7) the amended list of directors, the document specifying the names and addresses of new 
directors and the documents of appointment of new directors; and 
(8) other relevant documents and certificates required by SAIC. 
 
In case of the transfer of state-owned equity interest and in case of foreign investors' subscription 
to any increased capital of a company with state-owned equity interest, the approval documents 
of the authority in charge of economic and trade administration shall also be submitted. 
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Investors shall, within 30 days upon the receipt of the foreign investment enterprise business 
license, handle the necessary registration formalities with authorities for taxation, customs, land 
administration and foreign exchange administration, etc.. 
Article 19 In case of any of the following occurrences in connection with the merger or 
acquisition of a domestic enterprise by foreign investors, the investors shall submit notification to 
MOFTEC and SAIC: 
(1) the revenue of a party to the merger or acquisition in the domestic market for the current year 
exceeds RMB1.5 billion ; 
(2) the foreign investors have merged with or acquired more than 10 domestic enterprises in 
aggregate engaging in the related businesses within one year; 
(3) the market share of a party to the merger or acquisition in the domestic market has reached 
20%; or 
(4) the market share of a party to the merger or acquisition in the domestic market will reach 25% 
as a result of the merger or acquisition. 
 
Even without the above occurrences, MOFTEC or SAIC may still require the foreign investors to 
submit notification upon the request by any competing domestic enterprise, relevant functional 
department or industrial association, if MOFTEC or SAIC finds that the merger or acquisition 
will involve a huge market share, or if there is any other material aspect of the merger or 
acquisition which might severely affect market competition, national economy or people's 
livelihood and national economic security. 
 
The above-mentioned "a party to a merger or acquisition" shall include any affiliated enterprise of 
foreign investors. 
 
Article 20 In case of any of the described in Article 19 in connection with a merger or acquisition 
of a domestic enterprise by foreign investors, and if MOFTEC and SAIC believe that the merger 
or acquisition might lead to over-concentration, impair fair competition or damage consumers' 
interests, MOFTEC and SAIC shall, within 90 days upon its receipt of all the documents required 
to be submitted, jointly or separately after consultation with each other, hold a hearing of the 
relevant departments, organizations, enterprises and other related parties and decide according to 
law whether to approve the application for the merger or acquisition. 
 
Article 21 In case of any of the following occurrences in connection with an offshore merger or 
acquisition, any party to the merger and acquisition shall, prior to its public announcement of the 
plan for the merger or acquisition or together with its application to the regulatory authorities of 
the country where it is located, submit to MOFTEC and SAIC the plan for the merger or 
acquisition. MOFTEC and SAIC shall examine whether the merger or acquisition might cause 
over concentration of the domestic market, impair fair competition in the domestic market or 
damage the domestic consumers' interests, and decide whether to approve the plan: 
(1) the assets owned by a party to the offshore merger and acquisition within China exceeds RMB 
3 billion; 
(2) the sales of a party to the offshore merger or acquisition in the domestic market for the current 
year have exceeded RMB 1..5 billion; 
(3) the aggregate market share in the domestic market by a party to the offshore merger or 
acquisition and its affiliated enterprises has reached 20%; 
(4) the aggregate market share in the domestic market by a party to the offshore merger or 
acquisition and all of its affiliated enterprises in the domestic market will reach 25% as a result of 
the offshore merger or acquisition; or 
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(5) as a result of the offshore merger or acquisition, a party to the offshore merger or acquisition 
will hold, directly or indirectly, equity of more than 15 foreign investment enterprises engaging in 
the related businesses within China. 
 
Article 22 In case of any of the following occurrences in connection with a merger or acquisition, 
a party to the merger or acquisition may apply to MOFTEC and SAIC for an exemption from 
examination: 
(1) the merger or acquisition may improve the conditions for fair competition in the domestic 
market; 
(2) the merger or acquisition will restructure the enterprise running at a loss and ensure 
employment; 
(3) the merger or acquisition will absorb advanced technologies and management professionals 
and enhance the international competitiveness of the domestic enterprise; or 
(4) the merger or acquisition will improve the environment. 
 
Article 23 All documents submitted by investors shall be grouped into categories as required by 
the regulations and accompanied by a table of contents of the documents. All documents required 
to be submitted shall be in Chinese. 
 
Article 24 The Provisions shall apply to all mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises by 
investment companies duly established by foreign investors within China. 
 
Any acquisition of equity interest of PRC foreign investment enterprise by foreign investors shall 
be governed by the currently laws and administrative regulations governing foreign investment 
enterprises and Certain Regulations on Change in Shareholders' Equity Interest of Foreign 
Investment Enterprises. Matters not covered therein shall be governed by the Provisions. 
 
Article 25 Any merger or acquisition by investors in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Macao Special Administrative Region and Taiwan of a domestic enterprise established in any 
other regions of the PRC shall be handled with reference to the Provisions. 
 
Article 26 The Provisions shall come into force on April 12, 2003. 
 
 
